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INTIMATE DISCRIMINATION: THE STATE’S ROLE  
IN THE ACCIDENTS OF SEX AND LOVE 
Elizabeth F. Emens∗ 
This is a challenging moment for the law of discrimination.  The state’s role in 
discrimination has largely shifted from requiring discrimination — through official 
policies such as segregation — to prohibiting discrimination — through federal laws 
covering areas such as employment, housing, education, and public accommodations.  
Yet the problem of discrimination persists, often in forms that are hard to regulate or 
even to recognize.   
At this challenging moment, the intimate domain presents a vital terrain for study in 
two main ways.  First, conceptually, studying the intimate domain permits new insights 
into discrimination and the law’s identity categories, because people are more willing to 
be explicit about identity-based preferences in this domain than in others (such as 
employment).  Second, practically, examining the intimate domain reveals the ways that 
relationships in this sphere affect hierarchies and opportunities in more public domains, 
and the role the state plays in those relationships.   
This Article therefore examines intimate discrimination, focusing on race, sex, and 
disability, and identifies key norms for each category.  For race, the norm is homogamy, 
or pairing with one’s own type; for sex, by contrast, the norm is heterogamy, pairing 
outside one’s type; and for disability, the norm is desexualization, rather than pairing 
with one group or another.  The Article does not assume that intimate discrimination is 
necessarily bad.  On the contrary, examining the nuanced landscape of discrimination in 
this realm is one of the Article’s main purposes.  Ultimately, the Article concludes that, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  I thank the following people for com-
ments on earlier drafts and helpful conversations: Jill Anderson, Susan Appleton, Adrienne Asch, 
Katharine Bartlett, Noa Ben-Asher, Christina Duffy Burnett, Mary Anne Case, Deborah Denno, 
Ariela Dubler, Richard Emens, Cynthia Epstein, Robert Ferguson, Peter Fraenkel, Katherine 
Franke, Phillip Atiba Goff, Alix Keast, Suzanne Goldberg, Victor Goldberg, Scott Hemphill, 
Adam Hickey, Clare Huntington, Olatunde Johnson, Rachel Jones, Sarah Lawsky, Robin Len-
hardt, Daniel Malone, Martha Minow, Eben Moglen, Henry Monaghan, Rachel Moran, Martha 
Nussbaum, Brett Phillips, Robert Pollak, Alex Raskolnikov, Michael Rembis, Russell Robinson, 
Jennifer Rothman, Elizabeth Scott, Reva Siegel, William Simon, Rachel Smith, Richard Squire, 
Michael Ashley Stein, Geoffrey Stone, Lior Strahilevitz, Peter Strauss, Susan Sturm, Cass Sun-
stein, Bela Walker, Dorian Warren, Kenji Yoshino, and participants in the Regulating Family, 
Sex, and Gender Workshop at the University of Chicago Law School, the Work, Family, and Pol-
icy Workshop at Washington University, the Symposium on Unconscious Discrimination Twenty 
Years Later at the University of Connecticut School of Law, the New Frontiers of Family Law 
Conference at the University of Utah, the Critical Legal Conference at Birkbeck College, Univer-
sity of London, the NYC-Area Sexuality and Gender Law Workshop, the New York City Junior 
Faculty Colloquium at Fordham Law School, the Women & Society Conference at Marist College, 
the Society for Disability Studies Conference, and faculty workshops at Columbia Law School 
and Loyola Law School.  Christine Chang, Roberto Concepcion, Leah Godesky, Melissa Hazell, 
Maeve Herbert, Matthew Knox, Jacob Meyer, Meredith Morgan, Bradley Mullins, J. Andrew 
Pratt, Meera Shah, Chava Spivak-Birndorf, Becca von Behren, and Steven Wu provided excel-
lent research assistance, as did the staff of the Arthur W. Diamond Law Library at Columbia Law 
School, especially Carissa Vogel and Beth Williams.   
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at the level of individual interaction, intimate differentiation based on these identity 
traits can be good, bad, or neutral, depending on context.  For this and other reasons, 
legal regulation targeting individual differentiation on these bases would be woefully 
misguided.   
Nonetheless, the state plays important roles in intimate discrimination at a structural 
level.  By creating the infrastructure of society, the state shapes the accidents of who 
meets whom and how.  In addition, the state plays a role in the hierarchy of intimate 
opportunities by shaping social capital and relative advantages.  The state therefore 
should reform its laws and policies to attend to its structural role in intimate 
discrimination.  For sex, the most obvious next step is to cease to restrict marriage 
according to sex.  For disability, the state should help to encourage opportunities for 
intimate affiliation by, among other things, attending to the architecture of intimacy, by 
which I mean the ways that structures of accommodation operate to help or hinder not 
only access, but also closeness.  For race, the state’s goal should not be to encourage race 
mixing, but rather to lift burdens on existing relationships, such as residential 
segregation.  Recognizing how intimate affiliations affect opportunities and status 
hierarchies, both in the intimate sphere and beyond, points us toward new ways to 
intervene in the persistent problem of discrimination.   
INTRODUCTION 
There is a separation, as it were, between the bedroom and the boardroom.  
You don’t want the government or its laws meddling in your private life, 
what you do behind closed doors is your own personal matter, etc.  But, of 
course, this does not mean that there isn’t a relationship between whom I 
desire and whom I hire, or between whom I want my children to desire 
and whom I hire. 
— David Mura1 
 
he problem of combating discrimination faces a difficult juncture.  
Law has largely shifted from permitting or requiring discrimina-
tion (think segregated schools) to prohibiting discrimination (think em-
ployment discrimination law).  At the same time, law has pushed dis-
crimination underground.  Most institutional decisionmakers — public 
and private — no longer say overtly discriminatory things.  Discrimi-
nation is therefore harder to find and to regulate, because it has be-
come less acceptable, legally and socially, to speak its language.  Yet 
some groups in our society, such as people of color and disabled peo-
ple, are still subject to systematic disadvantage.  As many scholars 
have noted, this combination presents a difficult challenge for law and 
policies that address discrimination.   
This challenge requires us to look into less obvious domains to un-
derstand the phenomenon of discrimination and to evaluate the proper 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 David Mura, The Internment of Desire, in UNDER WESTERN EYES: PERSONAL ESSAYS 
FROM ASIAN AMERICA 259, 282 (Garrett Hongo ed., 1995). 
T 
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role of the state in its elimination.  One such domain is the intimate.  
Because we do not police the intimate domain for discrimination, peo-
ple are more explicit here about the distinctions they draw along lines 
of race, disability, and sex.  By looking at our attitudes toward race, 
disability, and sex in the intimate realm, we can therefore learn about 
the condition and contours of our attitudes toward these categories 
more generally.     
Intimate discrimination also has practical significance.  As David 
Mura elegantly portrays in the epigraph, to speak of intimacy and dis-
crimination together is to join two spheres that we tend to, and like to, 
consider distinct.  Yet the intimate realm is central to our lives; fami-
lies and other close relationships structure our communities and our 
selves.  Intimacy is considered by many to be a valuable social good, 
so exclusion from intimacy has welfare consequences.  Moreover, inti-
mate affiliations and norms in turn affect our interactions in other 
domains, such as employment, as Mura suggests.  Marriages involve 
not only private sharing, but also public networking.  The intimate is 
thus a vital area for study as we confront the challenge of understand-
ing and eliminating discrimination. 
Discrimination in intimate relationships can of course occur along 
many axes, from class to geography to religion to age to musicality.  
This project is focused on a particular subset of those categories that 
constitute legally protected classifications when the domain shifts from 
the bedroom to the workplace: disability and race, and, to a lesser ex-
tent, sex and gender.2  
Even if one accepts that people discriminate in their intimate rela-
tionships, one might wonder what this sort of discrimination has to do 
with law.  In a way, our intimate exclusions might be understood sim-
ply as a form of discrimination that the law does not recognize.  Unlike 
prospective employees, prospective lovers cannot sue if you refuse 
them based on race or sex or disability.  We might conclude that there 
is nothing unusual about law’s nonintervention in intimate discrimina-
tion — in this discrimination in contact, rather than in contract, to use 
Glenn Loury’s terms.3  Perhaps intimate discrimination simply in-
volves a private domain with no connection to law. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 2 The Article uses the terms sex and gender to denote biology (maleness and femaleness) and 
culture (masculinity and femininity) respectively, in keeping with most scholarship in this area, 
even though they may not be so separable in practice.  Sex, rather confusingly, also refers to sex-
ual activity; I therefore try to make clear which I mean when.   
 3 Contrasting it with “discrimination in contract,” Loury says that “‘discrimination in contact’ 
refers to the unequal treatment of persons on the basis of race in the associations and relationships 
that are formed among individuals in social life, including the choice of social intimates, 
neighbors, friends, heroes, and villains.  It involves discrimination in the informal, private spheres 
of life.”  GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 95–96 (2002) (footnote 
omitted). 
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Yet law goes further than not permitting suits for intimate dis-
crimination: law sometimes actually requires intimate discrimination.  
In addition to the most obvious historical example — antimiscegena-
tion laws — the law has required intimate discrimination with regard 
to sex and disability.  Moreover, even aside from its express require-
ments, law shapes whom we meet and how.  It determines the acci-
dents of sex and love, because it controls the infrastructure of our lives 
— our neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, public spaces, and more — 
in ways that affect affiliations along the lines of race, disability, and 
sex.  The state also affects rational calculations in the dating market 
through social policies that contribute to social hierarchies and wealth 
distribution. 
Does this mean the state should treat intimate discrimination the 
same way it treats employment discrimination?  The issue will be dis-
cussed in greater depth in the Article, but the short answer is no.  In-
timate discrimination should remain a litigation-free zone.  But this 
does not mean it should be, or could be, a law-free zone.  On the con-
trary, law should take account of its role in intimate discrimination at 
a structural level and work to eliminate burdens and biases that cur-
rently shape who has access to intimate relationships and on what 
terms. 
Studying intimate discrimination thus serves two purposes, one 
conceptual and one regulatory.  Conceptually, this inquiry limns key 
categories for the antidiscrimination project — race, disability, and sex 
— to help us understand better what those categories mean and how 
they operate in our society.  And practically, studying intimate  
discrimination allows us to make conscious choices about how our 
regulatory interventions affect the fact and significance of intimate  
discrimination.4   
Before beginning, I should note that in this Article I use the term 
discrimination advisedly.  To discriminate means, among other things, 
to differentiate.  Beyond this neutral denotation, the term’s connota-
tions vary from the pejorative, in the sense of invidious stereotyping 
(discriminatory hiring policies), to the laudatory, in the sense of pos-
sessing taste or appreciation of quality (a discriminating palate).5  In 
this Article, I assume no negative connotation to the term “intimate 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 I know of no other work addressing discrimination in intimate relationships across the cate-
gories of disability, race, and sex.  One excellent recent article discusses both race and sex in rela-
tion to discrimination in dating.  See Russell K. Robinson, Structural Dimensions of Romantic 
Preferences, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2787 (2008) (studying gay dating websites and the connections 
between the stereotypes on the websites and the structural features of the broader society). 
 5 See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 
(2003); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).  
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discrimination”; rather, a key aim of the project is to understand 
whether any such connotation, negative or positive, is warranted.  
Moreover, as a term of art in the field of antidiscrimination law, “dis-
crimination” refers both to differentiation at an individual level and to 
differential effects of structural features of institutions, both typically 
with a pejorative connotation.6  That is, in the language of doctrine, 
discrimination includes both disparate treatment and disparate impact.  
Similarly, the term discrimination in this Article encompasses both in-
dividual differentiation and structural impact.  The Article will pro-
gress from examining individual differentiation and rejecting the idea 
of legal intervention targeting individual choice to focusing on sys-
temic impact and crafting appropriate structural interventions.   
By the term intimate, I mean to denote sexual, romantic, or marital 
relations.7  Leaving out friendship and other ostensibly nonsexual rela-
tions opens me to the critique that has been lodged against work that 
privileges erotic affiliation.8  But that critique, though powerful as a 
normative matter, also implicitly highlights, as a descriptive matter, 
the significant meaning law and culture attach to the erotic realm, as 
distinct from other realms; whether ascribed or inherent, this distinc-
tion is undoubtedly a meaningful one in present day and time.  Thus, 
discrimination means something different in the realm of erotic inti-
macy.  In addition, marriage, dating, and sex are distinct, sometimes 
nonoverlapping, forms of intimacy; yet because identity-related norms 
of discrimination often traverse the boundaries between these intimate 
forms, I discuss them together, attending at times to points of depar-
ture among them.  
A few caveats are in order.  There are complicated subjects and 
types of intimate relations that this Article does not systematically ad-
dress.  Two in particular should be noted here.  First, the question of 
capacity to consent in the context of mental disability raises important 
and difficult questions that this Article discusses only briefly — ques-
tions about the tension between autonomy and a right to sexual ex-
pression on the one hand, and concerns about coercion and abuse on 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 See sources cited infra notes 232, 432.  
 7 Intimacy is a far more complicated subject than my instrumental definition of intimate here 
allows.  For instance, one can speak of sex or marriage without intimacy, and intimacy without a 
sexual component.  For recent work elaborating some of intimacy’s complexities, see, for example, 
INTIMACY (Lauren Berlant ed. 2000); LEO BERSANI & ADAM PHILLIPS, INTIMACIES (2008); 
and ELIZABETH BERNSTEIN, TEMPORARILY YOURS: INTIMACY, AUTHENTICITY, AND THE 
COMMERCE OF SEX (2007).  
 8 See, for example, Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Beyond Intimacy 2 (Sept. 8, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library); and Brenda 
Cossman, Beyond Marriage, in MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, JUST MARRIAGE 93 (Joshua Cohen 
& Deborah Chasman eds., 2004).   
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the other.9  Second, the Article generally does not discuss vertical, as 
opposed to horizontal, relationships.  Adoption policy, for instance, 
raises intriguing and important issues at the intersection of discrimina-
tion and the intimate.  Though I allude to the issues of race surround-
ing adoption, I do not purport to fold this difficult issue into an al-
ready expansive discussion of horizontal intimate relationships.  
Several scholars have written thoughtful accounts of the issue, and the 
extent of their disagreement helps to show the challenges it presents.10 
Finally, this Article focuses on the categories of race, sex, and dis-
ability, rather than other categories, many of which are surely impor-
tant to intimate decisions.  This selection is not meant to imply that 
these three categories are necessarily the most important axes of inti-
mate decisionmaking.11  Rather, these categories are the Article’s focus 
because they are salient in antidiscrimination law and they provide 
rich material for considering discrimination in the intimate sphere rela-
tive to one another.  Race is arguably our primary category of antidis-
crimination analysis under U.S. law, making it important in its own 
right and as a comparator for other categories.  By contrast, disability 
has been relatively understudied in antidiscrimination law and theory.  
The role of sex in our intimate choices is more obvious, and the state’s 
ongoing role in regulating these choices is also more obvious, so I say 
less about it.  But sex serves a useful conversation-forcing function, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 I discuss the problem of abuse as it relates to the norm of desexualization and the need for 
legal reform, see infra section IV.D.1, p. 1390, but for an in-depth discussion of these issues, read-
ers should see, for example, Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 
U. ILL. L. REV. 315; and MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT 
FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION (1999). 
 10 See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 
FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999); RANDALL KENNEDY, INTER-
RACIAL INTIMACIES 386–479 (2003); R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive 
Parents’ Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998); 
Elizabeth Bartholet, Correspondence, Private Race Preferences in Family Formation, 107 YALE 
L.J. 2351 (1998).  In the context of disability, the topic of vertical relationships also raises impor-
tant issues such as selective abortion — see, for example, Adrienne Asch, Why I Haven’t Changed 
My Mind About Prenatal Diagnosis: Reflections and Refinements, in PRENATAL TESTING AND 
DISABILITY RIGHTS 234 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000) — and the reproductive 
autonomy and decisionmaking of people with disabilities, especially mental disabilities — see, for 
example, FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 9. 
 11 Were this an argument about the most significant determinants of intimate choices, there 
would be other key contenders, such as religion, class, and personal appearance.  These other 
categories warrant further inquiry as they pertain to intimate choices, but do not feature promi-
nently in this discussion of intimate discrimination as a lens through which to examine antidis-
crimination laws and norms.  Religion is commonly understood in this country, from constitu-
tional rights to cultural values, as an affirmative basis for affiliation, in a way that distinguishes it 
from other categories.  Class and personal appearance per se, by contrast, are hardly recognized 
by law, and so do not offer the same opportunities for thinking about the relation between the 
operation of the category in highly regulated domains such as employment and the relatively less 
regulated domain of the intimate.     
  
1314 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:1307  
because it tends to frustrate the generalized assertion that desire in its 
ideal form would operate independently of “superficial” identity traits 
and instead would track something “deeper” in the self.  Most people 
would, of course, not make the same assertion about the role of sex in 
their desire.  And so including sex forces the recognition that some of 
these traits make a difference for many or most of us, and not neces-
sarily in ways that are readily described as morally problematic.12 
The Article has four Parts.  The first Part describes how the law 
has expressly required intimate discrimination, then sets out three key 
norms that characterize our social regulation in this area: for race, ho-
mogamy (pairing with one’s own group); for sex, heterogamy (pairing 
with the other); and for disability, desexualization (exclusion from the 
sexual realm).  This Part concludes by discussing how these intimate 
norms affect the domain of employment and underpin problematic 
practices of employment discrimination.  Part II maps the terrain of 
individual intimate discrimination, that is, of one person differentiat-
ing among prospective lovers on the basis of race, sex, or disability.  
The discussion considers the meanings that such differentiation can 
have, whether positive, negative, or neutral, and ultimately concludes 
that the state should not intervene in this realm at the individual level.  
Nonetheless, society would be better off if individuals engaged in an 
ethical self-interrogation about intimate discrimination, framed by the 
legal concept of functionalism, as explained herein. 
Part III outlines the significance of intimate discrimination at a 
structural level and describes how law and policy create hierarchies of 
subordination both within the intimate realm and beyond it.  Specifi-
cally, the state shapes who meets whom and how, and also frames the 
conditions within which individuals evaluate each other as prospective 
partners, whether for sex or for love.  Thus, whether we think of love 
and relationships romantically or rationally, the state plays a meaning-
ful role in our intimate lives, affecting our ostensibly autonomous 
choices as well as our social hierarchies.  This Part concludes with a 
discussion of why intimate discrimination matters, including its effects 
on the problem of discrimination writ large. 
Part IV outlines what role the state should play in intimate dis-
crimination.  After rejecting interventions that target individual deci-
sions in the intimate realm, the discussion turns to key steps the state 
should take with regard to each identity category.  For sex, the state’s 
next steps are obvious: the state should not expressly regulate who can 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 But see IAN AYRES & JENNIFER GERARDA BROWN, STRAIGHTFORWARD: HOW TO 
MOBILIZE HETEROSEXUAL SUPPORT FOR GAY RIGHTS 30–37 (2005) (arguing that discrimi-
nating on the basis of sex in one’s dating choices is immoral, at least where it lacks an antisubor-
dination purpose, and that it is akin to racial discrimination in dating).  I return to Ayres and 
Brown’s argument.  See infra section II.B, pp. 1356–57.   
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marry whom on the basis of sex.  For disability, the state should re-
duce barriers to entry to intimate relationships for people with disabili-
ties, including reframing accessibility projects to take into account 
what I term the architecture of intimacy.  And for race, legal interven-
tions should lift burdens on existing interracial relationships, an ap-
proach that would challenge social policies relating to housing dis-
crimination and residential segregation.  
I.  THREE NORMS INSCRIBED IN LAW AND CULTURE 
A.  Law’s Express Role  
U.S. law has historically required rather than prohibited discrimi-
nation in the intimate realm — most obviously, by saying certain peo-
ple cannot pair with certain other people.13  Antimiscegenation laws 
prevented sex and marriage across race in this country until, in 
McLaughlin v. Florida14 and Loving v. Virginia,15 the Supreme Court 
abruptly completed the gradual process of state-by-state elimination of 
such laws.  In addition, until Lawrence v. Texas,16 laws prohibited, on 
their face or in differential prosecution, same-sex sex.17  Restrictions on 
who pairs with whom continue in the different-sex requirement of 
marriage under federal law and the laws of every state but Massachu-
setts and Connecticut.18   
Law discriminates not just about who can pair with whom, but 
about who can have sex or marry at all.  Here, disability becomes im-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 A comparative study would be very interesting, as there are various countries that have also 
had express restrictions (such as South Africa) and other countries with no such history of race-
based requirements for marriage (such as New Zealand).  See, e.g., SOUTH AFRICA: A COUNTRY 
STUDY 54–58 (Rita M. Byrnes ed., 3d ed. 1997); Victoria Freeman, Attitudes Toward “Miscegena-
tion” in Canada, the United States, New Zealand, and Australia, 1860–1914, 16 NATIVE STUD. 
REV. 41, 54 (2005).  This particular Article, however, looks only at U.S. law.  
 14 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (declaring unconstitutional Florida’s law banning interracial cohabita-
tion but not same-race cohabitation). 
 15 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage). 
 16 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and striking 
down Texas’s sodomy law). 
 17 E.g., Brief of the CATO Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10–18, Law-
rence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152342; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurispru-
dence and the Apartheid of the Closet, 1946–1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 773–77 (1997).  
 18 See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. and 1 U.S.C.); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 
(Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  The status of 
marriage is currently in flux in California.  After the California Supreme Court ruled that the 
state constitution required that same-sex couples be allowed to marry, see In re Marriage Cases, 
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), the constitution was amended by referendum to ban same-sex marriage, 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (codifying Proposition 8, passed Nov. 4, 2008).  The (state) constitution-
ality of this amendment was before the California Supreme Court at the time this Article went to 
press. 
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portant.19  Those below a certain mental capacity cannot legally con-
sent to sexual or marital relations in many states.20  Eugenic steriliza-
tion, upheld by the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell21 with the infamous 
conclusion that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough,”22 has op-
erated alongside institutionalization to restrict the intimate possibilities 
of people with mental disabilities, casting them as both vulnerable vic-
tims and sexual predators.23  The history of eugenic restrictions on 
marriage has also prohibited people with some physical as well as 
mental disabilities from marrying.24 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 Age is also relevant here, under the rubric of restrictions on who can have sex or marry at 
all (although most people age out of such restrictions), Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981), as well as under the rubric of restrictions on which individuals can marry which particular 
others (think statutory rape laws).  Age raises challenging issues of its own, which, though inter-
esting, are not a focus of this Article. 
 20 See, e.g., Denno, supra note 9, at 397–434 (cataloguing the relevant laws); sources cited infra 
note 24 (quoting examples).  
 21 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 22 Id. at 207; see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-36 (repealed 2003) (providing for involuntary 
sterilization of “mentally retarded” persons).    
 23 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 463 (1985) (Marshall, 
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Segregation was accompanied by 
eugenic marriage and sterilization laws that extinguished for the retarded one of the ‘basic civil 
rights of man’ — the right to marry and procreate.  Marriages of the retarded were made, and in 
some States continue to be, not only voidable but also often a criminal offense.  The purpose of 
such limitations, which frequently applied only to women of child-bearing age, was unabashedly 
eugenic: to prevent the retarded from propagating.  To assure this end, 29 States enacted compul-
sory eugenic sterilization laws between 1907 and 1931.” (footnotes and citation omitted)); FIELD & 
SANCHEZ, supra note 9, at 55–92; Denno, supra note 9; Matthew J. Lindsay, Reproducing a Fit 
Citizenry: Dependency, Eugenics, and the Law of Marriage in the United States, 1860–1920, 23 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 541 (1998); Michael A. Rembis, Disabling Sex (Aug. 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942), is sometimes thought to have overruled Buck v. Bell, but Skinner was about sterilization of 
criminals, and thus did not directly overrule the eugenic agenda of sterilization of people with 
mental disabilities.  Skinner created legal uncertainty, however, and anything associated with the 
term eugenics — at least at the level of rhetoric — fell out of favor after World War II.  On the 
rise and fall of the discourse of eugenics as it has shaped the history of miscegenation, see RA-
CHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE & ROMANCE 81–
99 (2001).   
 24 For some laws that have been repealed or struck down, see, for example, CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 1354 (1958) (repealed 1969) (“Every man and woman, either of whom is epileptic, imbe-
cile, or feeble-minded, who shall intermarry, or live together as husband and wife, when the 
woman is under forty-five years of age, shall be imprisoned not more than three years.”); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(1) (1989) (amended 1987) (prohibiting and voiding any marriage with “a 
person afflicted with acquired immune deficiency syndrome”), invalidated by T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 
840 F. Supp. 110 (D. Utah 1993).  For some laws remaining on the books, see, for example, D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 46-403 (LexisNexis 2001) (declaring as illegal and void any “marriage of an idiot or 
of a person adjudged to be a lunatic”); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1304(c) (West 2001) (“No mar-
riage license may be issued if either of the applicants for a license is weak minded, insane, of un-
sound mind or is under guardianship as a person of unsound mind unless the court decides that it 
is for the best interest of the applicant and the general public to issue the license and authorizes 
the issuance of the license.” (repealed as to “epilepsy”)).  For further discussion, see Denno, supra 
note 9; Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Issues and 
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These explicit legal interventions in intimate discrimination suggest 
three types of norms.  First, in the context of race, law inscribed a 
norm of homogamy (pairing with members of the same group25): par-
ticularly across the black/white color line,26 people could only legally 
partner — in sex or marriage — with people of their own race. 
Second, the norm surrounding sex/gender runs directly contrary to 
that surrounding race.  Rather than requiring pairs of the same type, 
the norm surrounding sex/gender requires pairing with a different 
type.  In other words, the norm is of heterogamy.  And unlike the race 
norm of homogamy, which has been purged from (explicit) law,27 the 
sex norm of heterogamy remains inscribed in law.28 
Third, while law and norms play matchmaker when it comes to sex 
and race, the norm surrounding disability has typically been one of ut-
ter isolation, or desexualization: by express legal mandate, some people 
with disabilities have been excluded from the realm of sex and mar-
riage altogether.29  Some of these laws are consigned to history, while 
others remain on the books.30 
The next three sections will elaborate the extralegal life of these 
norms, through material drawn from statistics, dating websites, and 
literature.  This combination of sources complements the preceding ac-
count of law by offering breadth and depth to our understanding of 
the norms of intimate discrimination.  Statistics provide a broad em-
pirical snapshot of intimate relations.  Analyzing the structure of dat-
ing websites shows how these norms shape a national dating arena of 
tremendous and increasing popularity.31  And examining one fictional 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 97, 121–23 (1994); and David Pfeiffer, Eugenics 
and Disability Discrimination, 9 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 481, 485–86 (1994).   
 25 The root “-gamy” refers specifically to marriage, but like “monogamy,” the term “homog-
amy” embraces a wider set of relational practices than just those associated with marriage. 
 26 The race-related norms and laws have been far more complicated than the black/white line 
would suggest, embracing and proscribing various color combinations with widespread local 
variations.  For an excellent and evocative discussion of these complexities, among others, see 
MORAN, supra note 23.   
 27 Though explicit race-based restrictions on sex and marriage are a thing of the past, fears of 
miscegenation have shaped the incomplete project of desegregation.  See infra notes 330–33 and 
accompanying text. 
 28 The norm is still actively inscribed in the civil law of marriage in most states, though it has 
been eliminated from the criminal law of sexual behavior.  See supra notes 16–18 and accompany-
ing text. 
 29 See sources cited supra notes 20–24. 
 30 See sources cited supra note 24. 
 31 See, e.g., MARY MADDEN & AMANDA LENHART, ONLINE DATING i (2006), http://www. 
pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Online_Dating.pdf (reporting that “among the relatively small and ac-
tive cohort of 10 million internet users who say they are currently single and looking for romantic 
partners, 74% say they have used the internet in one way or another to further their romantic in-
terests” and that “there is relatively broad public contact with the online dating world because 
significant numbers of Americans personally know others who have tried and succeeded at online 
dating”); Rufus Griscom, Why Are Online Personals so Hot?, WIRED, Nov. 2002, at 135, 135, 
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text for each category allows a sustained and textured encounter with 
what are ultimately highly contextualized attitudes and behaviors.  
The order of the categories discussed will loosely track the chronology 
of repeal of express marital restrictions, from race, to disability, to 
sex.32  The Part will conclude by examining the ways these intimate 
norms filter into the employment domain and skew courts’ perception 
of illegal discrimination. 
B.  Homogamy: Race 
The norm surrounding race is homogamy: within-group pairing.  
Our cultural platitudes in general include competing theories of attrac-
tion: “opposites attract,” but “birds of a feather flock together” and 
“like attracts like.”  Richard Epstein uses the last of these phrases — 
“[l]ike attracts like” — to argue that homogeneity is desirable in the 
workplace, because people like to be around those who are like them.33  
At least in the intimate domain, Epstein has the right catchphrase for 
the pervasive understanding of race.  Mary Becker, though writing 
from a very different normative position than Epstein, similarly asserts 
that “[w]e all empathize best with those most like ourselves.”34  This 
section portrays the norm of homogamy through statistics on interra-
cial dating and marriage, an examination of the structure of main-
stream dating websites, and a discussion of a short story by Derrick 
Bell. 
1.  Statistics. — The homogamy norm for race is reflected in statis-
tics on rates of interracial marriage and dating.  I briefly review a few 
of these figures, which show that rates of interracial marriage and dat-
ing, though on the rise, are well below what would be expected from 
random matching.  In addition, the interesting variations in the data 
across gender and race point toward an explanation that is at least 
partly cultural. 
(a)  Rates of Interracial Marriage and Dating Are Rising. — In 
2000, just over 5% of all married couples included spouses of different 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.11/view.html?pg=2 (noting that “one in five 
singles looks for love on the web” and predicting that “[t]wenty years from now, the idea that 
someone looking for love won’t look for it online will be silly, akin to skipping the card catalog to 
instead wander the stacks because ‘the right books are found only by accident’”). 
 32 Although marital restrictions remain in effect for some disabilities in some states, see 
sources cited supra note 24, the sex-based restrictions on marriage remain more widespread, see 
supra p. 1315; indeed, the latter are nearly universal. 
 33 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 68 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).  For further discussion, 
see infra p. 1337–38.   
 34 Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural Remedies for 
Racial and Sexual Disadvantages in Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1671 (1991).  Her different 
normative position is evident in the rest of her sentence, which is “but we live in a society in 
which white men disproportionately hold positions of power.”  Id. 
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races, whereas in 1970 that figure was less than 1%.35  Rates for dating 
are much higher, particularly among young people.  According to a 
2005 Gallup poll, 60% of 18- to 29-year-olds have dated interracially, 
compared with 53% of 30- to 49-year-olds, 46% of 50- to 64-year olds, 
and 28% of those 65 and older.36  Favorable attitudes have risen faster 
and higher than interracial dating behavior, even among the youngest 
group.  In a 2007 Pew research poll, 83% of Americans agreed with 
the statement, “I think it’s alright for blacks and whites to date each 
other.”37  This is up from 48% in a 1987 poll.38   
(b)  Rates of Interracial Marriage Are Still Well Below What 
Would Be Expected from Random Pairing. — By one calculation, 44% 
of all U.S. marriages would be interracial under random matching 
weighted by the size of the relevant groups,39 a figure far higher than 
the marriage rates cited above.40  In their study of speed dating among 
Columbia University graduate students, Raymond Fisman and col-
leagues reported a level of cross-race interest that was closer to what 
randomness would predict: 47% of the matches were cross-race, which 
was a statistically significant difference from the 53% that the authors 
say random matching would predict, yet much closer than for the gen-
eral population figures.41  The closeness of Fisman’s figures to random 
matching may reflect both the fact that higher education levels are a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 Sharon M. Lee & Barry Edmonston, New Marriages, New Families: U.S. Racial and His-
panic Intermarriages, POPULATION BULL., June 2005, at 11.  
 36 Jeffrey M. Jones, Most Americans Approve of Interracial Dating, GALLUP, Oct. 7, 2005, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/19033/Most-Americans-Approve-Interracial-Dating.aspx (describing 
the Gallup annual Minority Rights and Relations Poll). 
 37 News Release, Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Political Landscape More Fa-
vorable to Democrats 39 (Mar. 22, 2007), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/312.pdf.   
 38 Id.  
 39 Raymond Fisman et al., Racial Preferences in Dating, 75 REV. ECON. STUD. 117, 117 
(2008) (calculating this figure based on the U.S. population regardless of age, but asserting that 
“[a]lternative measures that restrict the calculation to ‘marriageable’ populations yield a similar 
figure,” id. at 117 n.1).   
 40 Of course, the marriage rates encompass people who entered their marriages at different 
historical moments.   
 41 Fisman et al., supra note 39, at 123.  The authors also report that women more than men 
showed racially homogamous preferences; I look forward to further study of this result, because 
there seem to be so many possible explanations, prominent among them that the women were 
more interested in relationships and the men more in sex.  The authors discount this explanation 
on the basis that their older participants showed more heterogamous preferences, despite being 
more interested in relationships.  Id. at 4.  This triangulation via older subjects does not seem an 
adequate basis for rejecting the different-dating-aims theory for women’s homogamous choices.  
(The triangulation might seem a particular problem if the older subjects were old enough that 
they were past the age of thinking about creating biological children, but apparently even the 
older subjects in this study were nearly all too young for that point to apply.  Conversation be-
tween Raymond Fisman and author (Sept. 10, 2008)). 
  
1320 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:1307  
predictor of willingness to date interracially and the fact that people 
are generally more open to interracial dating than marriage.42 
(c)  Rates of Interracial Marriage and Dating Vary by Race and 
Gender. — Gallup reports that as of 2005, 69% of Hispanics, 52% of 
blacks, and 45% of whites had dated interracially at some point.43  
Another study, using data from 1999–2000, found the following per-
centages of interracial dating among these groups: 57.1% of Asian 
Americans, 56.5% of African Americans, 55.4% of Hispanic Ameri-
cans, and 35.7% of European Americans.44  This study reports that 
while African Americans are as likely to date interracially as other mi-
nority groups, they are less likely to marry interracially.45 
With regard to gender and race, African American men are much 
more likely to marry white women than white men are to marry Afri-
can American women.  From 1970 to 2000, black men increased their 
rate of marrying white women almost sixfold, so that by 2007, nearly 
6% of black men were married to white women.46  Fewer than half as 
many — approximately 2.9% of — black women were married to 
white men.47  The opposite gender effect occurs among Asian Ameri-
can and white pairings.  As one recent analysis reports, “Until 1960, 
Asian men were more likely than Asian women to intermarry with 
whites.  By the 2000 census, however, this trend had reversed.  Asian 
women are almost twice as likely to marry a white person as Asian 
men.”48 
The vastly different rates of interracial relationships for African 
American men as opposed to women, and Asian American women as 
opposed to men, unsettle any simple conclusion of a general preference 
for partners of the same race (that is, homogamous mating, also called 
“(positive) assortative mating”).  Sociobiologists have spilt much ink 
explaining the potential benefits of endogamy — often with an as-
sumption that this just is what people tend to do, and so we need an 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 See Fisman et al., supra note 39, at 123; infra note 169 and accompanying text.   
 43 Jones, supra note 36. 
 44 George Yancey, Who Interracially Dates: An Examination of the Characteristics of Those 
Who Have Interracially Dated, 33 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 179, 183 (2002).  These generalizations 
do not reflect variations in intermarriage rates across different Asian American groups.     
 45 Id.; see also Richard Lewis, Jr., George Yancey & Siri S. Bletzer, Racial and Nonracial Fac-
tors That Influence Spouse Choice in Black/White Marriages, 28 J. BLACK STUD. 60, 64 (1997).  
In Rachel Moran’s words, “The critical divide may no longer be between whites and nonwhites 
but between blacks and nonblacks.”  MORAN, supra note 23, at 175 (footnote omitted).   
 46 Roland G. Fryer Jr., Guess Who’s Been Coming to Dinner? Trends in Interracial Marriage 
over the 20th Century, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2007, at 71, 77.   
 47 Id.; see also KELLINA M. CRAIG-HENDERSON, BLACK MEN IN INTERRACIAL RELA-
TIONSHIPS 15 n.11 (2006) (citing National Urban League, The State of Black America 
2001, for the proposition that African American men are three times more likely to marry across 
race than are African American women).   
 48 Fryer, supra note 46, at 77.   
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evolutionary “just so story” as to why.49  Yet other explanations must 
be considered, including the different social meanings of specific gen-
der and race pairings,50 the potential role of who (that is, men or 
women) tends to initiate dating,51 implicit associations between gender 
and race,52 in-group pressure on African American women to preserve 
the black family,53 and the maternalization of African American 
women as caretakers in white homes,54 to name a few.55  Whatever 
contribution sociobiological explanations may make to our understand-
ing of race and intimacy, the complicated interplay of gender and race 
in these statistics suggests that sociobiology cannot end the discussion. 
In sum, while rates of interracial dating and marriage have in-
creased, they have not increased nearly as much as favorable attitudes, 
nor do they reflect what random sorting would predict.  This may be 
unsurprising, but the gender contours of these statistics also trouble 
any quick explanations. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 49 Theories include, for instance, that homogamy increases altruism among relatives or marital 
stability and thus increases fitness.  See Del Thiessen, Robert K. Young & Melinda Delgado, So-
cial Pressures for Assortative Mating, 22 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 157, 
157–58 (1997).  The work on positive assortative mating tends to be particularly impressed that 
the phenomenon can occur even for disabilities, such as deafness or psychiatric impairment.  See, 
e.g., Del Thiessen & Barbara Gregg, Human Assortative Mating and Genetic Equilibrium: An 
Evolutionary Perspective, 1 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 111, 116–17 (1980).   
 50 For instance, the historical fear of black male/white female sexual relations is of course 
deeply implicated in some of the ugliest features of American racism, from lynching to the origins 
of the Ku Klux Klan.  It bears a different set of meanings than the no less ugly but distinct legacy 
of white men’s appropriation of black women’s bodies and claim to sexual access under slavery.  
See, e.g., CRAIG-HENDERSON, supra note 47, at 23–26; see also R. Richard Banks, The After-
math of Loving v. Virginia: Sex Asymmetry in African American Intermarriage, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 
533, 536–37 (discussing other scholars’ views of the importance of this history to the gender gap in 
black-white marriage).   
 51 See, for example, CRAIG-HENDERSON, supra note 47, at 88–89, for a discussion of the the-
ory that if racial pairing is affected by conscious or unconscious social climbing, then perhaps the 
gendered expectation of male initiation of dating means that men will tend to date up or across 
but not down the social hierarchy.  This theory, which Craig-Henderson is not endorsing, leaves 
something to be desired as a response to the gender patterns in Asian-white relationships.  See id. 
 52 Some provocative new work in social psychology by Phillip Goff and colleagues suggests 
that implicit bias and stereotypes might play a role in interracial intimate relationships.  See Phil-
lip Atiba Goff, Margaret A. Thomas & Matthew Christian Jackson, “Ain’t I a Woman?”: Towards 
an Intersectional Approach to Person Perception and Group-Based Harms, 59 SEX ROLES 392 
(2008).  Their work suggests that African American men are perceived (by a subject pool of 
mostly white students) as more masculine than white men — perhaps not entirely surprising — 
but apparently the same goes for African American women, whom white observers more often 
mistake for men than they do white women.  Id. at 400.  The same study also suggests that Asians 
— both men and women — are perceived as more feminine.  See Margaret A. Thomas & Phillip 
Atiba Goff, Pain at the Crossroads: How Intersectionality Works and Hurts (Jan. 2009) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
 53 See Banks, supra note 50, at 541. 
 54 See, e.g., MORAN, supra note 23, at 104 (describing the portrayal of black women as “asex-
ual and motherly” (footnote omitted)).  
 55 For further discussion, see Robinson, supra note 4, at 2803–08. 
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2.  Websites. — The commercial dating market provides a revealing 
glimpse into private preferences and expectations surrounding them.56  
Of particular interest to this discussion of intimate norms is the struc-
ture these companies impose on desire through the questions they ask 
in order to organize participants. 
Dating websites and speed dating companies ask for information 
about sex and race and organize people according to their answers.  
An inspection of popular mainstream dating sites57 reveals some nota-
ble features across the identity categories at issue in this Article, as this 
and subsequent sections will discuss.  Race is a salient category on all 
the mainstream sites, though it is presented more subtly than sex.  
Race is never on the initial introductory page, which typically contains 
only sex, age, and geography.  But all these sites allow you to indicate 
your racial preferences or search by race.58  All ask for your race, and 
some require you to state it.59 
Perhaps most strikingly, the site Singlesnet assumes homogamous 
preferences in the way it asks about racial preferences, inquiring 
“Would you consider dating someone from a different race?” with only 
“yes” or “no” options.60  The structure of this question is worth pausing 
over, as it reflects the way assumed norms operate.  The question is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 56 Several scholars have made excellent use of personal ads and dating websites to demon-
strate, among other things, the striking ways that race still explicitly organizes so many people’s 
private lives.  See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 4; Note, Racial Steering in the Romantic Market-
place, 107 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1994); see also KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 27–37. 
 57 An online site provides rankings of the most popular dating sites from three “dating service 
ranking companies”: Hitwise, Comscore, and Nielsen-Netratings.  InternetDatingUSA.com, Best 
Dating Sites, http://www.internetdatingusa.com/online-dating-site-rank.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 
2009).  As of December 2007, the sites that appear on those three top ten lists combined, which I 
consider a useful proxy for mainstream popularity, are as follows (in rough order of combined 
popularity): Yahoo Personals, http://personals.yahoo.com; Match.com, http://www.match.com; 
Singlesnet, http://www.singlesnet.com; True.com, http://www.true.com; eHarmony, http://www. 
eharmony.com; American Singles, http://www.americansingles.com; Mate 1, http://www.mate1. 
com; Black People Meet, http://www.blackpeoplemeet.com; gay.com, http://www.gay.com; Black 
Singles, http://www.blacksingles.com; Date.com, http://date.com; and Lavalife, http://www. 
lavalife.com (all sites last visited Feb. 8, 2009).        
 58 As noted, my emphasis here is on sites dedicated to dating.  See supra note 57.  However, it 
is interesting to note that the popular social networking site Facebook, http://www.facebook.com 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2009), does not ask for race and allows participants to choose whether they 
want their sex displayed.  Uploading pictures is popular and serves a similar function to stating 
these features in many cases, though revealing this information through pictures alone does not 
allow searches by race in the way that a drop-down menu would.  Though Facebook is a tool for 
friendship for many, it also invites participants to indicate their relationship status and the sex 
they are seeking (male, female, or both) and so can be used for dating purposes as well.      
 59 For instance, eHarmony asks for your ethnicity and asks, “What ethnicities would you be 
willing to accept as matches?” and “How important is your match’s ethnicity?”  You cannot pro-
ceed beyond that page unless you answer these questions.   
 60 In addition, while most questions on the initial registration page provide further submenus 
when you answer yes to a question, no further questions (such as, perhaps, “which race?”) follow 
this question.  The question is only whether you would consider interracial dating.   
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not, “Would you consider dating someone of your own race?”  The lat-
ter would likely sound preposterous as a general question.61  Even in a 
world of multifarious possibilities, the assumed move is to date — and 
marry — within one’s own race. 
3.  Literature. — The race homogamy norm has been depicted in a 
wide array of films and print fiction.62  Though only one such exam-
ple, Derrick Bell’s story, The Last Black Hero, usefully articulates the 
norm’s strength and consequences within both black and white cul-
ture.  This fictional account of the relationship between a wounded 
hero of race politics, Jason Warfield, and his white doctor, Sheila 
Bainbridge,63 elaborates the potential consequences of interracial love 
from both white and black society.  Sheila faces the racism of her col-
leagues at the hospital who, “appalled at her relationship with a Black 
man, . . . suspended her for allegedly violating their doctor-patient 
regulations,” despite her “scrupulous . . . dealings with Jason,” includ-
ing ceasing her treatment of him when she realized her feelings.64  
(Such grossly unlawful treatment of a white employee for an interra-
cial relationship might seem outdated, a thing of the past, but for re-
cent case law to the contrary.65)  More important for both lovers, how-
ever, is the meaning of their relationship to the black community: if 
Jason, “a Black, political leader who espoused pride in Blackness,” 
married a white woman, how could that act, “at the very least, [not] 
shift[] [Jason’s organization’s] energies from its racial reform goals to  
a divisive and likely interminable debate over the rightness and pro-
priety of his marital choice?”66  The story depicts Jason’s internal 
struggle: 
Jason had never advocated hate for whites as a component of his uniquely 
successful Black pride program. . . . [B]ut [his program] did everything it 
could to encourage Black men to “look to the sisters and do not forsake 
them.  For in Black women,” he urged, “you will find both counsel and ci-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 61 There are of course some contexts in which this would not be a surprising question, such as 
if posed to a person with a history of having a particular racial type not her own.  For a discus-
sion of “types” of this sort, see infra section II.A.4, pp. 1343–44.   
 62 For an excellent review of this literature, see KENNEDY, supra note 10, passim.  See also, 
e.g., infra notes 216, 294 (discussing some such films).  
 63 Derrick Bell, The Last Black Hero: A Chronicle of Interracial Love and Sacrifice, 8 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER J. 275 (1991). 
 64 Id. at 282.     
 65 See, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing summary 
judgment for the defendant in a claim brought by an associate head basketball coach allegedly 
fired for his interracial relationship).  The court recounted among the plaintiff’s facts the follow-
ing comment (also heard by a third party) by a vice president of the college, when asked by the 
plaintiff if he had received the plaintiff’s wedding invitation: “[Y]ou’re really going to marry that 
Aunt Jemima?  You really are a nigger lover.”  Id. at 134 (alteration in original) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 66 Bell, supra note 63, at 280. 
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vility, love and support, friendship and faithfulness, probity and integrity.  
For the Black man, the Black woman is the equivalent of home.”67 
Yet he loved a white woman, and he had always railed against the 
(white) American tradition of sacrificing individual black material in-
terests to some larger political project of society.68   
The story also depicts the pain of rejection felt by Neva, the black 
woman to whom Jason had planned to propose, who served as his 
deputy in their political organization.  When Neva learns about Ja-
son’s relationship with Sheila, her mother asks her, “Suppose Jason’s 
doctor had been Black?  Would you feel less hurt?”69  Neva responds, 
“I would be disappointed as a woman who lost her man, but I would 
not feel rejected as a person.”70 
When Neva, Sheila, and Jason all meet, Sheila first proclaims that 
she cannot marry Jason and do such an injustice to the African Ameri-
can community.  But Neva rejects this “martyrdom” from a white 
woman, insisting that Sheila’s services will be more useful, and her 
commitment to the community more meaningful, if she comes back 
with Jason and takes a staff position at Jason’s organization.71  Even-
tually Sheila agrees.  The narrative concludes with the interracial cou-
ple planning to travel to New York to try to brave the storm of outrage 
they will undoubtedly face both from Jason’s organization and from 
the black community more broadly.  In the final lines of the story, Ja-
son contemplates his failure as a hero, and the need for reality and 
faith over heroism.72  The pressures of the homogamy norm take Jason 
to self-abnegation and ultimately prayer, in an ending that leaves the 
reader with little confidence that the result of this love will be any-
thing less than a terrible injury to his advocacy community, and the 
loss of everything for him and his beloved, whose own career has al-
ready been seriously damaged by her love of him.  The story portrays 
some of the ongoing challenges faced by interracial couples, and 
dramatizes the significance of the homogamy norm not only to su-
perordinate groups, but to subordinate groups, who may value solidar-
ity in both public and private realms.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 Id. at 279. 
 68 See id. at 281. 
 69 Id. at 284 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 70 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71 See id. at 287–88. 
 72 See id. at 289. 
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C.  Desexualization: Disability 
Important recent work in disability studies has called attention to 
the desexualization of disabled people.73  As Tom Shakespeare has 
written, “disability is a very powerful identity, and one that . . . has the 
power to de-sex people, so that people are viewed as disabled, not as 
men or women, straight or gay.”74  In one study, “college students were 
asked to free associate with the terms ‘woman’ and ‘disabled 
woman.’”75  The students associated “sexuality, sexual relations, and 
mothering with the former, but loneliness and lifelessness with the lat-
ter.”76  The relationship between disability and sexuality is compli-
cated.  In some representations, disabled people seem presumptively 
hypersexual, rather than nonsexual.77  But such attributions of height-
ened or uncontrolled libido again serve as a justification for denying 
the sexuality of disabled people — to prevent them from imposing 
their sexuality on others and potentially tainting the human race.78  In 
this way, even when the depictions or assumptions vary, the norm of 
desexualization remains fairly robust. 
1.  Statistics. — Although disability studies scholars have worked 
to dispel the myth that people with disabilities are not sexual beings,79 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 73 See, e.g., TOM SHAKESPEARE, KATH GILLESPIE-SELLS & DOMINIC DAVIES, THE 
SEXUAL POLITICS OF DISABILITY (1996).  
 74 Tom Shakespeare, Disability, Identity and Difference, in EXPLORING THE DIVIDE: ILL-
NESS AND DISABILITY 94, 109 (Colin Barnes & Geof Mercer eds., 1996).  Susan Stefan makes a 
similar point specifically about people with psychiatric disabilities, writing that “[t]heir identity as 
psychiatrically disabled swallow[s] all other aspects of who they were — their sexuality, their reli-
gious identity, and their racial or ethnic identity.”  Susan Stefan, “Discredited” and “Discredit-
able”: The Search for Political Identity by People with Psychiatric Diagnoses, 44 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1341, 1363 (2003).  For foundational work on both the societal resistance to recognizing 
the sexuality of people with mental disabilities, particularly in institutions, and the concept of san-
ism, see Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the 
Last Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517 (1993–1994).  
 75 Anita Silvers, Reprising Women’s Disability: Feminist Identity Strategy and Disability 
Rights, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 81, 90 (1998).   
 76 Id. 
 77 For instance, see Deborah Denno’s discussion of the competing presentations of disabled 
girls as alternatively nonsexual (by prosecutors) and hypersexual (by defense attorneys) in recent 
trials of men accused of having nonconsensual sex with mentally disabled girls.  Denno, supra 
note 9, at 324.  Michael Rembis shows a similar dynamic in historical portrayals of girls institu-
tionalized for alleged mental impairment in the first half of the twentieth century.  Rembis, supra 
note 23.  Interestingly, one study finds that nondisabled men, but not women, are inclined to at-
tribute to disabled people a “greater interest in sexual activities.”  Kristen Robillard & Catherine 
S. Fichten, Attributions About Sexuality and Romantic Involvement of Physically Disabled Col-
lege Students: An Empirical Study, 6 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 197, 197 (1983). 
 78 See sources cited supra note 77; see also supra section I.A, pp. 1315–18 (discussing eugenics-
based legal restrictions). 
 79 See, e.g., ROBERT W. BAER, IS FRED DEAD? A MANUAL ON SEXUALITY FOR MEN 
WITH SPINAL CORD INJURIES (2003); KEN KROLL & ERICA LEVY KLEIN, ENABLING RO-
MANCE: A GUIDE TO LOVE, SEX, AND RELATIONSHIPS FOR THE DISABLED (AND THE 
PEOPLE WHO CARE ABOUT THEM) (1992); Michael A. Rembis, Beyond the Binary: Rethinking 
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it remains true that many disabled people continue to have more lim-
ited sexual and romantic opportunities than nondisabled peers.  People 
with disabilities are less likely to be married than people without dis-
abilities.  The latest U.S. Census data indicate that, among people be-
tween the ages of 25 and 64, 67.6% of nondisabled people are married, 
as opposed to 59.6% of people with disabilities that are not severe, and 
50.1% of people with severe disabilities.80  The 2006 National Health 
Interview Survey shows a comparable gap between disabled and non-
disabled people: among adults in general (those over age 18), 46.3% of 
those with disabilities are married, as opposed to 59.8% of those with-
out disabilities.81  People with disabilities are also less likely to be 
sexually active, with the gap apparently more pronounced for congeni-
tally acquired impairments than for those acquired late in life.82 
2.  Websites. — Disability is almost entirely absent from the main-
stream dating websites,83 suggesting, I think, its assumed importance 
(that is, its status as disqualifying).  The main exception is Date.com, 
which allows people to list “disabled” under their own “body type,” 
and to search for (or not to search for) “disabled” under the “body 
type” they are seeking.  In addition, True.com includes American Sign 
Language among its languages spoken or sought.  No other main-
stream site that I consulted mentions disability in any way.  
Marginal dating sites fill the gap for disabled people and, in so do-
ing, articulate the exclusion felt by disabled people on the mainstream 
sites.  For instance, the disability-related site Lovebyrd.com is “exclu-
sively” for disabled people, including most every disability imaginable.  
Indeed, Lovebyrd’s proprietors assert that they will adjust their site’s 
structure to include your disability in the drop-down menu within sev-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Sexualities and Disabilities (June 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library); see also Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled to Disabled: The Legal Empower-
ment of Americans with Disabilities, 43 EMORY L.J. 245, 260 n.97 (1994) (referring to “the com-
mon myth that disabled people are sexless”). 
 80 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2002, at 23–24 tbl.4 (2006), 
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disability/sipp/disab02/ds02t4.pdf.  
 81 E-mail from H. Stephen Kaye, Inst. for Health & Aging, Univ. of Cal., S.F., to Becca von 
Behren, research assistant to author (Apr. 10, 2008, 10:47) (on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library).  
 82 See, e.g., J.C. MacDougall & S. Morin, Sexual Attitudes and Self-Reported Behavior of Con-
genitally Disabled Adults, 11 CAN. J. BEHAV. SCI. 189, 189 (1979) (reporting, in a study of forty-
five congenitally disabled adults, that over half of the subjects had never had a sexual experience 
with another person); Marita P. McCabe & George Taleporos, Sexual Esteem, Sexual Satisfaction, 
and Sexual Behavior Among People with Physical Disability, 32 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 
359 (2003); Diana H. Rintala et al., Dating Issues for Women with Physical Disabilities, 15 
SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 219 (1997); Eric R. Wright et al., Stigma and the Sexual Isolation of 
People with Serious Mental Illness, 54 SOC. PROBS. 78 (2007).   
 83 See supra note 57 (explaining how mainstream sites were identified). 
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enty-two hours if your disability is not on their list.84  One might ask, 
in response to this site: Why would a person with “visual problems” 
have any specialized interest in dating a person who is “bipolar” or 
who has “Down syndrome”?  Why would disabled people want an ex-
clusive in-group setting for date seeking? 
Lovebyrd itself provides an answer: 
  Disabled singles complain that it is more difficult to meet someone on 
a mainstream dating site when you have a disability.  That is mainly be-
cause other members do not know you have a disability until you disclose 
this information yourself; and often when this fact is revealed, the interest 
of the counterparty is lost.85  
3.  “Literature.” — In the mainstream dating scene, disability is of-
ten relegated to the status of a joke.  The idea that a disabled person 
would be a desirable sexual or dating companion is treated as funny.  
This association is not new — indeed, Freud’s writings on jokes in-
clude many jokes that turn on the humor of a matchmaker trying to 
pass off a bride who is disfigured or disabled.86  But let us pause here 
to consider a contemporary example for its depiction of the relation be-
tween disability and sexuality.87   
Below is a “Joke of the Month!” from the men’s magazine, Maxim.  
Before quoting it, I want to acknowledge that, to many, this is a very 
disturbing “joke,” and not one experienced as funny.  With my apolo-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 84 Lovebyrd.com, Who Can Join Lovebyrd.com?, http://www.lovebyrd.com/challenges.php 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
 85 Lovebyrd.com, Disabled Dating Services, http://www.lovebyrd.com/dating_services.php 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2009); see also, e.g., KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 79, at 28.  Paralympian 
swimmer Denise Beckwith poignantly expresses this difficulty in her profile in the elegant Inti-
mate Encounters show of disabled “self-portraits” photographed by Belinda Mason-Lovering.  
Beckwith was photographed on a rock with a mermaid’s tail; her caption read, “Like the little 
mermaid wanted love, I too yearn for that.  I have been so close on numerous occasions.  But as I 
have to stand up at some point (and use my crutches to walk) . . . and they are forced to realise I 
am disabled, they seem to become somewhat scared.”  Media Release, Intimate Encounters by 
Belinda Mason, A Photographic Exhibition Exploring Sexuality, Disability and Body Image 
(2007) (quoting Denise Beckwith), available at http://www.belindamason.com/art/pdfs/ 
mediareleases2007/intimate%20encounters.pdf; see also Belinda Mason, Intimate Encounters, 
http://www.belindamason.com/art/ie_07_05.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
 86 See SIGMUND FREUD, JOKES AND THEIR RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS 61–65 
(James Strachey ed. & trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1960) (1905).  For instance: 
 The would-be bridegroom complained that the bride had one leg shorter than the 
other and limped.  The Schadchen contradicted him: “You’re wrong.  Suppose you 
marry a woman with healthy, straight limbs!  What do you gain from it?  You never 
have a day’s security that she won’t fall down, break a leg and afterwards be lame all 
her life.  And think of the suffering then, the agitation, and the doctor’s bill!  But if you 
take this one, that can’t happen to you.  Here you have a fait accompli.”   
Id. at 62–63 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 87 As with my discussion of the Bell story, see supra section I.B.3, pp. 1323–24, this account 
examines one source closely; I do not pretend to represent the range of the many fictional sources 
available in print, film, and television. 
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gies, I hope the reader will persist here, because jokes such as this can 
reveal shared cultural assumptions particularly starkly.  Here it is: 
 
Joke of the Month! 
A man with no arms or legs is sunbathing on a beach.  After a while he is 
approached by three gorgeous women, who take pity on him. 
  The first one says to him, “Have you ever been hugged?” 
  “Why, no, I can’t say that I have,” the man replies, shaking his head.  
So she leans down and gives him a hug. 
  The second woman says to him, “Have you ever been kissed?” 
  He shakes his head again.  She kisses him. 
  Rather abruptly, the third asks, “Have you ever been fucked?” 
  “No,” says the man, his eyes lighting up. 
  “Well, you are now.  The tide’s coming in.”88 
 
Someone clearly found this joke funny: it is the Joke of the Month 
in a magazine with over 2.5 million readers.89  Why? 
Maxim supplies its own answer.  Above the joke is a cartoon of the 
scenario: A man whose sleeves and pant legs taper off to signify the 
missing arms and legs sits in a deck chair on the beach, surrounded by 
three voluptuous vixens in bikinis.  He looks excited and embarrassed.  
A caption reads “Its [sic] funny ‘cause he’s horribly disabled!”90 
Perhaps Maxim is right.  Perhaps the mere fact of his disability is 
what makes the joke funny to its celebrants.  There is of course humor 
based just on disability: one might think of Mr. Magoo almost falling 
from great heights because of visual impairment, or the genre of “guy 
with no arms and no legs” jokes, of which this is one.91  Laughing at 
disability can cause offense, making it a prime target for the Maxim 
humor page, which apparently trades in the shock value, or rebellious 
frisson, of saying “un-PC” things.92 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 88 Josh Richman, Joke of the Month!, MAXIM, Jan. 2008, at 18 (joke submitted to the maga-
zine “via email”). 
 89 Magazine Publishers of America, Top 100 ABC Magazines by Average Total Paid & Veri-
fied Circulation, 2007, First Six Months, http://www.magazine.org/consumer_marketing/circ_ 
trends/25227.aspx (reporting “Total Paid & Verified Circulation” for Maxim of 2,568,339).   
 90 Caption to Joke of the Month!, MAXIM, Jan. 2008, at 18. 
 91 See, e.g., No Arms and No Legs Jokes . . . , http://www.geocities.com/heartland/hills/3456/ 
h_no_arms.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
 92 The page also includes the following “roasts,” targeting sex, age, and race: “Dr. Ruth is so 
old, her pussy has mice” and “Shaquille O’Neal: ‘Your knuckles look scraped.  Did you walk 
here?’”  Jeffrey Ross, The Dean of Mean, MAXIM, Jan. 2008, at 18 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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But this joke is about something more: it is about disability and 
sexuality.  The crucial moment is the turn from the man’s hopeful ex-
pectation of sex to his being told he instead faces looming disaster.  
The pun on the word “fucked” — its double meaning of intercourse 
and ending up in dire straits — provides the vehicle for his disap-
pointment.  The women look down on him from the beginning, both 
literally and figuratively.  They “pity” him; the first one “leans down” 
and gives him a hug.93  There may also be something in the active use 
of the verb “to fuck” by the woman.  The question is not whether he 
has ever “fucked” a woman, which would situate him as the active 
partner, but whether he has ever “been fucked” by a woman. 
The (presumptively straight male nondisabled) Maxim reader can 
feel reassured by the punchline.94  The world has been turned right 
side up again — back to the universe he expects — where beautiful 
women do not proposition disabled men.  After being led along by the 
women’s apparently kind approach, the reader who keeps thinking, 
“No, no, surely this guy isn’t going to live out every guy’s fantasy of 
sex with beautiful women on a beach,” is then reassured, “Of course 
not.”  The Maxim reader can reassure himself that at least he is better 
than someone. 
We might see the disabled character in the joke as representing a 
set of fears, of “existential anxieties” about disability,95 that makes the 
reader concerned to distance himself from this character.96  Then, 
when the character looks like he might get exactly what the reader 
wants, the anxiety increases.  However, the pun saves the day, and the 
disabled guy is “fucked” in life rather than “fucked” in bed.  Maxim’s 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 93 The women’s hug and apparent pity might read initially as maternal, particularly in light of 
the infantilization of disabled people that contributes to desexualization. 
 94 Indeed, it is not only nondisabled readers who might respond to the joke in this way; hier-
archies of status operate within, as well as around, the disability community.  And those who have 
a disability but do not identify as disabled may have particularly good reason to try to distance 
themselves from other disabled people, on a principle similar to that which underlies the word 
and concept of homophobia.   
 95 See Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences: Disability and Discrimination, 44 J. 
SOC. ISSUES 39, 43–44 (1988). 
 96 The gender angle on the joke supports another kind of anxious identification between the 
reader and the disabled man on the beach: both are potential victims of feminine wiles.  The car-
toon above the joke helps bring this out, as the women look like female villains in a Disney 
movie, wily and catlike with exaggerated curves and sinister eyes.  The reader’s anxiety may go 
further, for, under a psychoanalytic account, dismemberment may evoke anxieties about impo-
tence or castration.  See Margrit Shildrick, Dangerous Discourses: Anxiety, Desire, and Disability, 
8 STUD. GENDER & SEXUALITY 221, 233–38 (2007).  Under this account, such anxieties sur-
round sex generally because of its perceived potential to restore the self to an early state of undif-
ferentiated dependency, of pre-Oedipal polymorphous perversity — a prospect that is alluring yet 
also terrifying in its threat to the coherent self.  Id. at 235.  When sexuality meets disability, Shil-
drick argues, the anxiety is overwhelming.  Id. at 234. 
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cartoon caption thus serves to reassure the reader: “Its funny ‘cause 
he’s horribly disabled!”97  Not you, that is — him.98  
The joke thus shows several things.  Most importantly, it depicts a 
set of assumptions: a disabled man who has never been hugged, much 
less kissed or bedded, and an apparent need to explain under what cir-
cumstances beautiful bikini-clad women would have sex with an am-
putee — out of “pity.”  The joke shows the ease with which a disabled 
character is treated as a ridiculous figure for aspiring to fulfilling sex-
ual relations.  This is normative desexualization.         
And lest we think this desexualizing treatment of disability is con-
fined to laddish or trivial cultural contexts, we need only turn to the 
pages of the Federal Supplement for contrary evidence.  In a case from 
the late 1990s involving a claim of associational discrimination under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 199099 (ADA), a federal district 
court implicitly revealed its view of the likelihood of a disabled person 
engaging in sexual relations.  Explaining what kinds of relationships 
the ADA’s regulations assumed that disabled people would have, the 
court wrote: 
As the regulations make clear, the ADA’s purpose is to prevent discrimina-
tion against . . . those who may have a close familial, social, or possibly 
even physical, relationship with a disabled person.  The paradigmatic case 
is that of the parent of a disabled child, whose employer may fear that the 
child’s disability may compromise the employee’s ability to perform his or 
her job.100 
A disabled person paradigmatically would have a parent, and may 
have a “social . . . relationship.”  But a physical — that is, sexual — re-
lationship is presented as almost inconceivable: “possibly even.” 
D.  Heterogamy: Sex 
Sex of course operates differently than either race (pairing inside 
one’s group) or disability (not pairing at all).  The norm for sex is het-
erogamy: pairing outside one’s group.  As Alan Sinfield says, “The only 
relation of difference that is validated is gender, and then only when a 
male and a female are involved.”101  More colorfully, you may get 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 97 Caption to Joke of the Month!, MAXIM, Jan. 2008, at 18 (emphasis added). 
 98 The passive sexuality — figured through the disabled man cast as the object of the verb “to 
fuck” rather than the subject — might represent a sexual fantasy for some men, but one that 
needs to be disowned, pinned on someone else (to invoke Michael Warner’s phrase, from another 
context), a distancing function that disability usefully serves.  See MICHAEL WARNER, THE 
TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 3 (1999). 
 99 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 100 O’Connell v. Isocor Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 649, 653 (E.D. Va. 1999) (emphasis added). 
 101 ALAN SINFIELD, ON SEXUALITY AND POWER 14 (2004).  Contra Sinfield’s implication 
that sex is unique in this way, the family is another domain with regard to which heterogamy is 
assumed; that is, the incest taboo pushes a kind of intimate heterogamy.  Judith Butler suggests 
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called a narcissist for desiring people of your own sex, but you are not 
likely to get called a narcissist for desiring people of your own race or 
ability.102  U.S. law and norms have a long (though not uncomplicated) 
history of pushing heterogamous pairing with regard to sex.  From 
marriage law to sodomy law to “no promo homo” statutes,103 this norm 
is immediately recognizable in law as well as culture.  Indeed, the sex 
heterogamy norm is so assumed as to be invisible at times, even in 
academic writing; for example, work in sociology on relationship pat-
terns sometimes speaks as if homogamy is generally the driving force 
in romantic pairings, without noticing that a starting point for most 
people is heterogamy with regard to one key category: sex.104 
The heterogamy norm for sex — still inscribed in express legal re-
strictions on marriage — is so obvious as to render almost any descrip-
tion of it superfluous.  This section is therefore brief, noting a few sta-
tistics and website features, then glossing a cultural artifact that 
highlights the heterogamy norm through parody. 
1.  Statistics. — Fewer people act on same-sex desires than have 
them, and even fewer identify as gay or lesbian.  Specifically, according 
to some studies, 7.7% of men and 7.5% of women report having same-
sex desires,105 and 4.7% of men and 3.5% of women report having had 
at least one same-sex experience since the age of eighteen,106 as com-
pared to the 2.8% of men and 1.4% of women who report identifying 
as gay or lesbian (or bisexual).107  These numbers may well understate 
the prevalence of same-sex desire and experience, as other studies find 
higher rates,108 and of course the meaning of these data depends on 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
that the incest taboo is generative of all other sexual taboos.  See JUDITH BUTLER, ANTI-
GONE’S CLAIM 71 (2000).     
 102 On psychiatry’s historical linking of narcissism and homosexuality, see, for example, gayhis-
tory.com, words: Narcissism, http://www.gayhistory.com/rev2/words/narcissism.htm (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2009).   
 103 William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and 
the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327 (2000) (discussing laws that 
prohibit the “promotion” of homosexuality through, for instance, teaching safer sex practices for 
same-sex, as well as cross-sex, conduct). 
 104 See, e.g., Lewis, Yancey & Bletzer, supra note 45, at 61–62. 
 105 EDWARD O. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY 297 
(1994).   
 106 See Dan Black et al., Demographics of the Gay and Lesbian Population in the United 
States: Evidence from Available Systematic Data Sources 9 (Ctr. for Pol’y Res., Working Paper 
No. 12, 1999).   
 107 LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 105, at 293.   
 108 See, e.g., The Kinsey Institute, Data from Alfred Kinsey’s Studies, http://www.indiana.edu/ 
~kinsey/research/ak-data.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (summarizing data from ALFRED C. 
KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1998) (1948); ALFRED C. 
KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1998) (1953) (reporting that 
37% of males had had at least one same-sex experience to orgasm and that 13% of women had 
had such an experience)). 
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many factors.109  But even these conservative estimates point to some 
kind of gap that, while impossible to verify definitively, seems to re-
flect the heterogamy norm expressly inscribed in the law of marriage.  
2.  Websites. — On the mainstream dating websites, sex is omni-
present, nearly always asked first on the introductory pages of the 
sites.  The standard opening puts sex first and age second, on a typical 
introductory page taking this form: “I’m a: [Woman/Man] Seeking a: 
[Woman/Man] From: [age] To: [age].”110  In addition, mainstream sites 
require participants to seek only men or only women, thereby struc-
turally erasing the possibility of bisexuality.111  As with race, most sites 
do not otherwise try to force parties to conform to specific norms of in-
timate discrimination in their choice of partners.  Nonetheless, the 
sites’ insistence that participants identify their own sex (and sometimes 
race) requires participants to be subject to searching along these axes 
of identity and suggests the significance of these traits for participants’ 
mate choices.  Moreover, one mainstream site — eHarmony — allows 
only cross-sex seeking, directly demonstrating the sex heterogamy 
norm.112  Given that participants can sort themselves according to 
what sex they are seeking and thus avoid contacting or being con-
tacted by members of a sex they do not desire, it is striking that a ma-
jor site would limit its customers in this way.113  Perhaps an even more 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 109 Such factors include how many people have these desires while in monogamous relation-
ships with opposite-sex partners, and how many have desires toward other people of the opposite 
sex that they forgo acting upon, as well as how many people identify as bisexual.   
 110 True.com, http://www.true.com (last visited Feb. 8, 2009); see also, e.g., websites cited supra 
note 57. 
 111 Cf. Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 
(2000) [hereinafter Yoshino, Bisexual Erasure].  Mate 1 used to be the exception in this group.  As 
of March 20, 2008, Mate 1 allowed participants to be seeking a “man,” “woman,” or “either.”  By 
December 2008, however, the site allowed only monosexual options.     
 112 As of February 8, 2009, the options on eHarmony are “I’m a Man seeking a woman” or “I’m 
a Woman seeking a man.”   
 113 Lawsuits have been filed against eHarmony on this basis by a private plaintiff in California 
and by the Division on Civil Rights in New Jersey.  See Bob Egelko, eHarmony Accused of Dis-
crimination, S.F. CHRON., June 2, 2007, at B2; News Release, State of New Jersey, Division on 
Civil Rights Announces Settlement with eHarmony, Inc. (Nov. 19, 2008), available at http:// 
www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/pr20081119a.html.  On November 19, 2008, eHarmony settled 
the suit in New Jersey, promising to create a same-sex matching service by March 31, 2009, 
though continuing to deny any violation of state law.  McKinley v. eHarmony.com, No. PQ27IB-
01846 (N.J. Dep’t of Law and Pub. Safety, Nov. 12, 2008) (settlement agreement), available at 
http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/pr20081119a-eHarmony-SA.pdf.  As of this writing, the 
California case was still proceeding to trial; the defendant argues that the case is now moot in 
light of the New Jersey settlement, but the plaintiffs disagree, citing the compensatory damages 
claim.  See Debra Cassens Weiss, eHarmony Lawyer Says Calif. Gay Bias Suit is Moot; Plaintiffs 
Disagree, A.B.A. J., Nov. 20, 2008, available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/eharmony_ 
lawyer_says_calif._bias_suit_is_moot_plaintiffs_disagree/.  Though not reaching the merits, a re-
cent decision on a site for roommates may have helped pave the way for dating site lawsuits of 
this kind.  See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(holding that the Communications Decency Act does not shield Roommates.com from a Fair 
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striking indication of the persistence of the sex heterogamy norm is the 
fact that a niche site for singles with elite educations (the so-called 
Right Stuff) — which sidesteps the intimate norms around race by de-
clining even to invite participants to indicate racial preferences — 
permits only cross-sex searching.114 
3.  Literature. — Cultural texts depicting the pressures toward sex 
heterogamy are legion and familiar.115  Rather than examining one of 
those texts, therefore, this section highlights a source that parodies the 
sex heterogamy norm through the provocative lens of gender.  Norma-
tive heterogamy also applies to some extent to gender, in the sense of 
masculine and feminine, as well as to sex, in the sense of male and fe-
male.  Within the normative heterogamy of heterosexual expectations, 
masculine is expected to want feminine and feminine masculine.  A 
few years ago, a parody of the alternative gender pairing — and thus 
of the heterogamy norm for sex — appeared in the New Yorker.  Lam-
pooning what the author calls “Samish-Sex Marriage,” the piece sug-
gests a new horizon for the opponents of same-sex marriage: those 
male-female couples composed of masculine wives and feminine hus-
bands, whose genders come close enough to the middle or the other 
side as to approximate same-gender marriage.116  “Because my feeling 
is,” the author writes, “when God made man and woman He had 
something very specific in mind.  It goes without saying that He did 
not want men marrying men, or women marrying women, but also 
what He did not want, in my view, was feminine men marrying mas-
culine women.”117  The piece was parody — mainly of the same-sex 
marriage debate and, especially, the anti–gay marriage position — but 
it also comically depicted another serious phenomenon.  Gender expec-
tations in dating and marriage still arguably favor divergent roles and 
traits, and within male-female dating, some of these still imply a cer-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Housing Act claim, because the CDA’s safe harbor provision does not apply to content that inter-
net service providers “develop” in whole or in part, and Roommates.com develops content by re-
quiring users to create a profile that identifies their sex, sexual orientation, and parental status 
and then matching only those who fit each other’s criteria); but cf. Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for 
Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).    
 114 The Right Stuff bills itself as the “Ivy League of Dating” and checks out asserted academic 
credentials to make sure members actually attended one of the elite schools on their list.  See The 
Right Stuff, Schools, http://www.rightstuffdating.com/v_schools.cfm (last visited Feb. 8, 2009); 
The Right Stuff, How It Works, http://www.rightstuffdating.com/v_how_it_works.cfm (last vis-
ited Feb. 8, 2009) (“To join, . . . write a short profile of yourself, which will be seen by all mem-
bers of the opposite sex.”); infra notes 208–11 and accompanying text.  
 115 See, e.g., DAVID LEAVITT, My Marriage to Vengeance, in A PLACE I’VE NEVER BEEN 35, 
36 (1990); JEANNETTE WINTERSON, ORANGES ARE NOT THE ONLY FRUIT (1990); BROKE-
BACK MOUNTAIN (Paramount Pictures 2005) (based on Annie Proulx, Brokeback Mountain, 
NEW YORKER, Oct. 13, 1997, at 74); LOST AND DELIRIOUS (Dummett Films & Cité-Amerique 
2001).  
 116 George Saunders, My Amendment, NEW YORKER, Mar. 8, 2004, at 38, 38. 
 117 Id. 
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tain inequality of partners.  For example, research on male-female 
speed dating suggests that even a highly educated man who considers 
intelligence a plus in women generally does not want a woman whom 
he believes is more ambitious or intelligent than he is, whereas the 
woman prefers more intelligence in a man, even if that means he is 
more ambitious or intelligent than she.118  
E.  Intimate Norms Beyond the Intimate Sphere 
The norms from the intimate domain — of heterogamy, homogamy, 
and desexualization — extend beyond the bedroom walls into other 
domains.  For instance, these norms affect the ways that courts under-
stand claims of employment discrimination.  Specifically, they shape 
what scenarios courts recognize as discrimination in the workplace by 
fueling misleading “core stories,”  Linda Krieger’s term for societal sto-
ries that form a kind of template against which we compare all in-
stances of discrimination.119  Krieger focuses on the problematic role of 
discriminatory intent in our core stories of employment discrimination, 
an aspect of the antidiscrimination project that I also hope to unsettle 
through this consideration of discrimination.120  But core stories have 
other features as well, beyond the presence or absence of intent.  This 
section begins by introducing the idea of core stories and then sketches 
the significance of the intimate discrimination norms for our core sto-
ries of employment discrimination in the realms of sex, race, and dis-
ability.  Core stories are important to identify because they deflect 
courts’ attention away from forms of discrimination that do not fit the 
anticipated story.  
1.  Three Core Stories of Discrimination. — The question “which is 
worse?”, when asked about forms of discrimination, is typically best 
avoided.  It threatens to create turf wars and hierarchies among in-
commensurable experiences, and thus in many contexts, it is misguided 
at best, and deeply divisive at worst.121  But the question can be useful 
pedagogically, and I therefore ask my employment discrimination stu-
dents: “Is it worse to be an employee categorically excluded by a dis-
criminating employer, or to be an employee retained, kept within the 
fold, but relegated to a particular demeaning position?” 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 118 See Raymond Fisman et al., Gender Differences in Mate Selection: Evidence from a Speed 
Dating Experiment, 121 Q.J. ECON. 673, 684–85 (2006).   
 119 Krieger explains that the “core stories” that courts create “structur[e] the interpretation of 
experience and provid[e] the authors and audiences of future stories with commonly recognized 
plots, symbols, themes, and characters.”  Krieger, supra note 5, at 1166. 
 120 See infra Parts II–III, pp. 1340–79. 
 121 Its most obvious version is one that was commonly asked during the 2008 Democratic 
presidential primary: which is worse, race discrimination or sex discrimination?   
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The question arises in our discussion of an early Title VII case, 
Slack v. Havens,122 in which an employer ordered three African 
American women to do heavy cleanup of a worksite, when their jobs 
were supposed to entail only light cleanup of their individual worksta-
tions.  The significance of race to the employer’s assignment of tasks 
seemed fairly clear from the employer’s decision that day to transfer 
out of the department the one white employee and to transfer back in 
a black employee who had been temporarily assigned elsewhere.  The 
role of race was then made explicit, in response to the women’s insis-
tence that this wasn’t part of their jobs, by the supervisor’s comments 
that “Colored folks are hired to clean because they clean better” and 
“Colored people should stay in their places.”123 
Contrast the scenario in Slack with what we might call Clack, a 
hypothetical case in which the supervisor simply fires the women be-
cause the new plant manager does not like black people.  Which is 
worse from the women’s perspective?  Which employee would you 
prefer to be? 
The question of course has no simple answer, if it has an answer at 
all, but asking the question invites the students to elaborate what is 
deeply troubling about each scenario.  The students raise points like 
the fact that the Slack employees at least have a choice: they get to 
choose whether to stay on the job.  Moreover, they still have a job, and 
a paycheck, a material reality easy to overlook amidst discussions of 
stigma and contact and integration.  On the other hand, some students 
suggest that the excluded employees may face less of a dignity harm in 
their exclusion.  Those who are forced out may be spurred to develop 
their own businesses and self-sustaining enterprises.  Their lack of 
choice may help propel them to independence and eventually to real 
equality with their former employers. 
A student will eventually point out that in our contemporary world, 
our core story for race discrimination looks more like Clack, in which 
the employer just does not like people of another type and wants to 
avoid them at all costs, whereas our core story for sex discrimination 
looks more like Slack, in which the employer is the kind of man who 
does not necessarily dislike the other group, and does not want to 
avoid them; on the contrary, he wants women near him, but only in 
certain roles.  The student may recall Mary Becker’s point: 
  [The] desire for subordination, rather than aversion, may be a greater 
part of discrimination against women than against racial minorities.  Sex-
ist men do not, as a general rule, try to avoid all contact with women.  On 
the contrary, they desire contact in certain subordinating forms, such as 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 122 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 885 (S.D. Cal. 1973). 
 123 Id. at 886–87 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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having women as secretaries and dependent wives.  In contrast, many 
whites would prefer to avoid all contact with African Americans, although 
other whites . . . enjoy subordinating relationships with people of color.124  
Of course, as Becker suggests, both kinds of stories are present for 
both race and sex and, I would add, for disability.  (To imagine just 
one scenario in which a nondisabled discriminator would want dis-
abled people around and in a particular role, think of the Maxim 
reader wanting someone to laugh at, someone around whom to feel 
masculine and sexually successful.125)  But core stories tend to be those 
that dominate the imagination.  They can operate like an eclipse, mak-
ing it hard to see other types.  This story of Slack invites us to consider 
how the intimate discrimination lens of this Article illuminates our 
core stories — and courts’ associated difficulties seeing other stories — 
across sex, race, and disability.  The tripartite distinction in the inti-
mate domain among normative heterogamy (Slack), homogamy 
(Clack), and desexualization (an even more isolating story than Clack) 
turns out to help shape courts’ (mis)understanding of workplace dy-
namics, as this section explains.   
2.  Heterogamy: Intimate Hierarchy, or, Hold Them Close but Keep 
Them in a Role. — Our intimate norm about sex/gender proscribes 
within-group pairing; it works against men pairing with men and 
women with women in the intimate domain.  But normative heterog-
amy also prescribes putting men and women together and keeping 
them together.  In a sense, it is an integrative norm, one that requires 
intensely intimate forms of togetherness between members of different 
groups, a point that some anti–same-sex marriage briefs have played 
upon by using the language of equality and integration.126  But norma-
tive heterogamy does not mean being together in all ways.  Rather, it 
typically prescribes holding women close, but keeping them in a role.  
It is, in this way, the Slack version of events, more than the Clack ver-
sion.  Thus, by one account, when women begin to enter the workforce 
in traditionally male spheres, the men try to turn them into mistresses, 
thus replacing them in the private sphere.  Hence the familiar story of 
sexual harassment: the sexualizing of women in the workplace. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 124 Becker, supra note 34, at 1668.   
 125 See supra section I.C.3, pp. 1327–30 (discussing a joke from Maxim). 
 126 See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington Vermont et al. 
at 10–11, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (No. 98-32) (“Proponents of homosexual mar-
riage often present their position as advancing the equality of the sexes.  Precisely the opposite is 
true.  Homosexual marriage embodies a vision of sexual segregation which denies the equal value 
and indispensability of each sex to marriage. . . . The Court should not require the state, in the 
name of equality, to publicly affirm and legally sponsor relationships which fundamentally con-
tradict the vital ethos of gender integration.”  Id. at 11 (citation omitted)); see also Brief of Appel-
lee State of Vermont at 87, Baker (No. 98-32).  
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But men’s desire to maintain that role-based relation translates not 
only into sexualization; it can also translate into wanting to keep 
women out of the workplaces traditionally reserved for men.  Integrat-
ing those environments alters the expected roles.  It threatens to 
change not only those workplaces, but the relations between men and 
women in their intimate spheres.  If women operate as equals in male 
public worlds, then perhaps they won’t accept being something less 
than equals in private heterogamous intimate worlds (or perhaps they 
won’t accept those worlds at all).  Hence the story of sexual harass-
ment that Vicki Schultz has made prominent: men use sexuality and 
sexualization (as well as other work-undermining strategies) to try to 
push women out of jobs, not to keep them in and use them for sex. 
As Schultz has shown, courts often do not see the nonsexual forms 
of harassment as harassment.127  Normative heterogamy is assumed to 
be such a strong social force that courts expect that intimate pull be-
tween men and women to be ever present, and thus courts see the mat-
ing story above (and often instead of) all else.  When the undermining 
is based on competence, when the goal is exclusion and not sexual 
congress, then courts’ perceptive abilities fail them.  The norm of the 
intimate domain thus both contributes to one form of discrimination in 
the employment domain and skews courts’ perception so they can see 
only that form of discrimination.  
3.  Homogamy: Dissociation, or, the Illusion of Separate but Equal. 
— For race, the sexual norm is homogamy.  The expectation is that 
people desire and wed within their own group.  But this assumption is 
not a purely symmetrical one.  Rather, those on the bottom are gener-
ally expected to want those on the top; most notably, black men  
are expected to want white women.128  The dominant group is ex-
pected, however, to want to disassociate from other races.  In the 
workplace, this intimate norm may help to underpin the core story of 
race discrimination. 
The expectation of normative homogamy with regard to race may 
translate into difficulties for courts in seeing subtler forms of bias that 
involve what Becker calls “the desire to subordinate,”129 rather than 
the desire to exclude or simple aversion.  As noted earlier, Epstein 
writes, in theorizing about workplace dynamics, that “[l]ike attracts 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 127 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998). 
 128 See, e.g., supra note 51.  The fact that subordinate group members are expected to want to 
violate the norms of homogamy does not mean they actually want to.  (Think here, for example, 
of the reasons discussed in the Bell story, supra section I.B.3, pp. 1323–24.)  As to why more black 
men marry white women than black women marry white men, this is a complicated question sub-
ject to multiple explanations, as discussed in section I.B.1(c), pp. 1320–21. 
 129 Becker, supra note 34, at 1667.   
  
1338 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:1307  
like.”130  That is certainly the assumption in the intimate domain with 
regard to race.  Whereas courts are keen to understand intergroup re-
lations between men and women in the workplace as all about (male) 
desire — rather than exclusion — courts looking at race discrimination 
cases may fail to see complicated dynamics of role-based racial dis-
crimination because they are expecting exclusion.  Unless the case pre-
sents strongly racialized language and direct comparator evidence, as 
in Slack, courts may have difficulty in appreciating as discrimination 
the role-based demands that permit employees to remain so long as 
they perform or cover their race in particular ways.131 
4.  Desexualization: Isolation, or, Not Even the Illusion of Separate 
but Equal. — Just as normative desexualization is about utter exclu-
sion of disabled people from the intimate realm — not just relegation 
or segregation to pairing only within one’s group — so our core story 
of disability employment discrimination is about utter exclusion, that 
is, isolation.  The history of institutionalization of people with disabili-
ties makes its way into our current thinking about disability, in the in-
timate domain and elsewhere.  Normative desexualization entails an 
idea of disability that involves complete isolation — the man who has 
never been kissed or hugged, much less had sex — the kind of person 
who lives in the isolation of an institution.  (Of course, institutions are 
full of people, but I think in the popular imagination they involve be-
ing wrenched from one’s friends and family, and thus from any kind of 
social world.)  Even noninstitutional living for disabled people seems 
to imply by its name — “independent living” — a kind of isolated liv-
ing, all alone, independent.132 
In the workplace context, this notion of total social isolation fuels a 
misleading core story in two ways.  First, it may contribute to, and ra-
tionalize, the bind of the disabled ADA plaintiff in having to show 
both that she is really “substantially limit[ed in a] . . . major life ac-
tivit[y]”133 and that she is also otherwise qualified for the job.134  
While this is certainly a bind for the plaintiff, it is not, I think, the 
paradox that it seems.  If the image of a disabled person is of a person 
intensely and inherently limited — so limited that she must be isolated 
and institutionalized — then of course it is difficult to show that one is 
disabled and yet capable of participating in the workplace.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 130 EPSTEIN, supra note 33, at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 131 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Acting White? (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Harvard Law School Library), on performing; and Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE 
L.J. 769, 879–905 (2002), on covering.     
 132 I thank Jill Anderson for the point about the term “independent living.”  
 133 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).   
 134 Id. §§ 12112(a), 12111(8).  On this bind, see, for example, Chai Feldblum, Definition of Dis-
ability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do 
About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 141–57 (2000).  
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In addition, an idea of sexual and social isolation for disabled peo-
ple may undergird courts’ letting employers off the hook.  If isolation 
is the paradigm of disability, then the employer who already hired the 
disabled person, deeming that person capable of working and of par-
ticipating in the work world, must not be prejudiced.  Given that dis-
crimination lawsuits are, for various reasons, rarely failure-to-hire 
cases,135 the employer in such cases has therefore already demon-
strated its enlightened — even superhuman — perspective on disabil-
ity, by hiring a disabled person and thus defying this core story of iso-
lation.  This may help to explain why ADA plaintiffs have such a low 
success rate.136  Judge Posner has been criticized for saying that the 
word “stigmatizing” is “merely an epithet” when applied to separate 
but equal facilities under the ADA.137  Though the criticism of Judge 
Posner’s normative or legal conclusion may be apt, as a descriptive 
matter he may be correctly intuiting contemporary norms.  To have 
separate but equal facilities, to suffer merely segregation rather than 
isolation, is still viewed as a major advance for disabled people in the 
work world.  Courts may therefore not be able to see beyond this core 
story of discrimination as utter isolation, and thus they may fail to rec-
ognize other forms of workplace discrimination in this context.  In 
these ways, we see how the norms of intimate discrimination operate 
in the domain of the workplace to frame what forms of discrimination 
courts are able to see and thus to vindicate. 
II.  ON INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENTIATION 
Is intimate discrimination bad?  Might it be neutral, or even good?  
What does it mean to base our desires, our intimate decisions, on iden-
tity traits that cannot, by law, form the basis for decisions in other 
domains like employment?  Then again, what would it mean not to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 135 See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Dis-
crimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015–19 (1991); Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an 
Enforcement Void: Using Testers To Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-
Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 411 & n.23 (1993).  
 136 See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 257 (2001).   
 137 Judge Posner wrote, of a plaintiff’s complaint about a failure to make a $150 accommoda-
tion to lower a kitchen sink so the plaintiff could wash out her coffee cup in the kitchen rather 
than the bathroom, as follows: 
[W]e do not think an employer has a duty to expend even modest amounts of money to 
bring about an absolute identity in working conditions between disabled and nondis-
abled workers.  The creation of such a duty would be the inevitable consequence  
of deeming a failure to achieve identical conditions “stigmatizing.”  That is merely an 
epithet.  
Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 1995).  For criticism, see, for ex-
ample, Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis Without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable 
Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1895 (2007). 
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discriminate on the basis of race, disability, or sex in the erotic and 
romantic realms? 
This Part examines intimate discrimination at the individual level 
to try to address these questions.  For purposes of this Part, then, inti-
mate discrimination largely means intimate differentiation, that is, in-
dividuals distinguishing other individuals on the basis of these traits in 
the context of intimate relations.  The aim here is twofold: first, to un-
earth and elaborate the complications of the subject, for their inherent 
interest; and second, to help us see why the general policy assumption 
in this area — that individual differentiation in the intimate realm 
should not be legally prohibited — is both correct and incomplete.  
Studying the contours of this frequently overlooked cousin to legally 
regulated discrimination prepares us for a discussion of what roles the 
state should and should not play in intimate discrimination. 
A.  The Individual Lover’s Discourse 
This section both demonstrates the complexity of intimate dis-
crimination and explores the richness of the subject by presenting the 
ideas in a format that resists a simple summary.  Thus, what follows is 
a series of observations presented as numbered propositions, from one 
to twelve.  Some of the propositions are provocative; some may seem 
banal.138  These ideas are not meant to be the last word on the subject, 
but are meant, rather, to adumbrate the beginning of a study.  The 
propositions start with an inquiry into the problem of intimate dis-
crimination — asking what the trouble is here — then proceed to ex-
amine the reasons why people discriminate in the intimate domain.  
The list concludes with some preliminary reflections on the difficulty 
of determining what intimate nondiscrimination would mean at an in-
dividual level. 
Speaking about intimate discrimination in general means inevitably 
eliding important distinctions at times — most notably, the vast differ-
ences among sex, love, marriage, dating, and desire, all of which find, 
albeit variously and incompletely, a place under the rubric of the inti-
mate.139  At moments I will discuss these nuances in some detail, and 
at times I will breeze past them to reach other points.  Likewise, the 
identity categories at issue operate in significantly different ways — as 
Part I goes some way toward showing — but this section will at times 
speak of the categories together, to learn from their connections, to see 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 138 It may well be true that “it’s only by being shameless about risking the obvious that we 
happen into the vicinity of the transformative.”  EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY 
OF THE CLOSET 22 (1990). 
 139 See supra note 7 (noting the complexity of the term intimacy). 
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their contrasts more starkly, or again to reach further points without 
submitting to endless detours and disclaimers.  
1.  Some intimate discrimination tracks discrimination that we find 
objectionable in other domains. — As Charles Lawrence noted two 
decades ago, one of the signs of the unconscious significance of racism 
is the way it takes sexual forms, in “[t]he preoccupation among racially 
prejudiced people with sexual matters in race relations” and by the 
designation of outgroups as “dirty or smelly or both.”140  In this way, 
the white person whose online dating profile says that she would con-
sider dating others of every race but African American may well have 
something against that particular group.141  Demographers tend to 
measure a country’s racial integrative success by the levels of interra-
cial marriage in that country,142 and while there may be important, 
and sometimes benign, reasons for in-group affiliation (of which more 
later), extremely low rates of intermarriage in a country plausibly sig-
nify the presence of what we commonly understand to be racial ani-
mus.  Relatedly, rates of marriage and sexual activity for disabled peo-
ple are lower than for nondisabled people,143 for what is surely a 
complicated set of reasons, among them the stigma that discredits dis-
abled people as not fully human, and disgust at disabled bodies or 
minds.144 
Anecdotally, it is interesting to note that even those highly critical 
of what they term the “politically correct” project of thinking in terms 
of discrimination may invoke an individual’s personal relationships as 
a sign of their deeper politics of integration.  Thus the theorist Slavoj 
Zizek said in a recent talk, as an assumed indictment of political cor-
rectness and as if punctuating the end of a conversation rather than 
beginning one, “All the big multiculturalists I know have no black 
friends.”145  It is interesting to consider what it would mean to think 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 140 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 334 & n.70 (1987). 
 141 As Randall Kennedy points out, with personal ads, as with other racial discrimination, “[w]e 
see the racial signals but not the motives behind them.”  KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 29.  In re-
sponse to Kennedy’s written queries, some authors of personal ads explained their motives, in-
cluding the “first person who answered,” who “gave racist reasons for including whiteness among 
the traits he desired.  He believed that whites — or, to use his terminology, ‘Aryans’ — were supe-
rior to others and needed to band together to combat what he saw as the worldwide antiwhite 
conspiracy.”  Id. at 30.   
 142 See, e.g., Lewis, Yancey & Bletzer, supra note 45, at 60–61 (considering the United States’s 
interracial marriage rates).   
 143 See supra section I.C.1, pp. 1325–26. 
 144 See, e.g., SHAKESPEARE, GILLESPIE-SELLS & DAVIES, supra note 73.   
 145 Slavoj Zizek, Remarks at the Critical Legal Conference at Birkbeck College, University of 
London (Sept. 2007). 
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this sort of commonplace accusation, not in the realm of friendship, 
but in a sexual realm, where it is so rarely made.146 
2.  But some forms of intimate discrimination may be not only 
common but also necessary for desire. — With regard to the first 
proposition one might ask, What about sex, as opposed to disability or 
race?  Most people believe the sex of another is the starting point for 
their desire.147  That is, most people understand themselves to be 
monosexual rather than bisexual, so another person’s maleness or fe-
maleness is a prerequisite for desire, or at least for sexual intimacy.148  
Even among many bisexuals, a partner’s sex is not irrelevant.149  So if 
someone else’s sex is often understood to be necessary to desire, might 
this be true, for some people, of race or disability as well?150  Then 
again, one might ask, how often are assumptions about desire and race 
or disability based in stereotypes, and if stereotypes are by definition 
not true in every case, then how often can race or (dis)ability be truly 
necessary to desire?151 
3.  Affirmative desire for a certain type may seem less troubling 
than a desire to exclude or avoid certain types or categories. — The 
Asian American woman who, on a dating website, checks that she 
specifically seeks Hispanic men, looks rather different from the same 
woman who checks every box but African American.  Likewise, we 
may wonder whether the Christian person who checks every religion, 
including Muslim and Hindu, but declines to check Jewish, harbors 
anti-Semitic feelings.  More broadly, categorical desexualization of dis-
abled people may be more troubling than individual intergroup affini-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 146 Of course, the norm of monogamy limits the application of Zizek’s precise statement for 
most people.  Cf. Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous 
Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004).     
 147 This is a reason cited by and to parents of intersex children in favor of genital surgery.  See, 
e.g., Elizabeth Weil, What If It’s (Sort of) a Boy and (Sort of) a Girl?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, 
§ 6 (Magazine), at 48, 50. 
 148 Of course, literature is rife with examples of people desiring people of the sex they thought 
they did not desire, when the other is in cross-sex disguise.  Bisexual desires are apparently more 
common than they are acknowledged, see, e.g., Yoshino, Bisexual Erasure, supra note 111, at 377–
88, but most people nonetheless understand their desire to be, first and foremost, framed by the 
other’s sex.  The internet provides multifarious possibilities for unsettling this assumption, which 
may be part of why sex is always and obviously asked first on mainstream dating sites.  See supra 
section I.D.2, pp. 1332–33.      
 149 See infra p. 1355. 
 150 Some of the evolutionary theories of love and desire, which aim to explain such phenomena 
of assortative mating, would posit biological factors as key to this kind of sorting, including along 
racial lines.  For more on assortative mating, see infra notes 286–87 and accompanying text.  But 
note also that even sex for these purposes may be largely culture (gender) — the cues to biological 
sex — rather than sex per se, in the sense that desire typically precedes direct knowledge of an-
other’s sex organs or chromosomes (for instance).  Perhaps the gender of another, his or her mas-
culinity or femininity, is crucial.   
 151 Cf. infra note 182. 
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ties and disaffinities, such as compliance with a racial homogamy 
norm, since desexualization isolates rather than segregates. 
4.  Category-based affinities may also be controversial, however — a 
tension captured by the language of having a “fetish” as opposed to a 
“type.” — So-called fetishists or devotees around certain races or dis-
abilities or body types garner very mixed reactions.  For instance, 
“amputee devotees” (or acrotomophiliacs), who specifically desire fe-
male amputees,152 are met with outright hostility by some amputees 
and other disabled people for their objectification of particular bodies 
and impairments.  But these devotees are greeted more favorably by 
others, who feel that desire generally involves objectification, and that 
it is appealing to be desired, even or especially for that which inspires 
rejection or revulsion in many.153  These debates mirror features of 
longstanding debates among feminists and disability activists about 
whether and when objectification might be appealing, particularly to 
those who have been subjected to normative desexualization.154  Relat-
edly, early psychological work on cross-ability relations implied that 
nondisabled people who became involved with disabled people must 
be pathological in some way; more recent work has attempted to 
counter this pathologizing move with qualitative studies of nondis-
abled people in cross-ability relations.155 
The complicated terrain of racial types, or exoticism, is elegantly 
captured by Phyllis Rose in her biography of Josephine Baker: 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 152 Per Solvang, The Amputee Body Desired: Beauty Destabilized? Disability Re-Valued?, 25 
SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 51 (2007); Ian Gregson, The Acrotomophile (or Devotee): An Ampu-
tee’s Perspective (Sept. 28, 2008), http://www.amputee-online.com/amputee/acrotomophile.html.  
 153 See, e.g., Solvang, supra note 152; see also SHAKESPEARE, GILLESPIE-SELLS & DAVIES, 
supra note 73, at 124–31; M. Christian, Please, Take My Limbs: The Sexual Worship of Stumps, 
GETTINGIT.COM, Aug. 2, 1999, http://www.gettingit.com/article/577 (discussing the erotics of 
amputee devotion, and its relationship (for some) to a desire or decision to be amputated oneself).  
Related debates have arisen around “fat fetishism” or “fat admirers,” as possibly signaled by the 
removal of a pro-fat admirer “official position” statement on the site of the National Association 
to Advance Fat Acceptance (NAAFA).  See NAT’L ASS’N TO ADVANCE FAT ACCEPTANCE, 
FAT ADMIRERS, available at http://www.naafaonline.com/dev2//about/Policies/FATADMIRERS. 
pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).  
 154 See, e.g., Adrienne Asch & Michelle Fine, Introduction: Beyond Pedestals to WOMEN 
WITH DISABILITIES 1, 29–30 (Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch eds., 1988).   
 155 See, e.g., Maureen S. Milligan & Aldred H. Neufeldt, Postinjury Marriage to Men with Spi-
nal Cord Injury: Women’s Perspectives on Making a Commitment, 16 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 
117 (1998).  As Milligan and Neufeldt explain, one early work offered the following “typology of 
individuals who are unusually attracted to disabled people, though no data was given in support 
of their descriptors”: “walking wounded”; “would-be dictators”; “unsolicited missionaries”; “gallant 
gesturers.”  See id. at 118 (citing CHARLENE DELOACH & BOBBY G. GREER, ADJUSTMENT 
TO SEVERE PHYSICAL DISABILITY 95–96 (1981)).  DeLoach and Greer do acknowledge an al-
ternative nonpathological type, though very briefly.  See DELOACH & GREER, supra, at 95 (“Not 
included among the descriptions which follow are those valued individuals who relate well to eve-
ryone, disabled or not.”). 
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  Compared with racism, exoticism is merely decorative and superficial.  
It doesn’t build death camps.  It doesn’t exterminate.  Exoticism cares 
mostly about its own amusement and tends to find differences of color 
amusing where racism finds them threatening.  Exoticism is frivolous, 
hangs out at nightclubs, will pay anything to have the black singer or pi-
anist sit at its table.  Racism is like a poor kid who grew up needing 
someone to hurt.  Exoticism grew up rich, and a little bored.  The racist is 
hedged around by dangers, the exoticist by used-up toys.  
  If one is to be treated as a thing, one would rather be treated as a rare 
and pretty thing than as a disgusting or dangerous one.  But that is still to 
be treated as a thing.156 
In the rather different domain of adoption, Rachel Moran writes that 
adoption “agencies tend to distrust adoptive parents who express a 
preference for a child of a different race and commonly make extensive 
inquiries about their racial attitudes.”157  This example from another 
context sets into relief the suspicion assigned to particular intimate af-
finities across the divides of race or disability, in contrast to the as-
sumed normalcy of a particular desire for one’s own race or of a cate-
gorical lack of desire vis-à-vis disability. 
5.  Moreover, certain intersections of identity categories conjure 
their own stereotypes and hierarchies of desirability and exclusion. — 
For men, blackness is associated with greater masculinity, and Asian-
ness with less.158  Russell Robinson has written eloquently about the 
constraints these stereotypes of desire place on dating options, particu-
larly among gay men, and has demonstrated the presence of certain 
“racialized sex roles” on gay dating sites,159 specifically, the “aggressive 
black top” and the “submissive Asian bottom.”160  These stereotypes 
work together with the broader cultural privileging of masculinity in 
men — and in many contexts, though not all, femininity in women — 
in the intimate domain.161  As discussed earlier, the meanings of inter-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 156 PHYLLIS ROSE, JAZZ CLEOPATRA: JOSEPHINE BAKER IN HER TIME 44 (1989), quoted 
in MORAN, supra note 23, at 115.   
 157 MORAN, supra note 23, at 147; see also BARTHOLET, supra note 10, at 182.       
 158 Cf. Thomas & Goff, supra note 52. 
 159 Robinson, supra note 4, at 2788. 
 160 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 2809–18. 
 161 Mary Anne Case has written persuasively about the greater value placed on masculinity in 
both men and women in other spheres of life.  Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from 
Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 
YALE L.J. 1 (1995).  The intimate and sexual spheres may provide the central counterexample to 
this phenomenon for women (though not for men), in the context of their relationships with men 
and sometimes women.  I say “sometimes women” because butch lesbians generally do better than 
butch straight women in their respective status hierarchies of desire, but femmes or non-butches 
are nonetheless more in demand for many women seeking women.  See, e.g., Christine A. Smith & 
Shannon Stillman, Butch/Femme in the Personal Advertisements of Lesbians, in LESBIAN LOVE 
AND RELATIONSHIPS 45, 48 (Suzanna M. Rose ed., 2002) (discussing a study of lesbian personal 
ads in which, of the one-third of ads that specified a gender preference, more of those ads explic-
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racial sex for black men with white women differ markedly from those 
for black women with white men, in ways that may contribute to the 
gendered divide in black-white marriage rates.162  Some work suggests 
that “[t]he only group of disabled adults in which women are more 
likely than men to be married is women who are labeled retarded,” an 
anomaly scholars have attributed to the intersection of disability and 
gender stereotypes.163  That is, “the retarded wife may fit all too well 
the criteria of the ‘good wife’: one who is docile, passive, loyal, and 
dependent, not likely to show her husband up.”164  Some identity inter-
sections create categories of individuals who are relatively left out of 
the dating market, much as normative desexualization works to ex-
clude people with disabilities.  For instance, as discussed earlier, and as 
Robinson notes, interracial dating rates are higher among black men 
than black women, leaving black women with relatively fewer poten-
tial partners.165  Moreover, access to dating opportunities and even in-
formation may be affected by the intersection of one’s identity catego-
ries, as, for example, many gay disabled people know too well.166  
These are just a few of the intersections that work to create differential 
opportunities in dating markets.167  These examples show some of the 
ways that the identity contexts of intimate discrimination defines its 
meaning.168 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
itly preferred feminine women, either affirmatively or through specific “no butches” requests, 
whether the ads were written by women who identified as femme, butch, or neither).     
 162 See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
 163 Asch & Fine, supra note 154, at 15 (citing Constantina Safilios-Rothschild, Discrimination 
Against Disabled Women, INT’L REHAB. REV., Feb. 1977, at 4, 4). 
 164 Id. 
 165 See supra notes 46–55 and accompanying text.  Age also works with sex to help create the 
relatively disadvantaged category of older women. 
 166 See, e.g., Chelsea Whitney, Intersections in Identity: Identity Development Among Queer 
Women with Disabilities, 24 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 39, 40 (2006); cf., e.g., MILK (Focus 
Features 2008) (portraying a young man in a wheelchair trying to figure out how to escape his 
parents’ plans to institutionalize him for being gay). 
 167 A related problem is the way that certain identity intersections can leave some individuals 
particularly vulnerable to sexual victimization — such as African American women and disabled 
women — whether through pervasive ideas or circumstances of vulnerability, sexualizing stereo-
types, or relative disregard by the criminal justice system.  See, e.g., Kimberl[é] Crenshaw, Map-
ping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,  
43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1265–82 (1991); supra notes 23, 74 and accompanying text; see also Ken-
neth W. Mack, Law, Society, Identity, and the Making of the Jim Crow South: Travel and Segre-
gation on Tennessee Railroads, 1875–1905, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 377, 387–94 (1999) (on, inter 
alia, the “image of the Jezebel, the sexually promiscuous black woman,” id. at 389).  Sexual vic-
timization can sometimes, paradoxically, be abetted by the norm of desexualization.  See infra pp. 
1381–82.   
 168 For a thoughtful discussion of the varied meanings of interracial intimacy, depending on 
context, see Robert S. Chang & Adrienne D. Davis, The Adventure(s) of Blackness in Western 
Culture: An Epistolary Exchange on Old and New Identity Wars, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1189 
(2006).  Davis and Chang note the cultural assumption by some — their example is the arc of the 
film Monster’s Ball — that interracial sex is inherently anti-racist, that it is “subversive of the his-
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6.  Intimate discrimination has different meanings and causes de-
pending on the type of relationship. — For instance, people will some-
times sleep with people whom they would not marry (or sometimes 
even date).169  A person’s family, friends, and religious and other 
communities typically have more opportunities to express their views 
about more serious, and more public, relationships.  Indeed, one func-
tion of weddings is surely to present the prospective spouse to one’s 
community, to confront the views of “God and everyone.”170  Another 
way that the type of relationship matters to intimate discrimination 
concerns numerosity.  That is, most people have many more friends 
than lovers and certainly more than they have spouses.171  So for most 
people, the possibilities for diverse intimates are typically broadest in 
friendship, less broad in dating and sex (depending on how many 
partners they have over time or at once), and least broad in marriage 
(also, however, depending on how many times they divorce and re-
marry).  If people form lasting and exclusive relationships, as many 
people do or aspire to do,172 then any categorical variations among 
their sexual intimates come from their dating or sexual history rather 
than from present practices. 
7.  Categorical affinities for in-group members look different, and 
potentially more appealing, when expressed by members of subordinate 
groups. — Members of any group might worry that multiracialism, for 
instance, will lead to all of us becoming culturally “beige” rather than a 
more complicated and varied bunch.173  But the desire to preserve 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
toric racial order.”  Id. at 1205.  As they rightly note, the meaning of interracial sex varies widely, 
however, and is thus context-specific.  See id. at 1200–08. 
 169 Cf. Erica Chito Childs, Listening to the Interracial Canary: Contemporary Views on Interra-
cial Relationships Among Blacks and Whites, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2771, 2775 (2008) (“Even 
white college students [interviewed in the study] who said their parents did not care if they dated 
interracially clearly indicated that their families prefer, or in some cases demand, that they marry 
within their race.”).  A stark difference in the social meanings of black-white sex, as opposed to 
marriage, has a long, problematic history.  See, e.g., Kevin Noble Maillard, The Multiracial 
Epiphany of Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2709, 2712, 2724 (2008); see also supra p. 1320.  In 
the context of religion, the idea that dating against the norm may be okay but marriage is not  
is well captured in the (potentially offensive) phrase “shiksas are for practice.”  For use of the 
phrase (which can be purchased printed across t-shirts, baseball caps, and thongs, among other 
items), see Jtshirt.com, Shiksas Are for Practice, http://www.cafepress.com/www_jtshirt_com/ 
3034903 (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).  Shiksa is “a disparaging term for a non-Jewish girl or woman.”  
The Free Dictionary, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/shiksa (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
 170 See infra p. 1360. 
 171 Cf. Emens, supra note 146, at 288–91 (discussing the norm against jealousy in friendship as 
opposed to in sexual relationships). 
 172 See id. (discussing the gap between the fantasy and the reality of monogamy). 
 173 See, e.g., Peggy Orenstein, Mixed Messenger, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 
9 (“Race is thrust on Hapas [multiracials] based on the shades of their skin, the shapes of their 
eyes, their last names.  (Quick: What race is Apolo Ohno?  How about Meg Tilly?  Both are half-
Asian.)  But ethnicity, an internal sense of culture, place and heritage — that’s more of a choice.  
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one’s culture through homogamy seems more easily separable from ra-
cism (or its equivalent) when expressed by members of subordinate 
groups.  In his generally measured and thoughtful book Interracial In-
timacies, Randall Kennedy dismisses too easily such preferences as “es-
sentially defensive and compensatory responses to white aggression.”174  
A variety of reasons might drive such politics, including wanting to 
create or preserve a family or a community that feels safe from a hos-
tile world, or to signify pride in one’s own subordinated community, 
reasons dramatized in Bell’s The Last Black Hero, discussed earlier.175  
Relatedly, a member of a subordinated group could want to avoid 
pairing with superordinate group members if assimilation means ab-
sorption into the dominant culture.176  (The difficulties of avoiding ab-
sorption into the dominant culture are well known to non-Christians 
— or to Christians, for that matter — trying to raise children without 
Christmas.)  One could even imagine a version of this anti-
assimilationist desire that would lead a person (on a dating website) 
not to pick only her own (non-white) race, but instead to check every 
box but white.  The separatist move within deaf culture is by now well 
known, though more for struggles over cochlear implants and who 
should lead Gallaudet University than the concomitant debates around 
out-marriage versus in-marriage.  Just as there are deaf parents who 
resist cochlear implants for their children, though, there are deaf indi-
viduals who would prefer a deaf spouse.177 
8.  Members of superordinate groups may also have reasons that are 
not obviously related to racial animus or discomfort with disability to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Cultivating it in our children could be the difference between a Hapa Nation that’s a rich, varie-
gated brown and one that fades to beige.”).  
 174 KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 34.   
 175 See generally supra section I.B, pp. 1318–24.  Ayres and Brown acknowledge an antisubor-
dination justification as the only legitimate exception to their endorsement of race- and sex-blind 
dating, emphasizing an African American’s reasonable desire to avoid the “vestiges of racism” and 
associated difficulties in intimate relationships, AYRES & BROWN, supra note 12, at 35, or a 
woman’s desire to avoid the gender stereotyping that might come more readily in a relationship to 
a man, or to show that “male supremacy . . . is not necessary for the operation of healthy, loving 
relationships,” id. at 37.   
 176 Kennedy acknowledges these reasons:  
Among the most influential opponents of interracial intimacy are blacks who see it as 
capitulation to white dominance.  Asserting that blacks need to feel a greater sense of 
racial obligation to themselves as a collective, that on the ground of racial kinship they 
ought to prefer one another to others, and that interracial intimacy constitutes a divisive 
diversion, significant numbers of African Americans oppose black participation in inter-
racial dating, marriage, or adoption (especially when the others involved are white).   
KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 34.  But he prefaces these words with the following explanation: 
“Victims of oppression are . . . quite capable of hurting themselves and others through specious 
beliefs and mistaken actions.”  Id.  Kennedy seems to be concerned about blacks policing other 
blacks’ choices, however, and other comments suggest he might be more sympathetic to an indi-
vidual’s reasoned choice along the lines I state. 
 177 Cf., e.g., Thiessen & Gregg, supra note 49 (discussing disability-based homogamy). 
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prefer in-group members, although it may be difficult or impossible to 
separate those reasons from animus or stereotyping. —  A member of a 
dominant group might cite any number of reasons for preferring one’s 
own group, such as a perception of shared cultural reference points, or 
a feeling of being better understood, or ease of family and community 
acceptance,178 or worries about a harder life for one’s children because 
of discrimination or segregation,179 or a wish for particular functional 
abilities in one’s spouse,180 or a desire to avoid what Erving Goffman 
calls the “courtesy stigma” of close association with a stigmatized 
group member.181  Some of these may appear race- or disability-
neutral on their face, though they may ultimately be hard or impossi-
ble to distinguish cleanly from animus or especially from stereotyping, 
by the individual or the community.182     
9.  Identity categories are multifaceted; some traits or signals of a 
particular category might matter more or less to different people. — 
This point may be most obvious with disability, which comprises so 
many different types of impairments: from deafness to blindness to 
mobility impairments to psychiatric or cognitive impairments, to name 
just a few.  Types of disabilities include functional limitations (which 
are greater or lesser depending on the design and accessibility of the 
environment183), cosmetic variations that entail no functional limita-
tions (such as scarring from burns184), and mitigated impairments (such 
as a heart condition corrected by a pacemaker185), as well as combina-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 178 Cf. Note, supra note 56, at 889–90 (discussing the constitutional illegitimacy of adverting to 
social prejudice to justify state discrimination, see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), and yet 
the difficulty of this question as a social or moral matter). 
 179 Cf. Chito Childs, supra note 169, at 2780–81 (noting the concern among black individuals 
interviewed on the subject of interracial relationships for “how the biracial children will fare in 
this racially divided world”).  On the burdens on interracial families, especially housing segrega-
tion, see infra section IV.E.2, pp. 1398–99. 
 180 Cf. infra section II.A.9, pp. 1348–50. 
 181 ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA 30 (Touchstone 1986) (1963) (“In general, the tendency for a 
stigma to spread from the stigmatized individual to his close connections provides a reason why 
such relations tend either to be avoided or to be terminated, where existing.”).  
 182 See Chito Childs, supra note 169, at 2776–77 (describing white interviewees, on the subject 
of interracial relationships, “den[ying] racial preference” but providing a similar set of apparently 
neutral reasons for “their reasons for not dating interracially”); Note, supra note 56, at 888–91 
(problematizing the reasons, such as aesthetics, given for racial preferences).  The accommodation 
step of the individual self-inquiry proposed in section II.C may go some way towards identifying 
the sources of — and even unsettling — these seemingly neutral reasons for some individuals; to 
ask, for instance, whether any changes to one’s environment or community could alter one’s feel-
ings about the desirability of a partner of a particular race or disability should prompt an interro-
gation of the social and contextual creation of salient features of these categories. 
 183 See infra section III.A, pp. 1366–73 (discussing the social model of disability). 
 184 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (1994) (providing the example of a “prominent facial scar or disfigure-
ment” as a disability under the “regarded as” prong of the ADA definition). 
 185 Cf. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding, in a case involving correc-
tive lenses, that ADA plaintiffs who mitigate must be considered in their mitigated state for pur-
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tions of these.  Preferences against the latter two categories seem nec-
essarily related to stigma or stereotypes, or at least to concerns about 
courtesy stigma,186 whereas functional limitations might fit to varying 
degrees with different personalities and needs (and may also be linked 
to stigma).  A particular individual — a pianist, say — might care 
tremendously about hearing in a partner, whereas a visual artist might 
care much less about sound than sight.  A carpenter or builder who 
likes to drill at odd hours — or a person who snores — might see ad-
vantages to impaired hearing in a partner.  A person with a mobility 
impairment might want a partner with great physical agility, for the 
flexibility of engaging in certain sexual activities or routine tasks with-
out third-party assistance.  Or the same person with a mobility im-
pairment might desire someone who shares her impairment, for the 
understanding or identification or sexual freedom that inhabiting un-
conventional bodies brings to some.187  (Desires for in-group members 
among subordinated groups, such as within the deaf community, were 
discussed earlier as a phenomenon with relatively well known poli-
tics;188 this point instead tries to consider other kinds of reasons for 
particular identity-based pairings.)  In addition, people may select their 
prospective partners in part because they intend to have biological 
children and, correctly or incorrectly, expect the partner’s traits to be 
passed to the children, or expect those traits to help or hinder parent-
ing skills.189 
Seeing this point with regard to disability helps us see its relevance 
to race, which is of course a deeply contested category, with many pos-
sible defining elements.  Throughout U.S. history, legal and social 
definitions of race have variously emphasized skin color, physiognomy, 
cultural recognition, or blood lines (variously defined).190  Any one of 
these could be more or less important to an individual’s imprinted 
erotics or community and companionship needs or social milieu.  Or 
any of these might trigger racist fantasies in a prospective partner — 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
poses of the definition of disability).  In contrast with Sutton’s narrow reading of the ADA, this 
Article considers disability generally to include mitigated impairments, consistent with various 
state statutory definitions, see, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21) (McKinney 2005), and with the 
recent revisions of the ADA (except for vision impairments), see ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).   
 186 See supra p. 1348. 
 187 See, e.g., Rembis, supra note 79, at 7–12 (citing sources). 
 188 See supra section II.A.7, pp. 1346–37.   
 189 Cf. Asch & Fine, supra note 154, at 21 (“Fears that disabled women would produce children 
with similar conditions (nearly always groundless since the vast majority of disability is not he-
reditary) have mingled with convictions that they would harm, deprive, or burden children they 
attempted to rear.”). 
 190 See, e.g., ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL (2008); IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, 
WHITE BY LAW (1996); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. 
L. REV. 1 (1991). 
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racist fantasies that might be a deeply disturbing reason for both part-
ners to avoid such a relationship or, as some have written, that could 
become part of a cooperative, role-playing exploration or expurgation 
of these cultural artifacts.191 
Sex might seem a cleaner category, less subject to cultural disman-
tling.  Of course much has been written, however, about sex’s com-
plexity.  Whether sex is defined by chromosomes, external or internal 
genitals and sex characteristics, appearance and community recogni-
tion, or self-identification is hotly disputed.192  Our categories of sexual 
orientation tend to assume a rather thin notion of sex, but surely our 
erotic selves respond to a more complicated set of signals, including 
how someone inhabits his or her sex, what gender role or roles the per-
son occupies, in ways that track or defy normative expectations.  (One 
might think here of the New Yorker piece discussed earlier.193) 
10.  It is unclear how fixed or malleable desire is. — Some people’s 
sexual tastes change over time or in response to new encounters or new 
people; some people’s do not.  Much work in the history of sexuality is 
dedicated to showing that sexuality is constructed, partially or fully, by 
social and historical context.194  While this work shows that sexual 
preferences and desires change to some extent across time and culture, 
it does not necessarily claim that the forms sexuality takes are any less 
real, or any more flexible, to a given individual at a given time.195  
There is also work in psychology — which terms this phenomenon 
“erotic plasticity” — asserting that women’s desires are more malleable 
than men’s.196  Is this plausible, and if so, is it the result of biology or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 191 See, e.g., SINFIELD, supra note 101, at 32–53; Gary Fisher, Journals and Notebooks, in 
GARY IN YOUR POCKET 119, 234–38 (Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick ed., 1996). 
 192 See generally ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY (2000); Noa Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change: A 
Struggle for Intersex and Transsex Liberties, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 51 (2006); Dean Spade, 
Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731 (2008).  
 193 See supra section I.D.3, pp. 1333–34.    
 194 See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 
(Robert Hurley trans., 1990); SEDGWICK, supra note 138; David M. Halperin, Is There a History 
of Sexuality?, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 416 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 
1993); Mary McIntosh, The Homosexual Role, 16 SOC. PROBS. 182 (1968); Randolph Trumbach, 
London’s Sodomites: Homosexual Behavior and Western Culture in the Eighteenth Century, 11 J. 
SOC. HIST. 1 (1977). 
 195 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the 
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 552–53 (1994) (distinguishing types of con-
structivism and noting that “it is possible for a constructivist to claim that sexual-orientation iden-
tity is mutable across the range of human possibility, without making the distinct claim that it is 
mutable in a given person, or even in a given society or era”). 
 196 See, e.g., Roy F. Baumeister, Gender Differences in Erotic Plasticity: The Female Sex Drive 
As Socially Flexible and Responsive, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 347 (2000); see also LISA M. DIA-
MOND, SEXUAL FLUIDITY: UNDERSTANDING WOMEN’S LOVE AND DESIRE (2008).  On de-
bates about the malleability of desire more generally, see Edward Stein, Born That Way? Not a 
Choice?: Problems with Biological and Psychological Arguments for Gay Rights 12–13, 30–31 
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something more cultural?  Is it the result of subordination, of women’s 
not having their desires matter so much as men’s, or is it a sign of 
greater attunement to the range of sexual possibility or of desirabil-
ity?197  Some people also discover or realize a new sexual orientation 
later in life to the surprise — or sometimes not — of their friends.  But 
we commonly understand a person’s “sexual orientation” with regard 
to sex to remain the same over time, even if it is not always realized.  
(In contrast, people’s age-related desires are expected to shift over 
time, to get older as they get older.198) 
Thus, desires might sometimes appear to change because, in fact, 
the desirer was previously mistaken about his desire or hiding it from 
others.199  Desires may also change because experience exposes the de-
sirer to real people whom she would not have anticipated liking in the 
abstract.  If a person of race X grew up in a racially homogeneous 
community, she might think she could never desire someone of race Y; 
later life events might nonetheless bring her into contact with people of 
race Y and change that feeling.  (The assumption here is not that eve-
ryone’s preferences would change with such exposure, but that some 
would.)  In this way, desires may be somewhat endogenous to an indi-
vidual’s social architecture.  
Relatedly, though people with disabilities are often portrayed as 
asexual,200 what is assumed to be true of the able-bodied person whose 
able-bodied partner becomes disabled?  Is his or her desire imagined to 
leave with that transformation?  It might be assumed that there is 
some sociobiological or essential aversion to pairing with a disabled 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(Cardozo School of Law, Jacob Burns Inst. For Advanced Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 223) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1104538. 
 197 See DIAMOND, supra note 196, at 9 (contesting the former argument).  For further discus-
sion, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Adaptive Desires (July 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the Harvard Law School Library). 
 198 It is not pedophilia for an eleven-year-old to fancy another eleven-year-old, but it is different 
if a forty-year-old fancies an eleven-year-old.  Indeed, the increasing age of a desired object over 
time is what makes age homogamy possible for most people.  Note, though, the typical imbal-
ances in the age norms — it is entirely acceptable, or even expected, for men to desire younger 
women, and for women to desire older men; even large age gaps in that direction draw fewer 
looks than the reverse.  Commercial dating sites reflect the complicated status of age homogamy: 
the movement has been toward greater homogamy, though with a remaining assumption that men 
in straight pairings will be slightly older.  One can see this, for example, in the age brackets in-
vited to commercial “speed dating” events, which are for, say, “women 23–32, men 25–35” or 
“women 29–39, men 31–42,” in which the men are two to three years older in each pairing.  New 
York Easydates, Upcoming Speed Dating Events in the New York, Manhattan, and Surrounding 
Area [sic], http://www.nyeasydates.com/events.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).   
 199 In addition, proponents of wider recognition of bisexuality as an identity category some-
times claim that such flips, from straight to gay, or the reverse, reflect ongoing mistakes about 
identity because more people evince bisexual desires than embrace bisexual identities.  See, e.g., 
Yoshino, Bisexual Erasure, supra note 111.       
 200 See supra section I.C, pp. 1325–30. 
  
1352 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:1307  
person, if humans are assumed to possess some eugenic aspect to their 
desires.201  But Harlan Hahn has written eloquently of the historic as-
sociations between disability and erotic revelry.202  And lest one imag-
ine that only disability advocates think impairment can be beautiful, it 
is worth remembering Edmund Burke on how much more beautiful 
women are when flawed: 
There is another notion current . . . ; that Perfection is the constituent 
cause of beauty. . . . But in these, so far is perfection, considered as such, 
from being the cause of beauty; that this quality, where it is highest in the 
female sex, almost always carries with it an idea of weakness and imper-
fection.  Women are very sensible of this; for which reason, they learn to 
lisp, to totter in their walk, to counterfeit weakness, and even sickness.  In 
all this, they are guided by nature.  Beauty in distress is much the most af-
fecting beauty.203 
In Burke’s rendering, a minimal level of impairment is an attractive 
part of femininity. 
Setting aside the complications, of which there are many, we can 
observe that sexual orientation (in the sense of the sex someone desires) 
is generally assumed to be more fixed and less malleable, at the level of 
individual control, than is desire related to race or (dis)ability.204  This 
is partially reflected in the differences across categories in whether we 
have names for those who violate or comply with the norms of inti-
mate discrimination.  Mainstream English has names in a strong sense 
for those who desire within their own sex (homosexuals and bisexuals) 
and for those who desire across sex (heterosexuals); in a much weaker 
sense for those who desire across race (miscegenator or miscegenist) 
and not for those who desire within race (the normative choice); and 
not much for those who desire across disability (specific disability  
fetishists, such as the amputee fetishist mentioned above, might be  
an exception) and not at all for those who desire within disability or  
ability.205 
11.  To be rejected for one’s identity category may be especially 
painful; however, for others to signal their preferred type may also be 
especially useful in the intimate domain. — Given the emotion sur-
rounding intimacy for many people, it is unsurprising that intimate re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 201 But cf. supra note 49 (citing work on disability-based homogamy). 
 202 See Harlan Hahn, Can Disability Be Beautiful?, SOC. POL., Winter 1988, at 26, 27–29 
(1988). 
 203 EDMUND BURKE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF 
THE SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL 84 (Dover 2008) (1759).   
 204 Cf. infra p. 1389.  This is not to say that sexual orientation is “essential” rather than “con-
structed.”  See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text. 
 205 Under race, there is also the term “nigger lover,” see supra note 65 (discussing a recent em-
ployment-discrimination case involving the term), though arguably this offensive term often refers 
as much to friendship and simple social affiliation as to anything romantic. 
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jection related to one’s salient identity traits is often described in 
poignant terms.  In the words of Ricardo Pau-Llosa:  
With the Anglo woman, you are reminded of your exile not just from 
Cuba but from effortless cultural participation of any kind. . . . Whether I 
dated unapologetically philistine cubanas or gringas out to prove (and 
therefore disprove) their ‘open-mindedness,’ it has been in matters of love 
where I have felt the pain of double exile the strongest.206   
In recent years, as single works and then volumes have emerged on 
disability and sexuality, the pain of desexualization and related disap-
pointments emerges as a persistent theme.207 
Yet people’s explicit articulation of their dating preferences as to 
race, (dis)ability, and sex may be efficient for — or even, in some cases, 
appreciated by — prospective mates (and non-mates).  Gays and lesbi-
ans, for example, have long understood the utility of creating distinc-
tive spaces for gay socializing; even in the absence of a need to avoid 
detection or violence, queer-only spaces save time and energy, not to 
mention needless rejection. 
Relatedly, the niche website The Right Stuff, for straight-seeking 
elite-educated folks, asks members to include their age, religion, and 
religious preference in their (otherwise freeform) short profile.208  
While members must pay to obtain other people’s longer bios, this 
short profile is available for free.  The suggestion to reveal religious 
preference at the first stage is presumably trying to save members the 
money (and trouble) of buying profiles of others whose religious pref-
erences might categorically exclude them.  By contrast, the site no-
where asks members to state race preferences — and also waits until 
the long pay-per-view profile to ask for a member’s own race, “if rele-
vant to you” — likely reflecting heightened sensitivity surrounding 
race issues among those with elite education.209  As others have noted, 
while race is often visible, racism is not.210  For that reason, some 
might even wish that preferences in this domain were made more ex-
plicit, so that mismatches could be avoided.211 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 206 Ricardo Pau-Llosa, Romancing the Exiliado, in MUY MACHO: LATINO MEN CONFRONT 
THEIR MANHOOD 111, 123 (Ray González ed., paperback ed. 1996).   
 207 E.g., BAER, supra note 79, at 22; KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 79, at 15–22; SHAKE-
SPEARE, GILLESPIE-SELLS & DAVIES, supra note 73; see also Mason-Lovering, supra note 85. 
 208 The Right Stuff, New Membership Form, http://secure.rightstuffdating.com/forms.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2009).  As noted earlier, The Right Stuff refuses to allow same-sex searching, which 
may open it up to a lawsuit akin to that filed against eHarmony.  See supra pp. 1332–33.   
 209 The Right Stuff, supra note 208.  Of course, participants can choose to state a race prefer-
ence in the open form sections of the short or long profile.  In the short profile, they may also opt 
to state their race or to include a photo, which may permit some assumptions about race.   
 210 E.g., Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption 
and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485, 525–27 (1998). 
 211 Of course, there are also many reasons why parties on a dating site might not want to state 
racial preferences even if they have them, including (1) not wanting to acknowledge the preference 
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Not knowing about another’s racial preferences can have unfortu-
nate consequences in the public sphere of, for instance, employment, as 
it can make it harder to avoid employers or coworkers who harbor 
hostility to one’s race.  In  the workplace, however, one might choose 
to live with subtle antipathy, if other factors (for example, salary) suffi-
ciently counterbalance it.  Such a tradeoff is harder (though certainly 
not impossible) to imagine in the romantic arena, because interaction 
between the partners is the essence of the relationship.  Explicit articu-
lation of categorical preferences and aversions thus may be particularly 
welcome in the intimate domain, because it allows those whose cate-
gory is not desired to avoid wasting time and emotion on unappealing 
or fruitless interactions.  Moreover, it may at times be preferable to 
understand accurately any such rejections as categorical, rather than 
speculating about one’s attractiveness as a mate in some more indi-
vidualized way.  While categorical rejections — disparate treatment — 
in other domains are sometimes assumed to be more painful for vic-
tims than disparate impact,212 this seems far from clear in the intimate 
domain, as a categorical rejection may make it easier to dislike or 
blame the other party in some contexts, rather than doubting one-
self.213  That said, as with employment, we might wish that deciding 
what trades are worthwhile could be left up to the one who would be 
rejected; if the prospect of any partner is scarce, some partner — even 
one with some issues around the other’s identity — may be preferable 
to none.  Or at least some individuals may feel that way, while others 
will not, making it hard to settle on a general rule in this sphere.214 
12.  It is not clear what intimate nondiscrimination would mean. 
— Would it be intimate nondiscrimination to claim not to notice 
someone’s race or disability (or even sex)?  In antidiscrimination law, 
metaphors of “color-blindness” and “sex-blindness” represent one 
common understanding of antidiscrimination — the model sometimes 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
to oneself; (2) not wanting to be thought by others as racist or narrow-minded; and (3) not want-
ing to send appealing signals to prospective mates who are generally racist.   
 212 E.g., Jeremy Waldron, Indirect Discrimination, in EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION 93, 
95 (Stephen Guest & Alan Milne eds., 1985) (“There is a sense in which harm suffered through 
action motivated by prejudice is felt more keenly and resented more deeply than superficially 
identical harm suffered through action that was not consciously racist or sexist.”).  
 213 I suspect this depends in part on whether one’s surrounding community, and associated 
norms, would support one in feeling wronged by the other’s prejudice (as might be the case with 
race), or whether the surrounding community would be likely to share the other person’s preju-
dice (as might be more likely with disability).  Sex operates differently, however; there, the extent 
to which we assume categorical fixity of desires based on sex may help ameliorate individual feel-
ings of rejection.  That is, we understand rejection based on sex to be rejection more because of 
the other person’s sexual orientation than because of our sex.  Cf. supra pp. 1351–52.  This pre-
sumably works differently in long-term relationships, however, than in first meetings.       
 214 This is one reason why individual self-inquiry, with the contextual particularities permitted 
by it, may nonetheless be useful.  See infra section II.C, pp. 1357–66. 
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known as antidifferentiation.  In the realm of sexual intimacy, this 
seems a particularly odd way to understand the ideal treatment of oth-
ers.215  Think how offended a lover can be if a partner fails to notice 
trivial aspects of appearance, such as new glasses or a haircut; imagine 
if it were the partner’s sex that went unnoticed.216 
Rather than involve the “blindness” metaphor common in antidis-
crimination law, then, perhaps intimate nondiscrimination would be 
desiring aspects of how someone wears his group identity — how the 
person inhabits his race, or his disability, for instance.  That is, rather 
than not see those traits, one might see them and appreciate their rela-
tion to the whole of the person.  Theorists of bisexuality comment on 
something similar with sex, because bisexuality is not what many 
think; it is not generally about not noticing or caring if someone is a 
man or a woman.  Rather, bisexuality often involves desires related to 
maleness or femaleness, masculinity and femininity, as they relate to 
how they are inhabited and by whom, but not in a way that is limited 
to only men or only women.217 
And what does nondiscrimination in the intimate domain look like, 
if we are operating under an antisubordination, rather than an antidif-
ferentiation, model?  For some minority group members, marrying 
within one’s own group may be an appealing antisubordination move, 
as discussed above.  Thus, in some contexts, choosing a mate with race 
or disability (or even sex) in mind may be a form of discrimination in 
contact that works to combat discrimination more broadly and in 
other domains.  I return to the question of what intimate nondiscrimi-
nation might mean at the individual level later in this Part.218 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 215 Cf. Richard A. Wasserstrom, On Sexism and Racism, in TODAY’S MORAL PROBLEMS 75, 
96–97 (Richard A. Wasserstrom ed., 2d ed. 1979).  
 216 For a portrayal of the race-blindness metaphor literalized onscreen, see A PATCH OF BLUE 
(Filmway Pictures 1965), in which a blind white girl (played by Elizabeth Hartman) falls in love 
with the character played by Sidney Poitier without realizing he is black.  When she learns his 
race from her disapproving, abusive mother (played by Shelley Winters, who won an Oscar for 
the role), she loves him no less, while he continues to think she loves him because she is literally 
“blind” to his race.  In a climactic scene, she rattles off a list of things she knows about him, about 
his kindness and the like, ending with “and I know you’re colored, and I think you’re beautiful.”  
He is moved, both to learn that she knows, and to hear her describe him as beautiful, and he re-
sponds, “Most people would say the opposite.”  While here love across race is made possible by 
disability, by literal blindness (and across disability by race, by his stylized isolation from society), 
the film nonetheless makes it important that she loves him with this knowledge, and incorporates 
it into her love for him, rather than merely seeming to tolerate it and remain blind to it. 
 217 See, e.g., MARTIN S. WEINBERG ET AL., DUAL ATTRACTION 7 (1994).      
 218 See infra section II.C, pp. 1357–66 (discussing a proposal for an individual ethical self  
inquiry). 
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B.  Abandoning the Individual Bad Actor 
What I take from the above analysis of normative meanings and 
descriptive possibilities is that our intimate choices — about whom to 
date, sleep with, or marry — do matter, but they should not be judged 
at an individual level.  Finding a bad actor in the intimate realm may 
sometimes seem easy: it’s the person who jilted you.  But on a princi-
pled level this may be harder to do, at least on the basis of “discrimi-
nation” along recognizable axes. 
As discussed, people may have strongly held preferences in the 
realm of desire.  Those preferences may sometimes overlap with, or be 
shaped by, invidious sentiments toward certain groups.219  Alterna-
tively, these preferences may be innocuous or even positive;220 regard-
less, they may sometimes be necessary to an individual’s desire.221  
They may be relatively fixed with regard to an individual, or they may 
change or adjust over time, just as we generally hope aspects of our 
desires adjust as we and our partners and peers grow older and endure 
sickness as well as health.222  Expressing desires that involve differen-
tiating on the basis of race or disability (or even sex) may sometimes be 
hurtful to those who are not desired on a given occasion.223  But in 
some contexts, not acknowledging the exclusionary nature of one’s de-
sires may lead to more hurtful consequences.224 
The complexities of individual desire along these axes — and thus 
of intimate discrimination in the sense of intimate differentiation — 
suggest that judging others is largely misguided in this realm.  Love, 
marriage, desire, and sex are deeply personal and highly significant as-
pects of human experience.  To impinge on people’s individual prefer-
ences in the intimate domain would seem a gross imposition on per-
sonal autonomy, in the absence of a substantial showing of 
countervailing harm.225  Even to judge these desires as a matter of so-
cial rather than legal regulation, as some scholars have urged,226 would 
risk false conclusions and perverse consequences.227  For society, much 
less law, to cast judgment on an individual’s choices or patterns in this 
realm generates troubling echoes of the forms of physiological and psy-
chiatric “conversion therapy” historically imposed upon, and some-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 219 See supra section II.A.1, pp. 1341–42. 
 220 See supra sections II.A.2–3, pp. 1342–43; II.A.7–9, pp. 1346–50. 
 221 See supra section II.A.2, p. 1342. 
 222 See supra section II.A.10, pp. 1350–52. 
 223 See supra section II.A.11, pp. 1352–54. 
 224 See id. 
 225 An example with substantial potential harms would be pedophilia. 
 226 See AYRES & BROWN, supra note 12, at 30–37. 
 227 We might of course ask whether these problems of the individual bad-actor model could 
apply as well to the employment domain; this is a broader question that I do not answer in this 
Article, though I return to it briefly in the Conclusion.   
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times submitted to by, homosexuals.228  Even if the sex-based desires 
that have been targeted by conversion therapy are more deeply en-
trenched, for any given individual, than desires related to race or dis-
ability — which seems plausible though not definite — we might 
worry about perverse consequences of imposing social judgment on 
these desires.  
Some people’s desires may be fixed along relevant axes, temporarily 
or permanently, such that proscribing them might mean those indi-
viduals find no sex or mate at all.229  Part III includes a discussion of 
why intimate discrimination matters, citing, among other things, re-
search on health and lifespan effects of sex and relationships.230  To 
pass judgment on the ways people attain these benefits, when they are 
fortunate enough to find consensual forms of fulfilling love or sex, 
seems to sacrifice too much of what makes for satisfaction and mean-
ing in human lives.  Moreover, we might worry not just about the love 
lost generally — which might or might not be substituted with differ-
ent love gained — but also about a disparate impact on love lost.  
Some people would surely be more likely than others to take that so-
cial judgment to heart and deny themselves what they most desire.  As 
sex-positive feminism has highlighted, for instance, the last thing 
women in particular need is another reason to suppress, critique, or 
feel bad about what turns them on.231  The complexities of intimate 
differentiation — including its benefits for some members of subordi-
nated groups and, more widely, for its role in the pursuit of love, lust, 
and happiness for individual seekers of many stripes — argue against 
a conclusion that the associated harms could justify individual-level 
regulation. 
C.  Functionalism As an Individual Ethical Inquiry 
Does this mean that intimate discrimination should not be a matter 
of legal or ethical concern?  The answer is no, for two reasons.  First, 
there is another meaning of the term discrimination, which refers to 
structural subordination rather than to individual differentiation along 
protected class lines.232  Law has played a role in intimate discrimina-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 228 See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 131, at 783–803 (recounting this history as part of the assimi-
lation demands placed on gays). 
 229 See supra section II.A.10, pp. 1350–52. 
 230 See infra section III.B, pp. 1374–79. 
 231 See, for example, Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of 
Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER 267 (Carole Vance ed., 1984); Carol Queen, Sex Radical 
Politics, Sex-Positive Feminist Thought, and Whore Stigma, in IDENTITY POLITICS IN THE 
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 92 (Barbara Ryan ed., 2001); and Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: 
An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001). 
 232 See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990); Samuel R. Bagen-
stos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 
 
  
1358 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:1307  
tion from this structural perspective and continues to do so, for in-
stance, by prohibiting policies that create a disparate impact (in some 
circumstances) even when they do not involve disparate treatment.  In 
the intimate realm, there is significant room for legal reform at this 
structural level, as I discuss in Parts III and IV. 
Second, there is even room for some scrutiny at the individual 
level, warranted by the effects individual decisionmaking has on the 
patterns of exclusion that characterize the dating market.233  As this 
section discusses, there is a set of ethical questions one can and should 
ask oneself,234 suggested by the functionalism framework established 
by employment discrimination law.235  This discussion introduces an 
innovative relation between law and critical analysis by first using a 
doctrinal framework as a tool for individual ethical inquiry, and sec-
ond, using the nonlegal application of this framework to teach us 
something about the legal framework itself.236  This move bears a 
similarity to the work of legal pluralists, who demonstrate how legal 
frameworks come to inform extralegal contexts.237  But rather than de-
scribing a feature of how law influences culture, the analysis here uses 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
VA. L. REV. 825 (2003); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1415 (2007); Tristan K. Green, A Structural Approach As Antidiscrimina-
tion Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849 (2007); John A. Powell, Struc-
tural Racism: Building Upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791 (2008); Michael 
Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations As Antidiscrimination, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004); Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Dispa-
rate Impact, and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861 (2006); David A. Strauss, The Myth of Color-
blindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99; Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: 
A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) [hereinafter Sturm, Second Generation]; 
Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 
29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247 (2006) [hereinafter Sturm, Architecture of Inclusion]; see also Sam-
uel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 
1 (2006). 
 233 For discussion of why intimate discrimination matters, due to subordination within the dat-
ing market and the repercussions beyond it, see infra section III.B, pp. 1374–79. 
 234 Ayres and Brown provide several thoughtful examples of discrimination-related self-
inquiries, see AYRES & BROWN, supra note 12, at 37, 158, with which I agree in form, though in 
content I take a different position on the role of moral judgment, for the reasons discussed in sec-
tion II.B, pp. 1356–57. 
 235 Cf. ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS 7 (2008) (using the phrase “functional individualism” 
to describe this aspect of employment discrimination law); cf. also Robert Post, Prejudicial Ap-
pearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 13–24 (2000) (refer-
ring to “functional rationality”).  
 236 The discussion in this section particularly benefited from conversations with Adrienne Asch.   
 237 See, e.g., DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION (2003).   
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law as a heuristic238 to guide normative inquiry beyond the legal  
domain.239  
Employment discrimination law characterizes job applicants and 
job holders in functionalist terms — that is, in terms of their “ability to 
perform” the job in question.240  Under the ADA, which offers a useful 
formulation of this functionalism approach, the question for the em-
ployer is whether this employee can perform the “essential functions” 
of the particular job (with or without reasonable accommodation).241  
This inquiry forces the employer to consider the employee’s abilities 
and the necessary components of the job to see if they are a good fit.  
The accommodation inquiry also forces a reconsideration of how the 
job is typically done. 
In the context of intimate relations, the equivalent inquiry would 
be to ask, What are the essential functions of being X’s partner?  Can 
Y perform those functions?  Unlike the functionalism framework in the 
employment context, which privileges functionality over appearance, 
functionalism in the intimate context would surely fold appearance 
into the functionalism inquiry.  That is, the essential functions of being 
X’s partner might include being a type of person that X desires, which 
includes being, say, a man, or being a man X finds attractive.  Thus, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 238 Heuristic is here used in its traditional, broad meaning — that is, of an interpretive device, 
a device “[s]erving to find out or discover,” as THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
193 (2d ed. 2004) defines it — not its meaning in behavioral economics, which considers heuristics 
to be mental shortcuts that misfire in important ways.  In the language of behavioral economics, 
my use of the legal framework for qualified individuals under the ADA is more akin to a debias-
ing strategy.  A debiasing strategy aims to counteract an individual’s bounded rationality, see 
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 201–02 
(2006), or, more broadly, as Jolls and Sunstein put it in a recent article discussing debiasing strate-
gies of antidiscrimination law, it is a strategy “designed to counteract biases of various sorts,” see 
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 973 (2006).  
Here we might understand the norms of intimate discrimination to lead people to make judgment 
errors about what range of individuals could potentially be a good partner for them (for whatever 
form of intimacy).  The individual self-inquiry forces them to consider more precisely what they 
want and to question the assumed context of their relationship, in ways that may open their eyes 
to a broader or different set of individuals.  Although individuals surely have some interest in 
keeping an open mind even without the pressure of an ethical inquiry, the breakdown of steps 
herein may help to counteract the pressure that norms can apply and thus to constrain an indi-
vidual’s thinking, or his or her “gut impulses,” in this domain.  A similar intent to counter bias 
through systematic consideration of needs, fit, and context presumably underpins the qualified 
individual and accommodation inquiry in the employment discrimination law context itself.     
 239 In this way, it is akin to the approach of institutional proceduralism, which uses the struc-
ture of due process analysis to devise institutional processes.  See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Law’s Role in 
Addressing Complex Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RE-
SEARCH 35 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nielsen eds., 2005).  In substance, however, the 
probing inquiry proposed here probably bears more similarity to the idea of “institutional mind-
fulness,” see Sturm, Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 232, at 257–58, than to either institu-
tional proceduralism, see Sturm, supra, or debiasing, see supra note 238.     
 240 KIRKLAND, supra note 235, at 7. 
 241 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).   
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contrary to a functionalism analysis that embraces a blindness meta-
phor — the paradigmatic musician behind the screen — a functional-
ism inquiry in the intimacy context would embrace appearance as po-
tentially functional for many people.242 
I think we can fairly say that X is the proper arbiter of the essential 
functions of being his or her partner, and of whether Y can perform 
those functions.  That is, others — friends, parents, therapist, religious 
community — may have views on the matter, some of which X may 
weigh heavily.243  But ultimately, though other societies may dis-
agree,244 contemporary U.S. society has largely reached the conclusion 
that X gets to make that decision, and I do not question that conclu-
sion here. 
Nonetheless, it could help pave the way for a world of dating with 
fewer categorical exclusions and hierarchies245 (and possibly more suc-
cessful pairings generally) if everyone went through the steps of asking, 
“What are the essential functions of the job of being my partner?  And 
who qualifies or doesn’t, if I think specifically and personally, rather 
than merely through the norms of the dating market?”  Mistakes or 
mistaken assumptions about one’s own desire may be corrected by 
new experiences.246  New questions may serve a similar function.  The 
Maxim joke presents disability as the punchline to a dating scenario, 
the end of an inquiry, rather than the beginning.  It is assumed that 
the amputee in the joke would have had no sexual experience and was 
not going to get any now.  But what if the women approaching him 
asked themselves, individually, what they were really looking for in a 
partner, what was essential to them? 
For some, desire might depend on legs; for others, it might not.  As 
noted earlier, fit is likely to be important: for a composer, hearing in a 
partner might be vital; for a painter who snores, a partner’s hearing 
might be irrelevant or even problematic.247  Similarly, to ask oneself if 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 242 On the musician behind the screen, see, for example, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, 
Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 
1092–93 (2006). 
 243 See supra section II.A.6, p. 1346. 
 244 The United States has been thought unusual in its deference to individual choice in matters 
of love.  See, e.g., William J. Goode, The Theoretical Importance of Love, 24 AM. SOC. REV. 38, 39 
(1959) (discussing the fact that “love as a common prelude to and basis of marriage is rare, per-
haps to be found as a pattern only in the United States”).  Recent work suggests, however, that 
attitudes in other countries — even countries with strong traditions of arranged marriages such as 
India — are growing more favorable to love matches, with families providing consultation rather 
than decisionmaking power.  See ELAINE HATFIELD & RICHARD L. RAPSON, LOVE AND SEX: 
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 49–51 (1996) (reporting on studies of attitudes and practices 
in various countries). 
 245 For more discussion of the significance of these effects, see infra section III.B, pp. 1374–79. 
 246 See supra section II.A.10, pp. 1350–52. 
 247 See supra section II.A.9, pp. 1348–50. 
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a racial stereotype is necessary to one’s desire might lead to surprising 
conclusions.248  If race seems important, one might ask, what aspect of 
it matters?  Is it about shared, or different, cultural background, in 
which case is race an imperfect proxy?  Or is it about a value assigned 
to the race of one’s children, or about family approval?  Or does one 
experience race as important to one’s sexual desire, in a way that 
might suggest early imprinting, through friends or family or early 
erotic exposure?  The aim is to ask the questions, not to assume or 
judge the answers.249    
There are surely limits to what may come of this type of inquiry, in 
individual cases and more broadly.  For instance, for most people, 
merely questioning the sex of whom they desire is unlikely to lead 
them to new conclusions.250  Some people of all ages do discover their 
sexual orientation at surprising junctures of life.251  Currently, how-
ever, in the United States, few people can avoid having ever encoun-
tered the question of whether another’s sex matters to their desire.  To 
suggest that merely asking the questions I propose here could affect 
sexual orientation in that sense seems highly dubious.252  The ethical 
inquiry I am imagining therefore does not urge self-interrogation with 
regard to the sex of the person one desires.253   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 248 Cf. supra sections II.A.5, pp. 1344–45, II.A.10, pp. 1350–52. 
 249 Different individuals might reach different conclusions about whether to judge their own 
desires.  Some would surely be troubled to realize that racial animus formed the basis of their 
preferences in the erotic domain.  Whether to judge those desires, however, is a more difficult 
question for many reasons; for instance, it entails questions about various tradeoffs, see, e.g., supra 
p. 1357, and questions about what it means to judge feelings as opposed to behavior, particularly 
in a domain in which behavior antithetical to one’s feelings might seem itself worthy of judgment 
for the harms it could cause.  For these reasons, I do not urge judgment as part of this inquiry.  
 250 A compelling exception to this may concern desires for intersexed and transgender individu-
als, which arguably warrant a similar self-inquiry to that proposed here for race and disability 
because many individuals will not have engaged in this kind of inquiry along these axes.  For dis-
cussion and insight on these subjects, as well as discussion questioning the importance of gender 
classifications in various legal settings, see, for example, sources cited supra note 192.   
 251 See, e.g., Katy Butler, Many Couples Must Negotiate Terms of ‘Brokeback’ Marriages, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, at F5; see also supra section II.A.10, pp. 1350–52.   
 252 On the assumption that our sex-based desires are relatively fixed, at least at the individual 
level, see supra section II.A.10, pp. 1350–52.   
 253 Ayres and Brown make a strong case, however, for raising one’s children in a way that does 
not presuppose hetero- or homosexuality.  AYRES & BROWN, supra note 12, at 23–30.  This ap-
proach, as it affirmatively embraces whatever sexual orientation children arrive with or develop, 
seems a sound one for nurturing parenting.  Ayres and Brown go further, however, and argue for 
trying to raise one’s children to be bisexuals, on the ground that bisexuality is a more moral way 
of being than monosexuality, because it does not involve discrimination (in the sense of differen-
tiation).  Id. at 30–37.  They are, for the same reason, “concerned that so many progressives are 
unselfconscious in even asking the question whether their own sex discrimination is moral.”  Id. at 
37.  For the reasons discussed earlier, I am more troubled than they by the idea of imposing moral 
judgments on other people’s sexual desires, see supra section II.B, pp. 1356–57, and I am agnostic 
about the question of whether to judge one’s own desires, see supra note 249.        
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For some people, it may also not be new to consider probing ques-
tions about the relationship between race and their own desires; for 
others, it may be.254  Such questions are probably new for more people 
with regard to disability, since they are so rarely asked.255  In both 
cases, the argument here is that it is worth individuals’ asking them-
selves what the essential functions are of being their partner (for dat-
ing, marriage, sex, or whatever intimate practices they are seeking), 
and then to ask whether a particular race or disability precludes some-
one from fulfilling those functions.  
To ask oneself the question about essential functions is to invite a 
focused consideration of one’s own needs and desires.256  It also forces 
one to pause over the fact that a person’s race or disability is only one 
of the person’s many traits.257  This inquiry may therefore serve a kind 
of debiasing function by helping to contextualize these traits and to 
encourage more than a gut response based on the norms of intimate 
discrimination.258 
The inquiry, following the ADA’s functionalism approach, should 
also involve an additional step.  After articulating the essential func-
tions, the questioner should ask whether any accommodation — either 
in the sense of a particular adjustment of one’s individual assump-
tions, immediate environment, or practices, or in the sense of a shift in 
the baseline of the surrounding community — would enable a relation-
ship that otherwise might look too difficult.  To make this suggestion is 
to highlight the fact that accommodation embraces two different, but 
related, ideas.  Accommodation is generally thought of as individually 
tailored adjustments that make one person’s impairment less disabling 
by allowing that person to adjust to the world as it is (this is what I 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 254 See, e.g., Chito Childs, supra note 169, at 2774 (reporting that in her research on attitudes 
toward interracial relationships, “most whites interviewed replied that they ‘had never really 
thought about it’ and ‘didn’t know it was an issue’ when asked about interracial relationships”).  
Moreover, for those who have encountered the question before, to ask about the possibility of dy-
namic accommodations, see infra p. 1363, might affect their understanding of their desires, or at 
least of the issues. 
 255 Cf. supra p. 1352 (discussing the lack of mainstream terms for people who date inside or 
outside of their (dis)ability). 
 256 The inquiry would include an examination of one’s past experiences and relationships that 
may have shaped one’s assumptions about categories of potential partners.  Recognizing the shap-
ing role of one’s past may lead to discoveries about the limited experiences that make up one’s 
perceived desires, whether alterable or not.  Relatedly, to examine whether another’s race or 
(dis)ability is a necessary qualification, one presumably needs to consider multiple and diverse 
members of the relevant groups.   
 257 Cf. Asch, supra note 10, at 235–36, 247–55 (making related arguments in the context of pre-
natal testing); Adrienne Asch & David Wasserman, Where Is the Sin in Synecdoche?: Prenatal 
Testing and the Parent-Child Relationship, in QUALITY OF LIFE AND HUMAN DIFFERENCE 
172 (David Wasserman et al. eds., 2005) (discussing the ethics of prenatal testing decisions by 
analogy to horizontal intimate relationship decisions).   
 258 See supra note 238 (explaining debiasing). 
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have elsewhere called the “static model of accommodation”).259  But 
accommodation also encompasses another meaning, which I have 
called the “dynamic model of accommodation,” which refers to a ques-
tioning of the baseline structure (of a workplace or, it could be, society 
more generally) that makes an impairment disabling.260  Under the 
dynamic model, one asks whether the individual disability and need 
for accommodation can show us any problems with or ways to im-
prove on our baseline assumptions that create disability.261 
In the self-inquiry about intimate discrimination, both models of 
accommodation are potentially meaningful.  Within the static model, 
one might ask if there is any individualized adjustment that would 
make a characteristic associated with disability or race no longer in-
hibiting of someone’s prospects for performing the essential functions 
of being one’s partner.262  For instance, adjustments to one’s home, so-
cial activities, or need for parental or community approval — or a 
move to a different building or neighborhood — might mean a par-
ticular disability is less disabling, or another’s race less challenging.263  
Whether these adjustments seem too burdensome would depend on the 
individual engaging in the inquiry.  Within the dynamic model, one 
might ask whether the relevant identity category would still matter to 
one’s intimate desires if the world were different than it is — in its 
laws, norms, material conditions, or architecture, for instance — and 
whether that alternative imagined world would be a better one.  The 
dynamic model inquiry is more likely to be theoretical rather than 
practical, since changing the baseline of the surrounding community 
may be impossible, but the inquiry might nonetheless be instructive, at 
least for one’s views of the world if not of a relationship.264  Such 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 259 See Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 894 (2008). 
 260 Id. 
 261 See id. at 894–96.   
 262 True to the accommodation doctrine, one might also ask whether the accommodation is 
“reasonable” and not an “undue hardship” in the sense of the costs not being disproportionate to 
the benefits, a concept that is interesting to ponder in this context.  See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wis. 
Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 1995).   
 263 See infra section III.A.2, pp. 1369–73 (discussing a hypothetical comparing relatively acces-
sible and inaccessible cities for their effect on dating and disability); infra section IV.E.2, pp. 
1398–99 (discussing the burdens that residential segregation places on interracial relationships). 
 264 By including the accommodation step, I am proposing an inquiry that goes beyond what 
Kirkland considers narrowly to be “functional individualism,” but this hybrid is still a functional 
account of personhood compared to the embedded personhood idea with which Kirkland con-
trasts it.  See KIRKLAND, supra note 235, at 9–11.  As Kirkland puts it, “[People with disabilities 
accommodated under the ADA] are still functional individuals — qualifications still matter for 
jobs — but the logic of functioning has been partially uprooted by a logic of blame-shifting.”  Id. 
at 127.  The blame-shifting function of the accommodation inquiry, particularly in its dynamic 
form, should therefore encourage an interrogation of existing hierarchies that inform desire and 
related decisions.  Post does not consider the accommodation inquiry in his analysis of “functional 
rationality.”  See Post, supra note 235, at 14.     
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changes in perspective could affect how one responds to friends and 
family (or even strangers) who make counternormative choices and 
what messages one conveys to the next generation. 
In some cases, this form of self-inquiry might be eye-opening and 
might allow for the possibility of an intimate connection otherwise 
dismissed categorically; in other cases, the obstacles would seem too 
great, or alternative arrangements might be irrelevant to the shape of 
an individual’s desire or goals.  But whether for shifts in behavior or 
only in perspective, it would be useful for individuals to engage in a 
functionalism inquiry modeled on that demanded by employment dis-
crimination doctrine under the ADA.  Moreover, though framed as a 
self-inquiry, this inquiry may work best for some individuals through, 
or in conjunction with, dialogue with thoughtful friends or trusted 
others.  My emphasis on self-inquiry aims only to highlight that the ul-
timate arbiter of this inquiry, as I imagine it, is the individual.265 
The functionalism model of personhood has been criticized in the 
employment domain for naively imagining that individuals can be re-
duced to their mere functionality.  These critiques have, rightly I think, 
pointed to the ways our selves are defined by more than our abilities; 
these critiques emphasize that our selves depend crucially on our “em-
bedded personhood.”266  Anna Kirkland explains the limits of the func-
tionalism approach thus: “What I call embedded personhood tells us 
that some aspects of a person cannot simply be ignored because they 
supply valuable information about what kind of person she is and how 
we can understand and judge her within a particular context.”267  She 
continues, “What we see in the mirror every day is a race, a gender, an 
able body or a disabled body, fatness or thinness, age or youth.  These 
traits anchor us within communities and render us recognizably our-
selves to others.”268     
Kirkland is right that these traits are more than incidental to our 
identities, to the ways that we mean in the world.  She aptly says 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 265 One could potentially conduct a similar inquiry about one’s friendships, asking about the 
race and disability makeup of one’s friends, about the essential functions of being one’s friend and 
whether race or disability is relevant, and about whether any changes to immediate circumstances 
or the broader community would change this assessment.  Such an inquiry might pertain to ongo-
ing decisionmaking for more people than would the intimate inquiry, because many people con-
tinue to form new friendships even if they have committed (as many do) to one monogamous sex-
ual relationship.  Moreover, the friendship inquiry highlights the potential utility of looking to 
impact or results, in addition to intent, in this self-examination.  For varying perspectives on the 
meaning, uses, and proper legal treatment of friendship, see Ethan J. Leib, Friendship and the 
Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631 (2007); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 189 (2007).  See also Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 
2702–05 (2008). 
 266 KIRKLAND, supra note 235, at 9–11; see also Post, supra note 235, at 14.   
 267 KIRKLAND, supra note 235, at 9.   
 268 Id. at 11.   
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therefore that these features of a person cannot “simply” be ignored.269  
Nonetheless, I think that functionalism can be useful as a kind of heu-
ristic, as an interpretive device for understanding ourselves and the 
world we inhabit.  Though these traits cannot be entirely ignored, they 
may be usefully (even if only partially) set aside to consider the impor-
tance of other traits and, ultimately, to evaluate properly the signifi-
cance of the protected traits themselves.  The fact that we cannot per-
form this functionalism inquiry perfectly does not mean we cannot or 
should not perform it at all.  Moreover, the functionalism heuristic — 
as presented by the ADA — does more than ask us to consider “intrin-
sic worth” as against superficial traits;270 it asks us to interrogate our 
own assumed desires, and then to question the influence of the sur-
rounding context on our perceptions of our selves and those we might 
desire. 
Indeed, considering functionalism as a way that one individual con-
templates what she specifically wants and needs in an intimate partner 
— recognizing that love and relationships, and even sex, will often de-
pend upon the whole of the partner, not just the sum of the parts — 
helps us to see why the inadequacy of functionalism to capture the 
depths of persons does not render it useless as an inquiry for unsettling 
discriminatory impulses in the employment domain.  To engage in this 
inquiry may press us to look past categorical types and expectations, 
and in fact to see the person more clearly, which may ultimately in-
clude appreciating how she is embedded in the very identity traits that 
the exercise invites us temporarily to set aside.  In this way, though 
imperfect, the functionalism inquiry in the employment domain can 
provide us with a practical tool for reimagining the workplace while 
also giving us insight into the relationship between the individual and 
the identity category at issue.  
Whether or not the ethical self-inquiry discussed here opens up in-
dividual intimate possibilities, the inquiry into essential functions, and 
possible static and dynamic accommodations, should encourage an in-
terrogation of existing norms and social structures.  This discussion of 
the individual self-inquiry thus accomplishes two ends.  On the one 
hand, we see a legal framework usefully informing an exercise in indi-
vidual ethics.  And on the other, we see that applying this legal frame-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 269 Indeed, some may hope that these traits are part of what another loves about them.  See 
supra section II.A.12, pp. 1354–55 and note 216.   
 270 Post notes this possible use of the functionalism inquiry, suggesting that the aim of it is to 
consider “intrinsic worth,” which makes it difficult to distinguish individuals.  See Post, supra 
note 235, at 12–13.  I think instead that this inquiry, particularly as required under the ADA with 
its accommodation requirement, can inspire a careful attention to context and the ways it can be 
disabling.  
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work to the intimate domain gives us insight into the utility of the le-
gal framework itself.         
III.  ON STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION 
“Like traffic accidents, love accidents often happen close to home.” 
 — Amy Spencer, Are You Ready To Find the One?271 
People may have strong preferences about the types of people they 
like and desire.  Though those preferences may sometimes overlap 
with, or be shaped by, invidious sentiments towards certain groups, 
such preferences may also be innocuous or even positive.  In any case, 
an individual’s preferences may be fixed to some extent.  For these and 
other reasons discussed in Part II, trying to punish or restrict individ-
ual intimate choices in the name of antidiscrimination thus seems mis-
guided and beyond the realm of appropriate state intervention, even 
though structured self-inquiry may be an ethical endeavor. 
Yet the state does play a role in intimate discrimination, though we 
like to think otherwise.  The state shapes both the accidents (whom we 
meet) and the calculations (who we think is an appealing match) of in-
timate decisionmaking.  This Part explains this claim.  It concludes by 
discussing the reasons that intimate discrimination matters at a struc-
tural level, as a prelude to Part IV’s discussion of the steps the state 
should take in this domain. 
A.  The State’s Role: Of Accidents and Calculations 
What determines sexual and other intimate behavior?  Many fac-
tors likely come into play, including biology,272 personality traits and 
fit,273 desires for and against one’s own family members,274 a rational 
(or quasi-rational) calculus of what will make for a good life or a good 
night,275 intention and effort,276 and social pressures of direct and indi-
rect sorts,277 to name a few.  These factors likely matter more or less 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 271 Amy Spencer, Are You Ready To Find the One?, CHEMISTRY, http://www.chemistry.com/ 
datingadvice/ReadyToFindTheOne (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
 272 See, e.g., DAVID M. BUSS, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE (rev. ed. 2003); David M. Buss, 
The Evolution of Love, in THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE 65 (Robert J. Sternberg & Karin 
Weis eds., 2006); cf. infra note 280.   
 273 See, e.g., Dick P.H. Barelds & Pieternel Barelds-Dijkstra, Love at First Sight or Friends 
First?: Ties Among Partner Personality Trait Similarity, Relationship Onset, Relationship Quality, 
and Love, 24 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 479 (2007). 
 274 See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS 294–98 (James Stra-
chey trans. & ed., Avon 1998) (1900).     
 275 For an important rationalist account of love in a philosophical vein, see MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 24–33 (paper-
back ed. 2005).  See also infra section III.A.2, pp. 1369–73.   
 276 See, e.g., ERICH FROMM, THE ART OF LOVING (Continuum 2000) (1956). 
 277 See, e.g., Goode, supra note 244, at 39–40. 
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depending upon the individual and the context.  Contemporary work 
in the psychology of intimate relationships tends to adopt an  
interactionist approach, assuming that various biological and cultural 
factors combine to lead to the phenomena we call love and desire.278  
This section considers the state’s role in lovemaking, whether what 
brings us together is understood as a matter more of accidents or of 
calculations. 
1.  Accidents of Sex and Love. — One factor that certainly matters 
to who loves whom, in a but-for sense, is the simple fact of who does 
and does not meet — or what demographers sometimes call “propin-
quity.”279  This is undeniably true in the sense that one will not be-
friend, bed, or marry someone whom one never meets.280  If a man in 
Ovid, Colorado, never meets anyone from Peru (in person or electroni-
cally), then the Ovidian will never marry a Peruvian.  If the Ovidian 
never meets someone from another racial group, the Ovidian will 
never marry outside his racial group.  Geography (real and virtual) 
shapes a result in the intimate domain on an individual level. 
Expanding out from scenarios of extreme isolation, we might rea-
sonably conclude that how often people encounter others of certain 
groups affects the odds of pairings across those groups.  Imagine a 
school system segregated strictly along disability/ability lines.  In this 
scenario (which is illegal under the ADA for its simple segregationist 
model), all disabled teens go to one high school, and all nondisabled 
teens go to a different school.  In the disabled school, the teens  
are grouped according to their disabilities, and all teaching and recrea-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 278 See, e.g., GARTH FLETCHER, THE NEW SCIENCE OF INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 
(2002); MICHAEL R. KAUTH, TRUE NATURE: A THEORY OF SEXUAL ATTRACTION (2000).   
 279 See, e.g., Diane C. Fujino, The Rates, Patterns and Reasons for Forming Heterosexual In-
terracial Dating Relationships Among Asian Americans, 14 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 
809, 812–13 (1997); Yancey, supra note 44, at 181; see also Shana Levin, Colette van Laar & Jim 
Sidanius, The Effects of Ingroup and Outgroup Friendships on Ethnic Attitudes in College: A Lon-
gitudinal Study, 6 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 76 (2003).  Propinquity is of course 
only one element in dating and sexual choices, and the size of its effect is unclear.  Recent experi-
mental work on dating websites, which attends to preferences based on race (but not sex or dis-
ability), urges that “sorting is not entirely due to search frictions, but rather that sorting patterns 
arise as a consequence of mate preferences, rational behavior, and an equilibrium mechanism by 
which matches are formed [— which] is not to say that search frictions are entirely absent in mar-
riage markets.”  Günter J. Hitsch, Ali Hortaçsu & Dan Ariely, Matching and Sorting in Online 
Dating 5 (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1113243.  
 280 The time and context of meeting may also matter in interesting ways.  See, e.g., Gary W. 
Lewandowski Jr. & Arthur P. Aron, Distinguishing Arousal from Novelty and Challenge in Initial 
Romantic Attraction Between Strangers, 32 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 361, 361–65 (2004) 
(reporting, inter alia, on a series of studies showing that strangers meeting in high arousal settings 
— as on a shaky bridge — were more likely to report attraction than those in low arousal set-
tings); see also Martie G. Haselton et al., Ovulatory Shifts in Human Female Ornamentation: 
Near Ovulation, Women Dress to Impress, 51 HORMONES & BEHAV. 40, 42 (2007) (reporting 
that, around the time of ovulation, women engage in more “active ornamentation” in their cloth-
ing and other apparel in ways that lead male and female judges to rate them as more attractive).   
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tion occur within a particular disability.  So deaf students form one 
subunit of the school, blind students another, quadriplegic students 
another, and schizophrenic students another.  (Students with more than 
one disability are placed randomly into a subunit of one of their  
disabilities.) 
This institutional structure would probably increase the likelihood 
that a disabled student would form relationships with others who 
share her particular disability, rather than with someone with a differ-
ent disability.  Regardless of any prior preferences, the student spends 
all her time at school with those who share her disability.  It also seems 
reasonable to conclude that the disabled students are more likely to 
pair across disabilities than with nondisabled teens, given their in-
creased chances of meeting before or after school or between classes, 
since they are housed in the same building, entirely separate from the 
nondisabled students. 
Now imagine one day the schools and classrooms are joined.  At 
first, we might expect preferences to have been shaped by the prior ar-
rangement, but over time, more intimate connections might form 
across the groups previously segregated.  It would be surprising if who 
mixes with whom mapped perfectly onto what intimate relationships 
formed, but the contrast between no mixing and complete mixing 
dramatizes the fact that the structure of a community plays a role. 
Casual contact creates the conditions for the accidents of sex and 
love.281  Of course, whom we choose as our partners depends largely 
on deeply held private preferences, perhaps particularly with regard to 
sexual desire, and on rational calculations (the next topic), perhaps 
particularly when people ponder marriage.  But accidents do occur.  
Crucial accidents may be the stuff of fiction,282 but they are also, some 
of the time, the stuff of life.  And the state plays a role in shaping these 
accidents. 
This is what the term “accidents” captures: the sense that who will 
love whom and who will desire whom may sometimes be an “unpre-
dictable, mysterious, and elusive phenomenon”283 at an individual 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 281 This was of course well understood by race segregationists.  See infra notes 330–32 and ac-
companying text. 
 282 E.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMER NIGHT’S DREAM; BACK TO THE FU-
TURE (Universal Pictures 1985); WHILE YOU WERE SLEEPING (Hollywood Pictures 1995). 
 283 Amy L. Wax, Discrimination As Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1230 (1999).  Wax uses this 
evocative description of accident, surprisingly, to argue that there is no way to shape the occur-
rence of the accidents of unconscious bias in the workplace.  I say surprisingly because, to me, the 
utility of the word accident comes from its implication that individuals may be erratic, but the 
surrounding environment exerts influence and thus can be usefully regulated.  This is not the 
place for a full examination of Wax’s argument, but I think her different path comes in part from 
her assumption that the science of unconscious bias is at such a primitive stage that such bias can 
never be predicted or curtailed, see, e.g., id. at 1133, an assumption that others have challenged.  
See, for example, the essays in Symposium, Behavioral Realism, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006).  By 
 
  
2009] INTIMATE DISCRIMINATION 1369 
level, and yet be inevitably shaped by the infrastructure — what 
Moran has called the “structural influences”284 — that determines who 
meets whom.  In this way, even a romantic view of love is consistent 
with an appreciation that the state shapes our romantic choices — as 
is a rationalist view, which is our next topic. 
2.  Calculating Desire. — Some lovers temper romance with ra-
tionality: they consider, implicitly or explicitly, the costs and benefits of 
being in a relationship with a particular other.285  One version of a ra-
tionalist account falls under the headings of “matching theory” or “as-
sortative mating.”286  Empirical work in this area indicates that people 
tend to pair with similar partners along dimensions such as attractive-
ness, education, wealth, earnings, and age (as well as race, as noted 
earlier).287  Controversies persist as to whether people seek those who 
are more attractive (or richer, etc.) than themselves, but end up sorting 
into similar matches because everyone cannot have the most attractive 
(richest) mate, or whether people simply seek those who are similarly 
situated in terms of attractiveness (wealth).288  Either way, state poli-
cies affect the distribution of social capital — such as education, 
wealth, and earning power — and thus play a role in shaping the bar-
riers (and on-ramps) to entry into intimate relationships.  
In the context of race, Randall Kennedy has observed that the 
“poverty, unemployment, lesser educational opportunities, and like 
deprivations” faced by many people of color place them at a disadvan-
tage in the U.S. market for marriage.289  Kennedy thus highlights the 
role our personal and social assets can play in our prospects for finding 
or keeping a (desirable) mate.  Kennedy’s work also offers vivid ac-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
contrast, there is no question that whom one loves and desires is, at least to some extent, shaped 
by whom one encounters.     
 284 MORAN, supra note 23, at 119.   
 285 Rachel Moran is right to suggest that we like to think of “rationality [as] misplaced in mat-
ters of the heart”; however, as she acknowledges, some of our dating methods — such as the 
search mechanisms of many commercial dating services — make explicit the role of calculations.  
Id. at 13.     
 286 See Lisa K. Jepsen & Christopher A. Jepsen, An Empirical Analysis of the Matching Pat-
terns of Same-Sex and Opposite-Sex Couples, 39 DEMOGRAPHY 435, 435 (2002); S. Alexander 
Takeuchi, On the Matching Phenomenon in Courtship: A Probability Matching Theory of Mate 
Selection, 40 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 25, 30 (2006).  For another version of a rationalist account, 
see NUSSBAUM, supra note 275.   
 287 See, e.g., Jepsen & Jepsen, supra note 286, at 450–51 (finding matching along all axes stud-
ied — including race, age, schooling, investment income, earnings, and blue or white collar job — 
though more for non-labor-market variables (the first four listed) than for labor-market variables, 
particularly for married different-sex couples); Takeuchi, supra note 286, at 27–28 (discussing the 
data on attractiveness).       
 288 See, e.g., Peter M. Buston & Stephen T. Emlen, Cognitive Processes Underlying Human 
Mate Choice: The Relationship Between Self-Perception and Mate Preference in Western Society, 
100 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8805 (2003); Takeuchi, supra note 286, at 26–27. 
 289 KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 520.   
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counts of the costs endured by interracial couples in a hostile world.  
Though most of these accounts are historical, some of those costs still 
exist, as I discuss further in Part IV.  Perhaps less well known or re-
marked upon, however, are the analogous barriers to entry surround-
ing intimacy and disability that can affect the rational calculation of 
whether to enter or remain in a relationship when one or both partners 
has a disability.  A second hypothetical captures the point. 
Imagine two towns: Accessible City (A-City, for short) and Inacces-
sible City (I-City).  Janet, an attractive young lawyer and triple ampu-
tee who uses a wheelchair, lives in A-City, where she meets John, a 
nondisabled librarian, and they begin dating.  In A-City, where every-
thing is accessible, John and Janet can go wherever they please to-
gether — parks, museums, restaurants, bars.  They go dancing and see 
movies; they take public transportation to the botanical gardens and 
the zoo.  Most private buildings are accessible, at least on the ground 
floor, so they visit friends together, attend parties, and enjoy an easy 
and relaxed social life.  In addition, the state in which A-City is lo-
cated has a welfare system that provides personal assistance to Janet 
for daily self-care tasks (as needed), and were she to marry, Janet’s 
state assistance would continue as before. 
Janet then moves to I-City, in a far away state, for a new job, 
prompting a breakup with John.  In I-City she meets Tim, another 
lawyer, at a local Bar event, and they hit it off.  Janet hopes their 
spark might develop into a relationship, but even dating proves diffi-
cult.  Public transportation in I-City is only partly accessible — with 
most subway stops accessible only by stairs and more than half the 
city’s buses without working lifts — and there are few accessible taxis.  
Difficulties with transportation make Janet late to work on numerous 
occasions, at first threatening her status in her new job, though she ad-
justs by leaving home at ridiculously early hours (something Tim, not a 
morning person, finds tedious).  Most restaurants have steps up to 
their entrance or such narrow aisles between tables as to make move-
ment in a chair impossible.  (Some of these obstacles violate the public 
accommodations title of the ADA,290 but compliance is poor and law-
suits have been rare.291)  The few restaurants that are accessible have 
tables with big circular bases on the table legs, so Janet has to park 
her wheelchair back from the table, making intimacy challenging.  
Movie theaters and stores are all hit or miss in their accessibility.  Al-
most no one’s home is accessible, so they cannot attend dinner parties 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 290 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189 (2000). 
 291 Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of 
“Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing the many problems with en-
forcement of the public accommodations title of the ADA, including court hostility and the un-
availability of damages). 
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together.  Tim’s friends feel awkward about this and debate whether 
even to invite him to things, knowing Janet will not be able to join 
him.  They begin to ask him, subtly and not so subtly, whether he 
would want to face a lifetime of such constraints.292  One of them, a 
social worker, points out that I-City’s state revokes personal-assistance 
services if a disabled beneficiary marries, on the assumption that her 
spouse will take on those duties.293  Janet has many more daily frustra-
tions in I-City, and feels a great deal more anger and hostility, which 
creates tension and conflict with Tim, who sees her perspective but 
also does not experience it as she does.  When he encourages her to be 
positive, she feels alienated from him and accuses him of an inability 
to understand her world.294  He feels excluded, and the distance be-
tween them grows. 
Janet’s prospects as a dating partner look starkly different in the 
two towns, based on decisions by the state about infrastructure, policy, 
and enforcement.  Her partner faces strikingly different costs related to 
her disability in I-City as opposed to A-City, making the prospect of 
dating her look rather different under any explicit or implicit rational 
calculus.  The situation in I-City would be only starker if Janet had 
actually lost her job; in this and other ways, the hypotheticals do not 
come close to depicting the material consequences that can arise from 
a lack of accessibility or of legal protection against discrimination.  
Other variations on the hypotheticals would illuminate further dimen-
sions of the issues.  For instance, if Janet’s disability had been some-
thing she could conceal, such as a psychiatric disability, there could 
have been added difficulties for the relationship surrounding her dis-
closure to her partner and dilemmas about whether or when to tell 
others.295  In addition, although the emphasis in the hypotheticals has 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 292 Cf. KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 79; SIMI LINTON, MY BODY POLITIC 101 (2006).   
 293 See infra section IV.D.2, pp. 1390–91. 
 294 Cf. GOFFMAN, supra note 181, at 31 (“The relation between the stigmatized and his stand-
in can be an uneasy one.  The person with a failing may feel that reversion to type may occur at 
any moment, and at a time when defenses are down and dependency is up.”); Chito Childs, supra 
note 169, at 2780 (describing black interviewees’, on the subject of interracial relationships, “of-
fer[ing] various examples of how whites mistreat blacks in general, connecting this to the prob-
ability that a white individual would use a racial slur, disrespect the black partner, and simply not 
understand what it means to be ‘black in America’”); Kim McLarin, Race Wasn’t an Issue to 
Him, Which Was an Issue to Me, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2006, at ST9 (describing the pain in a 
mixed-race relationship when one “person . . . grapples with race” and one does not); SOME-
THING NEW (Focus Features 2006) (portraying a mixed-race couple’s splitting up when the white 
partner proposes a break from discussing race, after the black partner had been complaining 
about racism at work).   
 295 See, e.g., GOFFMAN, supra note 181, at 99.  Goffman provides the following quotation as 
an example of “stigma management work done by wives of mental patients”:  
 I haven’t gotten too friendly with anyone at the office because I don’t want people 
to know where my husband is.  I figure that if I got too friendly with them, then they 
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been on ongoing relationships, many of the cities’ differences could af-
fect prospects for sexual encounters as well, which depend on access-
ing places to meet others and to interact sexually, as well as on one’s 
attractiveness to potential mates.  Social status, opportunities, and in-
come can affect a person’s attractiveness and confidence, as can the 
presence or absence of attractive and successful group members in the 
relevant community and available media.296  Such outcomes are easy 
to imagine as different in A-City and I-City.   
In addition to showing the significance of law to intimate discrimi-
nation, the contrast depicted in this hypothetical portrays a central 
idea of disability law and theory: the social model of disability.  Unlike 
the so-called medical model, which views disability as a medical prob-
lem with the individual, the social model views disability as inhering 
in the interaction between the impairment and the social environ-
ment.297  As the writer Simi Linton, who uses a wheelchair, portrays 
the difference between the medical and social models, “If I want to go 
to vote or use the library, and these places are inaccessible, do I need a 
doctor or a lawyer?”298  Consistent with the social model, Janet is 
much more disabled — and so is her partner, in effect — in one city 
than in the other, entirely because of the law and structures of the two 
cities, and not because of any difference in her physical impairment.  
The effects of inaccessibility on partners of disabled people may 
help to explain the bipartisan support for the ADA’s passage in 1990.  
Scholars have noted the many members of Congress who had disabled 
relatives, reasoning that these intimate affiliations gave nondisabled 
legislators more sympathy with the challenges and stigma faced by 
disabled people.299  An explanation based on sympathy may be right, 
but incomplete.  As the hypothetical about A-City and I-City suggests, 
these intimate connections may also have given nondisabled legislators 
an understanding of the social model, through their firsthand experi-
ence with the ways that inaccessibility creates disability, both for dis-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
would start asking questions, and I might start talking, and I just think it’s better if as 
few people as possible know about Joe. 
Id. (quoting M.R. Yarrow, J.A. Clausen & P.R. Robbins, The Social Meaning of Mental Illness, 11 
J. SOC. ISSUES 33, 36 (1955)).  For further discussion of issues and research related to disclosure, 
see Emens, supra note 259, at 903–08.   
 296 Cf. infra note 326 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of films, such as Mur-
derball, to ideas of desirability). 
 297 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 
397, 428–33 (2000); see also MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY 30–42 (1996) 
(explaining the “social model” as distinguished from the “individual model”).   
 298 LINTON, supra note 292, at 120. 
 299 See, e.g., JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW 
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 118–19 (1993); Stein, supra note 232, at 627.  The presence in Con-
gress of people who themselves had disabilities — most notably, Rep. Tony Coelho — was also 
vitally important to the Act’s passage.  SHAPIRO, supra, at 117–18. 
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abled people and for those who accompany them.  Intimate relation-
ships across race may perform a similar function, in giving members of 
superordinate groups experience with the ways discrimination shapes 
the category of race.300 
The hypotheticals in this section could also be rewritten to involve 
other categories.  One can imagine analogous scenarios involving cities 
more or less disabling to interracial couples, through features such as 
the availability of integrated neighborhoods, and to same-sex couples, 
through the practical and symbolic significance of the availability of 
marriage.  As another example, applicable to all three groups, hate 
crime laws could affect the experience of these relationships, and thus 
the rational calculation of whether the benefits of such relationships 
are worth the costs.   
These hypotheticals about accidents and calculations portray the 
structural truth lurking beneath David Mura’s words in the opening 
epigraph: “[T]here is[] a relationship between whom I desire and 
whom I hire, [and] between whom I want my children to desire and 
whom I hire.”301  Mura’s words seem to suggest an individual point: I 
have similar feelings toward some groups that make me inclined to 
hire the same people I desire.302  But they also reflect the more impor-
tant point of this examination of intimate discrimination: whom I hire 
shapes whom I meet and might desire, and whom my children meet 
and might desire.  And vice versa.  Whom I desire and date and marry, 
and whom my children desire and date and marry, shapes whom I 
know to hire.  And further.  Whom I hire shapes who has the social 
capital to be good enough to date my children.  And whom my chil-
dren marry shapes the people I want to hire, the people to whom I 
want to give opportunities for advancement and access to the good 
life.   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 300 These effects may also work across sexual orientation: think here of a bisexual seeing what 
it is to be gay in a particular community through his first relationship with another man, or a 
straight person seeing something of how it feels to be a sexual minority through a relationship 
with a bisexual.   
 301 Mura, supra note 1, at 282; see also supra p. 1309. 
 302 Sex operates differently from race and disability, as discussed in Parts I–II, pp. 1315–66.  
Cross-sex desire may not lead to hiring, but to a separate spheres mentality.  But the broader 
points that follow in this paragraph have some bearing on sex.  For instance, the sex of the people 
one’s children date may affect hiring choices; think here of people with unexpectedly tolerant atti-
tudes on gay issues who, it turns out, have a gay child.  In addition, an individual’s dating experi-
ences with members of the opposite sex whose gender is not wholly conventional may be more 
willing to hire those whose gender is not wholly conventional.  (The question of whether a 
straight-identified person’s same-sex sexual experiences leads to more tolerant attitudes, or to 
more homophobia, is complicated.  See, e.g., Yoshino, Bisexual Erasure, supra note 111.)    
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B.  Why Intimate Discrimination Matters 
As noted in the Introduction, these are challenging times for anti-
discrimination law.  The antidiscrimination project is plainly incom-
plete.  Widespread inequalities persist, along numerous lines, including 
race, disability, and sexual orientation.  Yet our current antidiscrimina-
tion protections do not seem to be adequate to the problem.  This chal-
lenge has been given various names, including “preservation through 
transformation”303 — the name Reva Siegel gives to the process by 
which discriminatory practices morph and persist in new forms in re-
sponse to legal prohibitions — and “second generation discrimina-
tion”304 — the term Susan Sturm applies to the subtler, more diffuse 
patterns of interaction that lead to disparate outcomes even in the ab-
sence of any individual ill will. 
In the face of such a challenge, a careful examination of intimate 
discrimination matters.  As we have seen already, this inquiry yields 
useful insights about the categories of discrimination and our ways of 
understanding them.  But its use is not merely conceptual.  Intimate 
discrimination is itself important as a practical matter, as this section 
discusses.  Because of intimate discrimination, some groups are ex-
cluded from opportunities for intimate affiliation, which itself has con-
sequences for members of those groups, and everyone’s intimate op-
portunities are limited by the current structures of discrimination.  
Moreover, intimate discrimination has ramifications for discrimination 
beyond the intimate sphere. 
1.  The Direct Harms of Intimate Discrimination. — Social stigma 
and structural constraints exclude some people from meaningful par-
ticipation in the dating, sex, and marriage markets.  The norm of de-
sexualization for people with disabilities both reflects and contributes 
to the relatively limited opportunities many disabled people face in 
forming intimate relationships.305  Moreover, inadequate implementa-
tion of legal entitlements — such as inadequate accessibility in public 
transportation and public accommodations — inhibits disabled people 
from meeting others and developing relationships.306  In addition, rela-
tive poverty and low employment rates among disabled people reduce 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 303 Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating As Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE 
L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996). 
 304 Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 232, at 468. 
 305 See supra section I.C, pp. 1325–30. 
 306 On the inadequate implementation of the ADA, see, for example, BACKLASH AGAINST 
THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003); 
Bagenstos, supra note 291; and Feldblum, supra note 134.  For an argument that the Supreme 
Court’s interpretations of the ADA reflect contradictions within the disability rights movement 
itself, see SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (forthcoming 2009). 
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the social capital they bring to the intimacy markets.307  As noted ear-
lier, Randall Kennedy has made related points about the relative im-
poverishment of people of color, as it affects their prospects for inti-
mate relationships.308  Race and gender also intersect to create 
particular subgroups who are relatively excluded in their intimate 
prospects, in particular, African American women. 
Limited opportunity for sex and marriage can have welfare conse-
quences.  Empirical studies suggest that both sex and marriage have 
positive physical and mental health effects.  For instance, studies show 
a positive relationship between lifespan and frequency of sexual activ-
ity, orgasm, or enjoyment of sex.309  Sex has also been shown to in-
crease happiness,310 though some research finds this to be more true 
for men.311  Marriage is also associated with decreased mortality risk 
and better health outcomes,312 though some work has also found the 
mortality effect of marriage to be greater for men than for women.313  
In addition, marriage predicts lower levels of depression and higher 
levels of life satisfaction than those reported by the never-married, di-
vorced or separated, and widowed,314 with some research finding that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 307 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 9 (2004) 
(discussing poverty and low rates of employment among people with disabilities).   
 308 KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 520. 
 309 See, e.g., Erdman B. Palmore, Predictors of the Longevity Difference: A 25-Year Follow-Up, 
22 GERONTOLOGIST 513, 515 (1982); Daniel R. Seldin et al., Sexual Activity As a Predictor of 
Life-Span Mortality Risk, 33 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 409, 422–23 (2002); 
George Davey Smith et al., Sex and Death: Are They Related? Findings From the Caerphilly Co-
hort Study, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 1641, 1642–43 (1997).      
 310 See, e.g., David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Money, Sex and Happiness: An Em-
pirical Study, 106 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 393, 411 (2004).   
 311 See id. at 402; Adam Crossley & Darren Langdridge, Perceived Sources of Happiness: A 
Network Analysis, 6 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 107, 126 (2005); see also Mary H. Burleson et al., In 
the Mood for Love or Vice Versa? Exploring the Relations Among Sexual Activity, Physical Affec-
tion, Affect, and Stress in the Daily Lives of Mid-Aged Women, 36 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 
357, 361, 364 (2007).  
 312 See, e.g., Norman J. Johnson et al., Marital Status and Mortality: The National Longitudi-
nal Mortality Study, 10 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 224, 236 (2000); Pekka Martikainen et al., 
Differences in Mortality by Marital Status in Finland from 1976 to 2000: Analyses of Changes in 
Marital-Status Distributions, Socio-Demographic and Household Composition, and Cause of 
Death, 59 POPULATION STUD. 99, 112 (2005); see also Bonnie Burman & Gayla Margolin, 
Analysis of the Association Between Marital Relationships and Health Problems: An Interactional 
Perspective, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 39, 58 (1992) (reviewing the literature to date and finding that 
being married generally predicts better health outcomes but that no evidence supports a causal 
relationship).     
 313 See Yuanreng Hu & Noreen Goldman, Mortality Differentials by Marital Status: An Inter-
national Comparison, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 233, 246 (1990).  
 314 See Ed Diener et al., Similarity of the Relations Between Marital Status and Subjective 
Well-Being Across Cultures, 31 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 419, 432 (2000); Steven Stack & 
J. Ross Eshleman, Marital Status and Happiness: A 17-Nation Study, 60 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
527, 531, 534 (1998); Kristi Williams, Has the Future of Marriage Arrived? A Contemporary Ex-
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health effects depend on marital quality.315  Overall, both sexual activ-
ity and marriage appear to have welfare benefits, which those with re-
duced opportunities in these domains miss.316       
In addition, it is not just people on the bottom of the hierarchy who 
are limited by the current regime.  Many people’s opportunities to 
meet people from a range of backgrounds and pursue intimate rela-
tionships are being limited by a history of exclusionary practices that 
have shaped our infrastructure and social conditions.  Admittedly, it 
would require a particularly romantic conception of love to argue that 
specific individuals have not met “the one” for them because the walls 
of segregation and inaccessibility have kept those particular individu-
als apart.  Such an idea of love is not unheard of, of course; most obvi-
ously, Plato’s Symposium offered Aristophanes’ tale of love as the 
search for our lost halves, created when the gods split our originary 
double-beings in half.317  But even without a belief that there is just 
one right person for everyone, we might feel a certain frustration or 
even outrage to realize that our opportunities to meet people have been 
constrained by the state’s (sometimes intentional) efforts to keep people 
like us apart.  If we think of a current person we love, in whatever ca-
pacity, and imagine that the structure of the state had precluded our 
meeting them because of some aspect of them (or us) that the state did 
not want mingling, then the limitations on all of us may be felt. 
It is of course impossible to determine some optimal amount of 
mixing.  And as to whether there should be more than there is now, 
with regard to race in particular there are arguments on both sides, in-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
amination of Gender, Marriage, and Psychological Well-Being, 44 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 
470, 473, 484 (2003).  
 315 See, e.g., Janice K. Kiecolt-Glaser & Tamara L. Newton, Marriage and Health: His and 
Hers, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 472, 493–94 (2001); see also Williams, supra note 314, at 483 (review-
ing the literature and observing inconsistent results on the conventional wisdom that marriage per 
se benefits men more than women and that marital quality affects women more than men, and 
concluding, from a longitudinal data set, that “[b]eing in a satisfying, supportive marriage offers 
similar [psychological] benefits to women and men, and exiting such a marriage or being in a 
strained marriage confers similar costs”).  
 316 Marriage also occupies a certain social status, which those excluded from its domain lack, 
despite being subject to regulation in its shadow.  See, e.g., Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of 
Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 
1641 (2003).  In addition, the state treats unmarried families differently, particularly those families 
receiving the kinds of state support associated with poverty, who experience a greater degree of 
state intrusion on their family autonomy.  See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A 
Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299 (2002).   
 317 PLATO, THE SYMPOSIUM 22–26 (M.C. Howatson & Frisbee C.C. Sheffield eds., M.C. 
Howatson trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2008); cf. Emens, supra note 146, at 291–94 (discussing 
Aristophanes’ myth in relation to the cultural fantasy of supermonogamy, the idea of one right 
person ever).  
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cluding from an antisubordination perspective.318  I will therefore re-
turn to this point, with a different proposal for race than for disabil-
ity,319 but it is worth noting here that the constraints of structural dis-
crimination do not limit the subordinated group members alone.         
2.  Contributing to the Broader Problem of Discrimination. — In-
timate discrimination has effects on discrimination beyond the inti-
mate realm.  To begin, the intimate sphere is literally where we make 
the next generation.  Whether we appear in the world through conven-
tional or sophisticated means, most of us grow up in families of origin 
with adults engaging in horizontal intimate relationships, permanent 
or temporary.  Those relationships may themselves create children of 
mixed race, which may at least partially unsettle some of the ugliest 
forms of U.S. white supremacy, based as they are on fantasies of a 
pure white race untainted by a single drop of nonwhite blood.  Evi-
dence that racial hierarchy can arise beyond the particular realm of 
white supremacy, with fine gradations of color signifying status dis-
tinctions, suggests that one should not put too much stock in the ex-
pectation that racial mixing will reduce prejudice, however.320  More 
meaningfully, there is reason to think that children of mixed race have 
more tolerant racial attitudes and prefer racially diverse settings more 
than do non–mixed race children.321 
Relatedly, families are at the heart of communities and thus of so-
cial and employment networks.  Who one knows has significant effects 
on one’s opportunities.  Discrimination that prevents and creates both 
intentional and accidental contacts can have major effects on ongoing 
social stratification.322 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 318 There are also arguments for in-group intimate preferences among disabled people, see su-
pra p. 1347, but because the norm with disability has been desexualization (not pairing of particu-
lar groups over others), the counter-normative intervention can aim to pair both within and across 
disability — and therefore not implicate this concern.  See infra section IV.D, pp. 1390–96 (dis-
cussing this contrast). 
 319 See infra sections IV.D–E, pp. 1390–1400. 
 320 See, e.g., Donna Goldstein, “Interracial” Sex and Racial Democracy in Brazil: Twin Con-
cepts?, 101 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 563, 563 (1999); see also MORAN, supra note 23, at 54–59; 
supra note 168. 
 321 See, e.g., Jean S. Phinney & Linda L. Alipuria, At the Interface of Cultures: Multieth-
nic/Multiracial High School and College Students, 136 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 139, 151–52 (1996); 
Walter G. Stephan & Cookie White Stephan, Intermarriage: Effects on Personality, Adjustment, 
and Intergroup Relations in Two Samples of Students, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 241, 242, 248–49 
(1991).  But cf. Diane Barnes, Multiethnic Parentage: A Potentially Valuable Resource in the 
Quest for Social Cohesion, 10 J. ETHNIC & CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN SOC. WORK 31, 42–43 
(2001). 
 322 See, e.g., LOURY, supra note 3, at 99–107; STEPHEN MENENDIAN ET AL., STRUCTURAL 
RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES 13–16 (2008); DEIRDRE A. ROYSTER, RACE AND THE IN-
VISIBLE HAND: HOW WHITE NETWORKS EXCLUDE BLACK MEN FROM BLUE-COLLAR 
JOBS (2003); Note, supra note 56, at 885. 
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Apart from effects on the next generation and on third-party con-
nections, the contact created by intimate relations may improve atti-
tudes across race and disability.323  Just as, under some conditions, 
workplace contact among people of different races or abilities im-
proves attitudes across those categories, studies of friendship and race 
also suggest that interracial friendship positively affects racial atti-
tudes.324  And the very limited work on the effects of interracial sexual 
intimacy also suggests some positive effects on racial attitudes.325  An 
important caveat to this concerns breakups: how relationships play out 
and eventually end (if they do) could also negatively affect attitudes 
toward a particular group, though I have found no empirical work on 
this question.  Thus, while the ultimate impact is uncertain and war-
rants further study, there is some basis for thinking that intimate con-
tact can help ameliorate discrimination. 
Moreover, desire and liking are powerful emotions that can trans-
form undesirables into desirables, and thus potentially alter hierar-
chies.  Perhaps this effect is more meaningful for groups that have 
been cast as undesirable or desexualized, where depictions of sexual 
desirability — or of coolness — can be transformative in the minds of 
third parties.  For example, the movie Murderball brought to a larger 
audience the sport of quad rugby and its accompanying glamour and 
sexuality.326  The audience effects of affirmative sexual depictions of 
sexually stigmatized groups merit careful study.  But such depictions 
are likely to have some significance for individual responses to, as well 
as broader attitudes toward, stigmatized groups.327  Of course, the 
power of desire and of liking can, as noted above, lead to both nega-
tive and positive feelings.  But the potential for some impact seems 
worth taking seriously.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 323 This hypothesis has been much criticized for overstated claims, but relevant meta-analyses 
show statistically significant results.  See Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-
Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751 (2006); 
see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 1, 22–29 (2000).   
 324 See, e.g., Shana Levin, Colette van Laar & Jim Sidanius, The Effects of Ingroup and Out-
group Friendships on Ethnic Attitudes in College: A Longitudinal Study, 6 GROUP PROCESSES 
& INTERGROUP REL. 76, 87–88 (2003); Katherine McClelland & Erika Linnander, The Role of 
Contact and Information in Racial Attitude Change Among White College Students, 76 SOC. IN-
QUIRY 81 (2006).     
 325 See, e.g., Shana Levin et al., Interethnic and Interracial Dating in College: A Longitudinal 
Study, 24 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 323 (2005). 
 326 See Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Shape Structures Story: Fresh and Feisty Stories About 
Disability, 15 NARRATIVE 113, 115–16 (2007).     
 327 Perhaps one way that desire can help to unsettle hierarchies is by inspiring individuals from 
different communities to listen to each other’s stories with compassion.  On the power of narra-
tive, imagination, and compassion to aid our appreciation of hierarchies of sex and race, see Mar-
tha Nussbaum, Narratives of Hierarchy: Loving v. Virginia and the Literary Imagination, 17 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 337 (1997).      
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Finally, as discussed in Part I, the norms of intimate discrimination 
take on a life of their own outside the intimate sphere, shaping the 
perceptions of courts in ways that hinder justice for employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs.328  And court decisions are just one legal exam-
ple of the broader set of ways that intimate norms — and particular 
expressions of those norms — contribute to stereotypes and stigma 
borne by various groups.329  For all these reasons, intimate discrimina-
tion creates a set of practical problems with which the state must con-
tend.  The next Part discusses how it should do so. 
IV.  THE ROLES THE STATE SHOULD PLAY 
[D]o away with the social and political distinctions now existing, and you 
immediately turn all the blacks and mulattoes into citizens, co-governors, 
and acquaintances: and acquaintances . . . are the raw material from 
which are manufactured friends, husbands, and wives.  The man whom 
you associate with is next invited to your house, and the man whom you 
invite to your house is the possible husband of your daughter, whether he 
be black or white. 
— W.W. Wright, Amalgamation (1860)330 
Those who opposed interpersonal contact between blacks and 
whites understood the potential consequences.  They saw that through 
such contact the accidents of friendship, sex, and love arise.331  And 
they appreciated the deep significance of such relations to our identity.  
State actors understood this too, and used that understanding to pre-
vent the commingling of desirables and undesirables.332  That regime 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 328 See supra section I.E, pp. 1334–39. 
 329 See, e.g., Note, supra note 56, at 879–84. 
 330 W.W. Wright, Amalgamation, 29 DE BOW’S REV. 1, 14 (1860).  The author continues, “If we 
examine the practical operation of this principle in other countries, we shall find that just in pro-
portion as . . . this prejudice of color, if you will, is done away with and abandoned, just in that 
proportion is the white population of those countries reduced in the standard of civilization and 
morals.”  Id. at 15. 
 331 See, e.g., Reginald Oh, Interracial Marriage in the Shadows of Jim Crow: Racial Segrega-
tion as a System of Race and Gender Subordination, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1321, 1339–41 (2006); 
Reginald Oh, Regulating White Desire, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 463, 476–85.  In addition, civil rights 
advocates, wise to fears that public associations across race would lead to private relationships 
across race, devised strategies of desegregation that would minimize such fears.  For instance, 
Thurgood Marshall recounted that the NAACP began its school desegregation efforts with gradu-
ate schools, and only later turned to primary schools, to accommodate public fears that integrat-
ing young children would have a deeper effect on attitudes toward intimate associations across 
race.  Marshall noted, “Those racial supremacy boys somehow think that little kids of six or seven 
are going to get funny ideas about sex and marriage just from going to school together, but for 
some equally funny reason youngsters in law school aren’t supposed to feel that way.”  Alfred H. 
Kelly, The School Desegregation Case, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITU-
TION 307, 318 (John A. Garraty ed., 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 332 In this light, we might read an explicit carve-out in federal housing law — the so-called 
Mrs. Murphy exception for owner-occupied dwellings of no more than five families — as a con-
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has officially ended now, at least with regard to race and to most dis-
abilities,333 but it would be naïve to think that the state no longer af-
fects our intimate choices.   
Although some important legal mandates have been repealed or 
struck down, those historical restrictions have arguably helped to 
shape private preferences and social norms.  These norms, in turn, 
have precluded certain relationships and caused pain and disadvan-
tage for many of those individuals thus separated or desexualized.  
Moreover, by deciding the form of our communities’ institutional and 
physical infrastructure, the state has shaped who meets whom, who 
interacts with whom, who has the chance to fall for whom.  This oc-
curs, for instance, when the state decides whether to put accessible toi-
lets in a town center and how many.  Without accessible toilets, those 
who require them will not enter or remain in certain public spaces.334  
There are many institutional examples of the state’s shaping which in-
timate accidents can occur — from the history of redlining and other 
state influence on residential (racial) segregation;335 to the institution-
alization of people with mental and physical disabilities;336 to school 
segregation with regard to race and disability (or no school at all for 
some at some times);337 to who sits together (or not) on juries;338 to 
who is housed together in prison spaces.339  And we know from the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
cession to fears of miscegenation, though it is usually framed in terms of privacy and freedom of 
association.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (2000); see also James D. Walsh, Note, Reaching Mrs. 
Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy Exception to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 605 (1999) (discussing the justifications for the exception and arguing for its 
repeal).  On the role that perceived public fear of miscegenation played in the Supreme Court’s 
choices about which desegregation cases to consider in what order, see infra note 420. 
 333 See supra section I.A, pp. 1315–18. 
 334 (Nor will they, probably, be able to have sex in the public toilets.) 
 335 See, e.g., SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION 10–11, 115–17 (2004); 
IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE 162–66 (2006). 
 336 See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101(2)–(3) (2000); Olmstead v. 
L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 597–601 (1999); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 
462 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); sources cited 
supra note 23.     
 337 On race, see, for example, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); and JACK 
GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS (2004), and on disability, for example, the findings 
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(c)(1)–(2) (2006); and Ruth 
Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 789, 794–
96 (2006). 
 338 See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79 (1986); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); 
Mary A. Lynch, The Application of Equal Protection to Prospective Jurors with Disabilities: Will 
Batson Cover Disability-Based Strikes?, 57 ALB. L. REV. 289, 298–99 (1993); Natasha Azava, 
Note, Disability-Based Peremptory Challenges: Need for Elimination, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. 
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 121, 121–34 (2006). 
 339 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) 
(per curiam); T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarceration for Persons with Severe 
Mental Disorders: Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 334–34 (1997). 
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growing literature in social psychology and decision science that 
choices are often shaped by subtle influences such as their framing.340  
Thus, because erotic preferences may be at least somewhat endogenous 
to these state-sponsored structures, even once the structures are re-
moved, the framing architecture may cast a shadow over our choices.  
But knowing that the state has created and reinforced intimate dis-
crimination does not tell us whether, or how, the state should be in-
volved in remedying it, and it is to that question that I now turn. 
With regard to sex/gender, of course, the state’s next step is clear.  
The state still places express legal restrictions on the sex of one’s mari-
tal partner, and thus excludes same-sex partners from the benefits, 
burdens, and expressive significance of marriage.  This Part therefore 
discusses sex more briefly before turning to the terrain of disability 
and race, where the state’s ongoing role is less obvious, because ex-
press restrictions are largely a thing of the past.341 
In the absence of express state-mandated discrimination, state in-
tervention at the individual level — prohibiting or discouraging indi-
viduals from discriminating, in the sense of differentiating, in the inti-
mate realm — seems misguided at best, for the reasons discussed in 
Part II.  But the state should nonetheless take affirmative steps to ad-
dress intimate discrimination, though in different ways for disability 
and race, in light of the different norms surrounding each.342    
With disability, the norm is of desexualization, of isolation and ex-
clusion from the intimate realm altogether.  In this arena, then, state 
efforts to lift barriers to entry to intimate relationships are in order.  
This means improving access to spaces and experiences where rela-
tionships begin and develop.  It means attending to intimacy in the de-
sign of accessibility — what I call the architecture of intimacy.  Sex 
and relationship education, institutional and residential rules, and  
welfare laws should all be structured to anticipate and facilitate oppor-
tunities for intimate relationships.  Contrary to the fears of some par-
ents and educators, reducing stigma and building sexual self-esteem 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 340 See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECI-
SIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 3 (2006); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics 
and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein & 
Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). 
 341 Express restrictions are entirely a thing of the past for race and for most disabilities, though 
they remain robust for mental disabilities, as noted earlier.  See supra note 9 and accompanying 
text; supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. 
 342 The question of what sort of action the state should take after it stops requiring discrimina-
tion arises in many contexts in addition to intimate discrimination, from school segregation to 
marital names.  See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the 
Future of Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (2007). 
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and opportunities should help reduce, not increase, the risk of abusive 
relationships.343 
With race, by contrast, the norm is homogamy, or in-group pairing.  
Here, rather than a norm that excludes an entire group from the inti-
mate domain, the norm pushes people to pair with some rather than 
others.  As discussed in Part II, the race homogamy norm has some 
proponents among the subordinated group and some sensible argu-
ments on its behalf.344  Most notably, members of a subordinated 
group may well think that strong families composed of subordinated 
group members are the best way to build self-esteem and resist assimi-
lation to dominant, even racist, cultural influences.  For this and other 
reasons, a state policy that actively encourages opportunities for inter-
racial relationships — even as a response to a history of discouraging 
such relationships — may be troubling.  As I discuss in the final sec-
tion, in the race context, the state’s involvement in intimate discrimi-
nation should therefore focus on lifting burdens on existing interracial 
relationships.  To be in an interracial relationship today is still to face 
numerous obstacles that the state helps to shape to a greater or lesser 
extent.  Particularly in light of the state’s history of express restrictions 
enforcing the homogamy norm, state policies should work to lift bur-
dens on interracial couples.        
This Part begins by briefly considering several interventions that 
the state should likely not pursue.  Then it sets out a toolkit of more 
plausible interventions to address intimate discrimination on a struc-
tural level.  The rest of the Part uses these tools to detail the best next 
steps for the state to take with regard to sex, disability, and race. 
A.  What Not To Do: Preliminary Ideas, Mostly Ill-Advised 
So what are some ways, in theory, that the state might intervene in 
intimate discrimination in the contexts of race or disability?  This sec-
tion briefly considers several interventions that should not be pursued, 
including several that are absurd, yet are worth considering to get a 
handle on the reasons why. 
1.  The Offense of Marriage Act. — Most intrusively, one could pro-
pose a regime in which only mixed race or mixed disability marriages 
were allowed.  (Among so many other objections, we can hear — or 
see — the protests of deaf Americans, representing the larger point 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 343 See, e.g., Carol A. Howland & Diana H. Rintala, Dating Behaviors of Women with Physical 
Disabilities, 19 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 41, 41 (2001) (“Men, and often the women them-
selves, view women with disabilities as ‘damaged goods.’  Since they are lucky to get anyone to 
ask them out on a date, the societal view is that they should be grateful for the attention of any 
man, even if he is abusive and contributes little or nothing positive to their relationship.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 344 See supra section II.A.7, pp. 1346–47. 
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about subordinated-group solidarity discussed earlier.345  With that in 
mind, we might cast the state’s objection only to all-white, all-
nondisabled marriages, recognizing that the numbers may not add up 
perfectly at first.346)  Several years ago, Geoffrey Stone created a simi-
lar thought experiment, the Mandatory Miscegenation Act of 2100, 
which provided that “[n]o person who is not genetically certified as a 
person of mixed race may procreate with another person of the same 
race.”347  In the fanciful Supreme Court opinion Stone wrote, provoca-
tively upholding the mock statute, the Court noted: 
  When the Act was first introduced in Congress, its drafters explained 
the Act as follows: “After centuries of racial strife and division, after end-
less failed efforts to eliminate racism from our hearts, our minds and our 
social policies, it is time to bring us all together and to end race once and 
for all as a divisive social construct.   
  If all Americans have only one race — the mixed race that is the one 
true melting pot of America — then and only then will we finally be ‘one 
Nation, indivisible.’”348 
Nobody, of course, would actually advocate a law that so patently 
impinges on individual liberty and autonomy.  The same could be said 
of a version of the Act that constrained marriage — not procreation — 
across race and disability.  One might suggest instead, however imp-
ishly, the Offense of Marriage Act: this statute would permit civil un-
ions for all partners, but decline to grant the label “marriage” to all-
white or all-nondisabled marriages.  A system that creates second-class 
marriages in this way also seems offensive, however, as the Act’s name 
suggests.349 
2.  Private Litigation. — Another (misguided) possibility would be 
to extend our current antidiscrimination regime to the intimate realm: 
that is, to authorize private lawsuits for sexual or marital rejections 
that were “because of” race or disability.  The problems with this are, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 345 See supra section II.A.7, pp. 1346–47. 
 346 It is an interesting question, which I do not take up here, as to which version of the statute 
— one defining marriage as always between people of different races, or one defining marriage as 
only nonwhites marrying — would face a bigger constitutional hurdle under Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967).  Both obviously seem very problematic, but while the latter seems more offen-
sive for its segregationist veneer, it also seems more in keeping with the antisubordination strand 
evident in Loving’s appreciation of antimiscegenation laws’ link to white supremacy fantasies.  
Id. at 11. 
 347 Geoffrey R. Stone, Commentary, If America Only Had One Mixed Race, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 
30, 1999, at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (reprinting Stone’s University of Chicago Cen-
tennial Contribution).  
 348 Id. 
 349 And as the same-sex marriage debates — and discussions of the Defense of Marriage Act — 
have elaborated at great length.   
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obviously, legion.350  First, there is the problem of a litigation explo-
sion.  If there is any truth to Robert Ellickson’s observation that “so-
ciopaths and love triangles” are “much overrepresented” in the cases 
that make it to court, then widely authorizing discrimination-based 
heartbalm lawsuits would be truly perverse, as it would invite nearly 
every love triangle into court without even the need for a nexus with 
an independent legal issue.351  We also might worry, as above, about 
the wisdom of incentivizing personal relationships that individuals 
may not desire. 
Moreover, this approach targets individual decisionmaking on the 
bad-actor model that haunts our employment discrimination regime 
and, even if it were the right model there (about which I have 
doubts352), it seems distinctly inapt in the intimate domain.  As dis-
cussed in Part II, animus and intimate discrimination may overlap, but 
distinctions on these categorical bases may sometimes be necessary for 
or generative of desire.  It is particularly difficult to determine what 
nondiscrimination would be in this domain, and whether and when it 
is even desirable.353  Even if we could determine what nondiscrimina-
tion means, a law targeting individual perpetrators of intimate dis-
crimination would create incentives to hide one’s preferences, thus ac-
centuating the difficulty of avoiding those who harbor animus or 
categorical nondesire towards one’s own type.354  Moreover, desire, 
and desire’s response to prohibitions, is unpredictable.355  Indeed, pro-
hibitions may fuel desire.  Whether or not other emotions and attitudes 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 350 These problems are in addition to the questionable constitutionality of such legislation, 
given Congress’s now-limited powers under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce 
Clause.  See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995).  Even the feared (but unrealized) extension of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), 
probably could not reach simple dating, though a discriminatory marriage choice is a more inter-
esting question.  Doing away with the state action doctrine, as Chemerinsky and a line of others 
proposed, would open the door to a whole range of such suits; but as Chemerinsky realized even 
back in 1985, that is not going to happen.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 
NW. U. L. REV. 503, 504–05, 556 (1985).  (Chemerinsky also thought that, in the absence of the 
state action doctrine, courts would directly invoke privacy and associational protections to pre-
vent the law’s entanglement with the (nearly proverbial) non-integrated dinner party, the example 
that is always raised in such conversations.  Id. at 538.) 
 351 Professor Ellickson mentioned this idea in a Property class at Yale Law School in the spring 
of 2001.  See also E-mail from Robert Ellickson to Elizabeth Emens (Nov. 26, 2008, 18:27) (on file 
with the Harvard Law School Library).  Of course, many of these suits would surely not be 
brought, for a wide variety of reasons.  Cf., e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1139–51 (2008) (discussing costs of publicly alleging discrimination).  It is 
nonetheless interesting to think whether, or how often, love-triangle motivations would overpower 
the costs of alleging discrimination. 
 352 See supra note 227. 
 353 See supra sections II.A–B, pp. 1340–57. 
 354 See supra section II.A.11, pp. 1352–54. 
 355 Cf. Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 692–704 (1997).   
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respond to legal prohibitions as the laws’ enactors might have 
hoped,356 desire is surely a realm in which we would not expect prohi-
bitions and exhortations as to individual behavior to lead neatly to the 
outcomes sought. 
3.  Tax Benefits. — Less ostentatiously, mixed couples could receive 
some sort of tax benefit.  Such a benefit might seem more apt in the 
context of groups subject to normative desexualization, rather than 
normative homogamy, for the reasons discussed above; thus, perhaps 
this solution is most fitting in the disability context and should apply 
to all marriages with at least one disabled spouse, whether heteroga-
mous or homogamous (with regard to disability).357  But a tax benefit 
in this area seems problematic for several reasons.  First, tax benefits 
for people subject to systematic disadvantage should not depend on 
whether those people marry; this seems a troubling distributive princi-
ple, even if one favored the incentives it created.358  Second, such a tax 
benefit would send a stigmatizing message about the status and desir-
ability of disabled people — to say that marrying “one of them” war-
rants some kind of special state financial gift.  This is akin to a point 
made by Tom Shakespeare and others about state subsidies for sex 
surrogates for disabled people: such initiatives may benefit some indi-
vidual people with disabilities, but they also send a troubling message 
about the sexual desirability of disabled people and the potential for 
true integration.359  Finally, one might also worry about creating fi-
nancial incentives to marry some people rather than others, for fear 
that there are at least some number of people who might marry for 
that reason alone, which could be bad for the public fisc, the marrying 
individuals, or both. 
B.  Toolkit: A Range of Plausible Structural Interventions 
This section sets out a range of structural interventions that may be 
useful to address intimate discrimination.  These tools are structural in 
the sense that they do not intend to restrict or burden individual 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 356 On the particular issue of perverse responses to law, it may be worth thinking more, for in-
stance, about whether the individual bad-actor model in Title VII fuels the anti-“PC” sentiment 
behind jokes like the one from Maxim magazine discussed in Part I.  See also supra note 92 (quot-
ing some of the other jokes in that issue of Maxim, involving racist humor).  
 357 This would be akin to the federal tax credit provided for the adoption expenses of parents 
who adopt hard-to-place children, a category that includes children with disabilities.  See 26 
U.S.C. § 23(a)(3) (2006).   
 358 Cf. LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES 117–54 (2006) (discussing governmen-
tal marriage promotion initiatives and critiquing the use of marriage as “the sole proxy for family 
forms that foster adult and child well-being,” id. at 154); Shari Motro, A New “I Do”: Towards a 
Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509 (2006) (discussing, and arguing against, the 
“marriage bonus” effectively given under current federal tax rules to many single-earner and un-
equal-earner married couples).   
 359 See SHAKESPEARE, GILLESPIE-SELLS & DAVIES, supra note 73, at 132–34.   
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choices; rather, they aim to allow individual choice and to create the 
structural conditions for relationships to form or flourish.  Subsequent 
sections discuss which interventions are most appropriate and impor-
tant for each category, depending on the particular norm and context 
of that category.  Detailed discussion of these tools will be included in 
these more concrete contexts, but this section first lays out broad types 
of interventions. 
The list, though certainly not exhaustive, should help us to think 
through the categories at issue in this Article, as well as provide  
tools for future thinking about intimate discrimination with regard to 
other groups.  As noted earlier, there are many categories that might 
make for interesting and productive analysis, including age, religion, 
and class, to name a few.360  One’s assessment of the problem (if any) 
of intimate discrimination for a particular identity category should 
help determine which of the following tools are more or less useful  
and appropriate, and may open one’s eyes to additional tools worth 
considering. 
1.  Lifting Formal Restrictions. — A basic step is to remove explicit 
restrictions — whether criminal or civil — on who can have sex or 
marry.361 
2.  Eliminating Penalties. — Current laws about state benefits — 
such as welfare benefits — may penalize particular types of relation-
ships, intentionally or effectively, or may discourage the formation or 
formalization of intimate relationships by those in the relevant 
groups.362  In some circumstances, removing these penalties may be 
desirable. 
3.  Leveling the Playing Field. — Having less access to social and 
material capital — such as housing, education, or employment — can 
harm an individual’s prospects in dating markets.363  In some contexts, 
the state may therefore want to take steps to increase a group’s access 
to social and material capital in order to level the playing (dating) field 
for individuals in that group.  In other contexts, however, although 
promoting equal opportunity may be good policy for other reasons, it 
should not be endorsed specifically to promote particular forms of in-
timate relationships, as discussed below in relation to race. 
4.  Allowing Access and Integration. — Removing obstacles to ac-
cess — through accommodation, for instance — can affect the possi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 360 See supra pp. 1310, 1313. 
 361 See supra section I.A, pp. 1315–18 (discussing the formal legal restrictions that existed, and 
in some cases continue to exist, in these areas). 
 362 See, e.g., infra section IV.D.2, pp. 1390–91 (discussing policies leading to the loss of some 
Social Security and Medicaid benefits for disabled people who marry). 
 363 See supra p. 1369 (noting Randall Kennedy’s remarks on the significance of these factors for 
interracial dating). 
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bilities of intimacy, as shown earlier, and should be promoted.364  As 
with leveling the playing field, however, I do not urge that (otherwise 
sound) policies of racial integration be promoted in the name of inter-
racial intimacy, as I discuss below.365 
5.  Designing the Architecture of Intimacy. — Getting into build-
ings is different from getting close.  And getting access to the public 
sphere is different from getting access to the private sphere.  Accom-
modation and integration should be evaluated for the kinds of intima-
cies, as well as the basic access, that they do and do not permit. 
6.  State Expression. — Finally, through forms of state-sponsored 
expression, such as public funding for the arts or a diversity campaign 
using public service announcements, the state could endorse affirma-
tive visions of relationships that are relatively disparaged.  Because 
state expression sometimes verges on burdening other types of rela-
tionships (see the Offense of Marriage Act discussed above366), using 
state expression in this way is a strategy to be used sparingly.  A re-
lated tool — of scrutinizing public expression for subtly disapproving 
messages — is often useful.367 
The rest of this Part elaborates on the meaning and uses of these 
tools through specific examples relevant to the categories at issue.368  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 364 See supra section III.A, pp. 1366–73. 
 365 See infra section IV.E, pp. 1396–1400 (explaining why this Article does not advocate policies 
that aim to encourage the formation of interracial relationships, as opposed to those — sometimes 
overlapping — policies whose aim is to unburden existing relationships). 
 366 See supra section IV.A.1, pp. 1382–83. 
 367 See, e.g., infra section IV.E.3, pp. 1399–1400 (noting the occasional persistence of state mar-
riage license applications that prominently ask for the race of the prospective spouses). 
 368 As noted, the list is not exhaustive.  For instance, one difficult question is whether the tool-
kit of structural interventions should include regulating third parties; in particular, we might 
wonder about regulating internet dating sites.  The design of dating websites does, after all, help 
to structure the ways that many individuals define themselves and the possibilities they confront 
and choices they make about potential partners.  See supra note 31 (discussing the popularity of 
dating websites).  But for that very reason, such internet interactions cut rather close to the space 
I think needs to be carved out for individuals to make choices and to be their own moral evalua-
tors rather than being judged by government or society.  See supra section II.B, pp. 1356–57.  An 
example demonstrates the difficulties here: My intuition is that there is a distinction between state 
interference in a site’s utterly excluding some groups from participation in the site — for instance, 
a court’s finding illegal discrimination in eHarmony’s excluding same-sex searching, or, if it ex-
isted, in a site’s excluding all disabled participants (eugenicdating.com, it might be called) — and 
state control of the types of searches that can be performed.  Cf. supra note 113 (discussing the 
eHarmony cases).  But even this suggestion is problematic, as the current structure of antidis-
crimination law in many domains is antidifferentiation, such that a legal decision in the eHar-
mony case could perhaps be used later to rule, for instance, that lesbians could not have their own 
dating sites that exclude men.  The antisubordination arguments I have discussed, on behalf of 
self-sorting by subordinated groups, would urge against the state intervening in the lesbian site, 
but courts might nonetheless allow such intervention after a favorable decision in the eHarmony 
context.  Moreover, state restrictions on the types of search mechanisms may sometimes make 
sense, particularly where these sites are fora for commercial, rather than merely dating, relation-
ships.  Cf. supra note 113 (describing a case involving roommates.com).  At any rate, I have not 
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The discussion begins with the categories subject to the greatest persis-
tence of formal restrictions and penalties — sex and disability — and 
then turns to race. 
C.  Sex: Lifting Explicit Restrictions and Eliminating Penalties 
With sex, the state explicitly burdens gay and bisexual individuals 
by restricting marriage to different-sex couples.  As has been elo-
quently stated in many places, the freedom to marry is not an abstract 
right; for it to mean anything at all, it must mean the freedom to 
marry the person that you love.369  Marriage restrictions have both ex-
pressive and practical significance; indeed, their consequences appear 
innumerable, until one reads the enumerations put together by advo-
cates and even courts.370  Related burdens on same-sex couples 
abound, from the federal Defense of Marriage Act371 (DOMA) and 
state mini-DOMAs and associated tax consequences, to the military’s 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy that prevents gay servicemembers from 
having open relationships, to the lack of second-parent adoption and 
restrictions on adoption by gay individuals in many jurisdictions.372  
To stop enacting intimate discrimination with regard to sex, the state 
should begin by removing sex-based restrictions on who can marry 
whom and associated penalties and burdens.373 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
fully developed the relation between my conception of the state as it relates to intimate discrimi-
nation and the structure of the internet as a domain of human relationship; this question is be-
yond the scope of this Article, but I hope to revisit it in future work. 
 369 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 958 (Mass. 2003); R.A. Len-
hardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the Fight for Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 96 CAL. L. REV. 839, 844–45 (2008); cf. Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27, 43–44 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2081, 2098–99 (2005).  
 370 See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955–56 (providing a list of the benefits denied to some 
by such restrictions).   
 371 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 1 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 372 See generally AYRES & BROWN, supra note 12 (describing burdens and proposing innova-
tive public and private responses).  For discussion of interpretive and constitutional problems 
with the mini-DOMAs, see generally Andrew Koppelman, The Difference the Mini-DOMAs 
Make, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 265 (2007).  Sex-based burdens also include zoning and police prac-
tices that target gay bars and bathhouses.  See, e.g., WARNER, supra note 98, at 149–93. 
 373 The same-sex marriage debate has prompted many related debates, including discussion 
about the value of the institution of marriage, and the rightness of the state’s involvement in mar-
riage.  See generally JUST MARRIAGE (Mary Lyndon Shanley ed., 2004).  There is much more to 
be said on this subject, but so long as the state provides civil marriage to different-sex couples, it 
should provide it to same-sex couples.  Mary Anne Case has also argued that opening marriage to 
same-sex couples will facilitate some progress toward gender equity in different-sex marriage.  See 
Mary Anne Case, What Stake Do Heterosexual Women Have in the Same-Sex Marriage/Domestic 
Partnership/Civil Union Debates (Feb. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library).  Whether the state can and should do anything to target gender discrimina-
tion in dating, as against feminine men or masculine women, or even against women who are 
highly educated or successful, see supra p. 1334, is an interesting question that deserves further 
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It is instructive to see how easy it is to identify what legal changes 
need to occur in this area, and yet how difficult it is to imagine what 
comes after those changes.  Our intimate decisions with regard to the 
sex of our partners are limited — through the marriage restrictions, in-
ter alia, mentioned above — in ways that our decisions about race and 
disability generally are not.374  Identifying the immediate steps for the 
state to take with regard to sex is therefore easy.  Trying to imagine 
what will come next is harder.  For instance, think of the Offense of 
Marriage Act discussed in the previous section.375  Such an act regulat-
ing relationships based on race or disability may seem troubling or of-
fensive, but a similar act regulating relationships based on sex would 
be simply preposterous.  It seems inconceivable that the state would 
try to encourage counter-normative pairings by applying the label 
“marriage” only to same-sex relationships and providing “civil unions” 
to different-sex couples.  This in part reflects the entrenchment of our 
current legal and cultural regime.  But it also reflects assumptions 
about the relative fixity of sex as a determinant category of desire.376  
Imagining a legal structure that would incentivize same-sex relations 
seems absurd, because our usual assumptions do not admit of that de-
gree of flexibility in choices about the sex of our sexual partners, de-
spite studies showing the frequency of some degrees of bisexual de-
sire.377  This is a striking difference from the common understandings 
of race and disability in relation to desire.  I do not mean to overstate 
the imaginative leap beyond removing express legal limitations; for 
starters, the passage of federal employment-discrimination protection 
and hate crime laws would lift some material and expressive burdens 
on gay individuals and couples378 and will likely precede marriage re-
form.  But it is nonetheless interesting to note the position of sexual 
orientation, relative to disability and race, in terms of whether and 
what affirmative steps are conceivable at this moment in time.   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
discussion.  On the issue of what we all can do to support freedom of sexual orientation, see gen-
erally AYRES & BROWN, supra note 12.     
 374 The primary exception to this comparative point is found in the remaining legal restrictions 
preventing sex and marriage by people with mental disabilities. See supra notes 20–24 and ac-
companying text.  These restrictions are akin to those pre-Lawrence laws governing same-sex  
relations. 
 375 See supra section IV.A.1, pp. 1382–83. 
 376 See supra section II.A, pp. 1340–55. 
 377 See, e.g., Yoshino, Bisexual Erasure, supra note 111, at 377–88 (citing studies). 
 378 On the Employment Nondiscrimination Act, see, for example, National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force Inc., Employment Non-Discrimination Act 2007 Action Center, http://www. 
thetaskforce.org/enda07/enda07.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009); relatedly, on the gay wage gap, see 
M.V. LEE BADGETT, MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE ECONOMIC LIVES OF LESBIANS 
AND GAY MEN 20–50 (2001).  On the lack of sexual orientation as a category in federal hate 
crimes law, see infra note 393. 
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D.  Disability: Removing Barriers to Entry and Encouraging Intimacy 
For disability, the structure of the legal and social norm has been 
exclusionary: people with disabilities have been treated as if outside 
the sexual realm altogether.  A wide range of reforms should thus be 
undertaken to reduce barriers to entry for people with disabilities, util-
izing each strategy set out in the toolkit above.  
1.  Lifting Explicit Restrictions. — The state’s explicit role in inti-
mate discrimination is most plainly ongoing with regard to sex and 
most plainly consigned to history for race.  Disability lies somewhere in 
between, as discussed in Part I.  Explicit eugenics-based restrictions on 
marriage based on physical disability are largely a thing of the past.379  
But restrictions — even criminal restrictions — on sexual activity and 
marriage by people with cognitive disabilities continue.380  As Deborah 
Denno has argued, such per se restrictions need to be replaced with 
contextualized inquiries into competency to consent, grounded in the 
same considerations always relevant to determinations of consent.381  
Per se restrictions on sexual activity by and with people with disabili-
ties stigmatize such individuals and permit families and guardians to 
deny the possibility of sexuality, a mindset that may itself contribute to 
the risk of abuse.382 
2.  Eliminating Marriage Penalties. — Federal and state disability 
benefits are structured in ways that penalize the decision to marry.  In 
some circumstances, marriage per se terminates benefits.  For instance, 
marriage terminates the benefits of a disabled adult child of a Social 
Security beneficiary if the spouse is not also a Social Security benefici-
ary, a rule the Supreme Court upheld in Califano v. Jobst.383  In addi-
tion to per se marriage penalties, marriage can also lead to changes in 
income calculations that cause a termination of benefits.  For instance, 
a disabled individual who receives Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) and then marries and lives with a spouse who is not eligible for 
SSI will have his income calculated as if it includes some of the 
spouse’s income.384  This increase in presumed income — “deemed” to 
the SSI-eligible spouse on the assumption that his ineligible spouse will 
use some of her income to care for his needs385 — may bump the dis-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 379 See supra pp. 1316–17. 
 380 See Denno, supra note 9; sources cited supra note 24. 
 381 See Denno, supra note 9, at 321.  For a fuller discussion, see id. at 355–79; and FIELD & 
SANCHEZ, supra note 9. 
 382 Cf. Howland & Rintala, supra note 343, at 41. 
 383 434 U.S. 47 (1977); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(1)(B)(ii), 402(d)(5) (2000).  For a discussion of 
the federal marriage penalties, see Robert E. Rains, Disability and Family Relationships: Mar-
riage Penalties and Support Anomalies, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 562–74 (2006).   
 384 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1160(a)(1) (2005); see also Rains, supra note 383, at 568–70.     
 385 20 C.F.R. § 416.1160(a)(1). 
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abled beneficiary out of SSI eligibility.  Moreover, Medicaid programs 
in some states are administered in a way that effectively reduces or 
eliminates a disabled person’s benefits upon marriage.386  Such bene-
fits — including personal care assistance for people with significant 
disabilities — are particularly important because they may enable in-
dependent rather than institutional living.  In addition, these benefits 
may be available only through public insurance because private insur-
ance often declines to cover tasks put under the category of “personal 
assistance,” though they may be vital to health as well as independ-
ence.387  A Medicaid system that ceases personal assistance when a 
disabled person marries effectively assumes that the spouse will take 
over these tasks.  Although a spouse may be willing and able to help 
with these activities, depending on size, strength, and time, he or she 
may also be daunted by the prospect of a marriage in which the state 
assigns to him or her such duties. 
3.  Leveling the Playing Field. — The relative poverty and unem-
ployment of disabled people is, for the reasons Randall Kennedy has 
identified in the race context, a serious hindrance in the dating mar-
ket.388  People without the income or status and social connections at-
tendant to employment or education lack key resources for the leisure 
activities of dating; they may also find confidence harder to come by.  
In addition, while love may involve accidents and magic, the positive 
assortative mating patterns — showing that people tend to pair with 
others who are highly similar on many dimensions including income, 
education, and attractiveness — indicate that one’s social status 
largely determines one’s dating prospects.389  Decisions of law and pol-
icy, for instance, about which laws to enforce and how vigorously, 
seem remote from the intimate sphere, but may have significant ef-
fects.  In addition, for some disabled people who have been denied ba-
sic sex education or early experiences with dating, it may be necessary 
to develop confidence and relevant social skills, as well as to gain ac-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 386 See, e.g., Stacy Forster, Disability Rule Change Sought: Marrying Can Lead to Loss of Vital 
Medicaid Coverage, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 2, 2008, at 1B.  
 387 An example of the overlap is checking patients with spinal cord injuries for pressure sores 
in the course of assisting with personal hygiene and grooming tasks.  See, e.g., K.S. LAWRENCE, 
THE RESEARCH AND TRAINING CENTER ON INDEPENDENT LIVING, PRESSURE SORES 7 
(2006), http://rtcil.org/products/RTCIL%20publications/Health%20Pressures%20sores.pdf. 
 388 See supra p. 1369. 
 389 See supra notes 286–89 and accompanying text.  Complexities arise here, for instance, in the 
fact that greater education for straight disabled women could possibly be a liability in the dating 
market in some instances, if men are relatively less educated, cf. Fisman et al., supra note 118, at 
685, or if men seek a stereotype of dependency or docility in a disabled woman, see supra  
note 163.  Though these difficult subjects deserve far more discussion, it is fair to say that im-
proving dating prospects should not trump improving access to other valuable resources such as 
education. 
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curate information about sexual relationships.390  Such programming 
may be particularly important for people with cognitive or psychiatric 
disabilities and is already provided in some local jurisdictions.391  
Thus, reforms should promote the enforcement of existing antidis-
crimination laws and the creation of new policies to support employ-
ment and independence392 — both of which have additional arguments 
in their favor — and they should expand psychological programming 
and support groups that specifically address dating and intimate rela-
tionships.  Finally, hate crimes can affect the day-to-day experience of 
people with disabilities, as well as those who travel with them.  Al-
though some local jurisdictions have hate crimes laws that cover dis-
ability, most do not, and legislation to create federal hate crime protec-
tion for disability (among other categories) has been proposed but not 
yet enacted.393 
4.  Basic Accessibility. — As portrayed through the I-City and A-
City hypotheticals in Part III, the accessibility of the local community 
affects not only people with disabilities, but also those who are close to 
them.  Whether the range of public accommodations — such as restau-
rants, hotels, and theaters — meets ADA standards of accessibility de-
termines whether disabled people and their partners can enter them.  
Though many of these changes are already required by law,394 en-
forcement of Title III has been inadequate, as it depends largely upon 
private lawsuits (for which damages are unavailable) that have often 
been met with hostility by the courts.395  Public transportation must be 
accessible and also reasonably efficient, and accessible private trans-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 390 For a list of some resources and curricula for sex education in the context of disability, see, 
for example, DIMPLE KESHAV & BARBARA HUBERMAN, SEX EDUCATION FOR PHYSICALLY, 
EMOTIONALLY, AND MENTALLY CHALLENGED YOUTH 4–5 (2006), http://www. 
advocatesforyouth.org/PUBLICATIONS/frtp/challengedyouth.pdf. 
 391 For instance, the New York City neighborhood of Chelsea is home to a state-financed social 
club called the Lonely Hearts Club for people with severe mental illness.  The club operates as 
part “how to find a date” assistance and part discussion group involving “deeper meditations on 
the nature of relationships, how to find them, manage them and survive them, when merely mov-
ing through daily life can be treacherous enough.”  Sarah Kershaw, Fragile Matters of the Heart, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2008, at CY5.   
 392 For examples of such policies, and arguments in their favor, see, for example, Bagenstos, 
supra note 307; see also infra section IV.D.4, pp. 1392–93.  
 393 On the status of the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act, which would 
cover disability, race, gender, and sexual orientation, inter alia, see, for example, Human Rights 
Campaign, The Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act/Matthew Shepard Act, 
http://www.hrc.org/fighthatecrimes/legislation.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).  Local hate crimes 
laws covering disability include that of New Jersey, which has also led to a high-profile prosecu-
tion.  See, e.g., Mark Sherry, Hate Crimes Against People with Disabilities (Jan. 2000) (unpub-
lished paper, University of Queensland), available at http://www.wwda.org.au/hate.htm. 
 394 See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2000); 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.101–.104 
(2008). 
 395 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case 
of “Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2006). 
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portation, such as taxis and airport shuttles, is crucial to enabling dat-
ing and other intimate relationships.396  Accessibility is important 
across domains of life, from housing to employment to education to 
health care to public spaces to government buildings, both for the in-
dividuals with disabilities who require it and for those who accompany 
them, disabled or nondisabled.  For starters, if the courthouse is not 
accessible, it is hard to get married in it.397 
5.  The Architecture of Intimacy. — Viewing these proposed 
changes through an intimacy lens also forces us to consider the way we 
integrate.  Does the structure of integration merely allow everyone to 
be in the same building, or does it permit or even encourage any kind 
of closeness?  For example, it is useful for restaurants to provide ramps 
and wide enough aisles for patrons in wheelchairs to enter the space; 
that is progress.  And the ADA requires that public accommodations 
not segregate disabled patrons into separate eating areas.398  But inti-
macy requires more.  The design of tables determines whether those 
patrons who come with their own chairs can sit near to others at the 
table.  For instance, if tables are too short, or are supported by legs 
with a wide base, wheelchairs cannot pull fully up to the table, leaving 
diners at an awkward and impersonal distance.  This is one very spe-
cific example of a broader inquiry into what we might call the archi-
tecture of intimacy.     
Other examples of the architecture of intimacy are potentially as 
varied as disabilities.  For instance, both cross- and within-disability 
intimacy could be enhanced by wider availability of instruction in sign 
language.  Communicating directly with another, rather than through 
an interpreter, allows for a different kind of fluidity and proximity.399  
State universities could increase fluency in American Sign Language 
(ASL) by permitting students to count ASL courses towards language 
requirements, as a limited number of universities currently do.400  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 396 See SHAKESPEARE, GILLESPIE-SELLS & DAVIES, supra note 73, at 29–30; Rembis, supra 
note 79, at 4–5; Dikaios Sakellariou, If Not the Disability, Then What? Barriers to Reclaiming 
Sexuality Following Spinal Cord Injury, 24 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 101, 107 (2006); cf. 
Howland & Rintala, supra note 343, at 55–56. 
 397 Cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532–34 (2004). 
 398 28 C.F.R. ch. 1, pt. 36, app. A, § 5.4 (1994).  
 399 Of course, indirect contact can also involve its own particular forms of intimacy; think here 
of email, among other media.  See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1150 
(2000).  But the option of employing either direct or indirect communication would seem to ex-
pand the possibilities.  In addition, in the context of sign language, communicating with an inter-
preter also allows intimacy with an interpreter, but more people knowing sign language might 
also lead to more frequent employment of interpreters for lectures and other events.  
 400 See, e.g., Indiana University, Degree Requirements, http://www.indiana.edu/~bulletin/iub/ 
coas/2006-2008/degree.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (citing Indiana University’s policy to this 
effect); The University of Chicago, Language Competence Requirement, http://www. 
college.uchicago.edu/academics/language.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (same).  But see, e.g., 
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Wider availability of services in movie theaters that provide audio de-
scriptions of what is onscreen would not only enable solo blind movie-
goers, but would also allow blind moviegoers to go to the movies to-
gether, and allow blind and sighted moviegoers to watch a movie 
without the sighted watcher distracting himself and others by describ-
ing the movie to his blind companion as it goes along.401  (Of course, if 
the descriptions are sufficiently elegant and well-timed, then sighted 
moviegoers might benefit from them as well, further enhancing the 
mutuality of the experience.402) 
In addition to making intimacy more possible in accessible spaces, 
the architecture of intimacy includes making intimate spaces more ac-
cessible.  For instance, there could be public support or regulation to 
make private homes accessible — what has come to be known as “visi-
tability.”403  Intimate affiliations are deeply affected by who can enter 
another’s home.404  The visitability movement therefore promotes 
home construction that enables people who use walkers or wheel-
chairs, or otherwise have trouble with steps, to visit or to live in those 
homes.405  Visitability has three basic requirements: one entrance with 
no steps, doorways at least thirty-two inches wide, and one main floor 
bathroom that someone in a wheelchair can enter.406  Though the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
UCLA, UCLA General Catalog 2008–09, http://www.registrar.ucla.edu/catalog/catalog08-09-
41.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (indicating that UCLA’s foreign language requirement does  
not count ASL); CU Sign, CU Sign’s New Initiative, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sign/ 
new_initiative.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (stating that Columbia University does not cur-
rently permit ASL to satisfy the language requirement).  
 401 The arrangement of seats in movie theaters, and other performance spaces, provides an-
other example: seating should be arranged so that those requiring accommodations, such as those 
in wheelchairs who require space without seats, can be spread out in the theater, sitting among 
companions who are not in wheelchairs, or gathered together, sitting among companions who are 
also in wheelchairs.  
 402 Cf. Emens, supra note 259, at 917 n.223; id. passim (discussing the third-party benefits of 
many accommodations, depending on how they are designed, including an example of different 
film descriptions that either interfered with or enhanced the experience for all). 
 403 See, e.g., Visitability, http://www.visitability.org (last visited Feb. 8, 2009); accord JORDANA 
L. MAISEL ET AL., INCREASING HOME ACCESS: DESIGNING FOR VISITABILITY (2008), 
available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/2008_14_access.pdf.  
 404 Cf. supra pp. 1370–71 (portraying the role of visitability in the ease of the dating scenarios 
in the two hypotheticals). 
 405 The visitability movement targets new housing not covered by existing laws that mandate 
more stringent measures of accessibility, especially new single-family homes.  See MAISEL ET AL., 
supra note 403, at 9.  The Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151–4157 (2000), and 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 29 U.S.C.), require five percent of the housing constructed using public funds to have 
accessible units.  The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 note (2000), re-
quires all new multifamily dwellings, public and private, to be accessible.  The standards for ac-
cessibility are more extensive than those for visitability.  MAISEL ET AL., supra note 403, at 6–8.  
 406 See MAISEL ET AL., supra note 403, at 9; REHABILITATION ENGINEERING RESEARCH 
CENTER ON UNIVERSAL DESIGN, VISITABILITY 1, http://www.ap.buffalo.edu/idea/ 
visitability/Booklet/VisBk%20Ver3-7-03.pdf; Visitability, http://www.visitability.org (last visited 
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movement is still in its early stages, a number of jurisdictions have 
passed visitability initiatives, often through advocacy efforts focused 
on both aging and disability; as of December 2007, fifty-seven such ini-
tiatives had been passed at the state or local level.407  Some of these 
are mandatory for all new homes,408 including one in Pima County, 
Arizona, that survived a state constitutional challenge brought by ag-
grieved builders under the privacy and equal protection provisions of 
the state constitution.409 
Visitability can also be promoted through tax credits and require-
ments for public housing contracts.410  For instance, Virginia provides 
a tax credit of up to $500 for making private homes visitable (and, in 
an unusual move, uses the word “visitability” in the statute).411  Geor-
gia restricts contracts for new public housing to applications that meet 
some visitability requirements, unless such construction will be “unrea-
sonably expensive,” a type of cost-cap measure common to these initia-
tives.412  Most of the current visitability legislation concerns new con-
struction, rather than retrofitting (which is sometimes costly), though 
Virginia provides its tax credit for either retrofitting or new construc-
tion.413  These initiatives often conform to only one or two, but not all 
three, requirements of visitability.414  A bill introduced in Congress in 
2002 (and again in 2003, 2005, and 2007) — the Inclusive Home De-
sign Act415 — would require all new single-family homes constructed 
with federal financial assistance to meet all three visitability require-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Feb. 8, 2009).  The bathroom can be a “half bath,” that is, with only a toilet and a sink.  MAISEL 
ET AL., supra note 403, at 1. 
 407 See MAISEL ET AL., supra note 403, at 21. 
 408 See, e.g., id. at 12; Jodi Wilgoren, Wheelchair Users Achieve Milestone in 2 Ordinances, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at A20; RERC on Universal Design at Buffalo, http://www. 
ap.buffalo.edu/idea/visitability/reports/existingcitylaws.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).  
 409 Washburn v. Pima County, 81 P.3d 1030, 1039–40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the cost 
of compliance is likely to be $100 (presumably per home), “substantially less” than the cost of later 
retrofitting, and less than the $200 cost cap, above which the county may waive the requirement).  
The Arizona Supreme Court denied review.  See MAISEL ET AL., supra note 403, at 66. 
 410 A recent study estimates, however, that the mandatory initiatives have led to far more visi-
table houses being built.  MAISEL ET AL., supra note 403, at 21–22. 
 411 See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-339.7 (2004).  
 412 GA. CODE ANN. § 8-3-172 (2004).  Michigan law requires, as of 2007, that 50% of new fam-
ily construction that receives state funding will be accessible.  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 125.2813 
(2007).  The Michigan law, like many of these regulations, speaks just of accessibility, without any 
particular attention to visitability.  Requirements that enable disabled people to live in, and not 
just visit, newly constructed homes are of course most valuable, beyond the idea of visitability.   
 413 VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-339.7. 
 414 See, e.g., 20 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2907 (2005) (imposing requirements on new construc-
tion — other than by the owner — but failing to mention the width of bathroom entrances). 
 415 H.R. 4202, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1441, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2353, 108th Cong. 
(2003); H.R. 5683, 107th Cong. (2002). 
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ments.416  Promoting visitability’s requirements, whether through 
regulation or subsidy, could vastly alter the potential for various forms 
of intimacy for people with mobility impairments.417  Both forms of 
the architecture of intimacy — making accessible spaces intimate and 
making intimate spaces accessible — are important reforms to counter 
the norm of desexualization for people with disabilities. 
6.  State Expression. — Important work in the arts and popular 
culture has helped to encourage recognition of the diverse sexualities of 
disabled people and challenge the myth of desexualization.  Much 
work remains to be done, however, and funding is scarce.  Arts fund-
ing, as one example of state expression, could help to counter stigma-
tizing and misleading norms in this area. 
E.  Race: Unburdening Existing Relationships 
Those lawmakers and bureaucrats who have overseen the incom-
plete project of desegregation have been well aware of the homogamy 
norm and, more pointedly, of fears of miscegenation.  As the author of 
this Part’s epigraph warned in 1860, “Do[ing] away with the social and 
political distinctions now existing . . . [will] turn all blacks and mulat-
toes into citizens, co-governors, and acquaintances . . . [and thus into] 
friends, husbands, and wives.”418  This history should be an additional 
reason we look closely at social patterns that we claim are now just 
free choice; if we still are not comfortable with interracial relation-
ships, then we may still be making policy that, on some level, reflects 
those fears. 
1.  The Best Policy for Race. — Structural subordination on the ba-
sis of race has received much attention for its material conse-
quences.419  The intimate consequences should concern us here as well.  
Given that the historical progress of desegregation was haunted by 
fears of miscegenation,420 we might expect lingering fears in this area 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 416 See MAISEL ET AL., supra note 403, at 7 (discussing H.R. 4202, (re)introduced by Rep. Jan 
Schakowsky (D-Ill.) on November 15, 2007).        
 417 In addition, all of the work I have seen on visitability focuses, somewhat surprisingly, only 
on facilitating wheelchair access, without regard to other kinds of disabilities.       
 418 See supra p. 1379 (emphasis omitted).  
 419 See, e.g., CASHIN, supra note 335, at xix (“[U]nless and until we complete the unfinished 
business of the civil rights movement, meaningfully integrating our public and private realms in a 
way that gives all Americans, especially those who have been most marginalized, real choices and 
opportunities, we will not solve the conundrum of race and class inequality in America.”); ME-
NENDIAN ET AL., supra note 322, at 9 (“[A] combination of public and private racial discrimina-
tion has produced entrenched patterns of residential segregation and resources disparities that 
exist today.”). 
 420 See, e.g., Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 213, 243 (1991) (discussing the Court’s evasion of the antimiscegenation law case of Naim 
v. Naim for fear that it could “thwart[] or seriously handicap[] the enforcement of [our] decision in 
the segregation cases,” as Justice Frankfurter put it to the Court in a memorandum read at con-
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to continue to limit the possibilities for racial justice.  Until we are 
able to talk about intimate discrimination, in its richness and complex-
ity, as well as its link to the bleaker side of race relations, we may not 
be able to talk effectively about housing and schools and a range of 
other, more apparently material, domains.  We should therefore think 
carefully about the ways the state structures who meets whom, and 
what influences the decisions of law and policy that determine those 
structures. 
We might go further.  We might say that the state should be con-
cerned about the low rates of interracial marriage, in light of the 
state’s formal and informal contribution to preferences and choices 
that must in part be endogenous to the institutional and legal regimes 
of the society.  Perhaps the state’s involvement in who meets whom, 
and who comes close to whom, should be the focus of explicit, targeted 
intervention.  Perhaps intimate discrimination should be offered as the 
reason for the structural interventions that others have been arguing 
are needed for a range of social and economic reasons, and maybe we 
should take further affirmative steps in the name of intimate integra-
tion.421  Or perhaps the state should engage in affirmative expression 
— through stamps or public art — to encourage interracial relation-
ships.  The idea of promoting interracial relationships to counteract 
the past is an interesting idea, but one that I think goes too far, for the 
reasons that follow. 
To center state policy on the goal of encouraging interracial rela-
tionships — even if intended as a remedial effort in response to a his-
tory of explicit state efforts to prevent such relationships — would not 
only run into possible constitutional difficulties, it would probably be 
the wrong policy decision, for two reasons.  First, reasonable minds 
can disagree about whether intimate differentiation — at the individ-
ual level — is bad, neutral, or even good.  As discussed in Part II, 
some people, especially members of subordinated groups, may wish to 
pair inside their community, to resist assimilation and form supportive 
intimate communities.  In addition, any number of reasons might 
frame people’s choice of mate, political or otherwise, and so for the 
state to try to encourage individuals in one direction or another seems 
hard to justify.422  One might ask why disability warrants more ex-
plicit interventions targeting the formation of relationships.  Different 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ference on Nov. 4, 1955 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Dennis J. Hutchinson, Una-
nimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948–1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 95–
96 (1979) (reprinting the memorandum).   
 421 I read Rachel Moran to advise this approach, recommending “[z]oning policy, home loan 
programs, integration of schools, and affirmative action in workplaces” to “expand the range of 
options that individuals can consider.”  MORAN, supra note 23, at 194. 
 422 See supra Part II, pp. 1339–66. 
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treatment is justified because the norm with disability is one of isola-
tion and exclusion — not pressure toward one group rather than an-
other423 — so efforts to encourage intimate possibilities for disabled 
people lack a counterclaimant.424  Remember that the efforts in the 
disability arena do not aim to encourage cross-ability relationships in 
particular; rather, they aim to support possibilities for disabled people 
to pair together or to pair with others without disabilities.  Second, 
and simply, policies to encourage interracial relationships are likely to 
rankle, rather than persuade, as they sound like social engineering, 
possibly against individual or community wishes, in a highly personal 
realm.    
2.  What To Do: Lifting Material Burdens by Eliminating Housing 
Discrimination. — The better approach would aim to lift social bur-
dens on existing interracial relationships.  Much of the impact of such 
an effort would be on the enforcement side; that is, as with some of the 
disability proposals, relevant law is on the books in several areas, but 
it is not adequately enforced.425  The most obvious such area for race 
would be in housing.426  Housing discrimination is still rampant; in-
deed, interracial couples likely see more of it and more dramatically, 
since they are built-in testers.427  Studies using pairs of black and 
white testers continue to reveal substantial amounts of racial steering 
in the housing market.  An administration committed to racial equal-
ity, but also one committed to unburdening interracial relationships, 
would put meaningful resources into enforcing the Fair Housing 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 423 There are some historical counterexamples, however; for instance, Alexander Graham Bell 
was an outspoken opponent of deaf people marrying other deaf people, since he so favored assimi-
lation.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS C. BAYNTON ET AL., THROUGH DEAF EYES: A PHOTOGRAPHIC 
HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN COMMUNITY 71, 74 (2007).  But the broader norm has been one of 
desexualization and exclusion per se. 
 424 Of course only consensual relationships are encouraged; as discussed earlier, though fears of 
abuse may contribute to desexualization, I think we should be more concerned that desexualiza-
tion compounds the risk of abuse.  See supra p. 1390. 
 425 E.g., Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing Title VII’s protections 
against associational discrimination in employment).   
 426 Other relevant areas include, for example, education, which may affect the children of inter-
racial couples at the primary and secondary school levels, and may affect young couples at the 
post-secondary levels.  But the prospect of school integration has been made increasingly difficult, 
particularly outside of elite educational contexts with extensive resources to devote to individual-
ized admissions processes.  See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 
(2003); Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937 (2008); see also LANI 
GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING 
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002).       
 427 See, e.g., CASHIN, supra note 335, at 32–34 & passim; Cynthia L. Estlund, Working To-
gether: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 14–16 (2000); see also Chito 
Childs, supra note 169, at 2772–73.   
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Act.428  The housing-related burdens on interracial couples are also 
broader than specific instances of housing discrimination.  Interracial 
couples bear a particularly heavy burden from the lack of meaning-
fully integrated neighborhoods, as it makes it nearly impossible for 
such couples to find communities in which they — and any children 
they may have — can settle amidst mutual communities of origin.429  
Preventing discrimination from interfering with individual choices of 
where to live is the tool described above as allowing access; working to 
eliminate housing discrimination in ways that lead to integrated 
neighborhoods that are comfortable spaces for interracial couples 
sounds also in the architecture of intimacy.430 
Residential segregation is much more than a function of private 
preferences; as twentieth-century historians have documented, gov-
ernment agents at all levels determined the patterns of racial distribu-
tion and home ownership through practices such as redlining.431  Im-
portant work is underway to determine the best policy routes to 
integrating our communities, in the interests of racial and economic 
justice and in an effort to undo the twentieth-century history of state-
sponsored housing segregation;432 lifting the burdens on interracial 
couples is yet another reason for such efforts.  Of course, greater inte-
gration may also facilitate new relationships across race.433  But the 
policy justification for them, to the extent that it implicates intimate 
relationships, should center upon unburdening existing relationships.    
3.  Lifting Expressive Burdens. — The state’s expressive burdens 
on existing interracial relationships should also be eliminated.  As one 
small but striking example, marriage license applications in various ju-
risdictions continue to request each party’s race, even though this in-
formation should no longer have any effect on a couple’s ability to 
marry.434  Some jurisdictions request this information in an apologetic 
way at the bottom of the form, headlined by a note that it is being 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 428 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000). 
 429 See, e.g., CASHIN, supra note 335, at 41–43 (presenting evidence of the scarcity of integrated 
neighborhoods, under multiple definitions). 
 430 See supra section IV.B.4–5, pp. 1386–87. 
 431 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 335. 
 432 See, e.g., CASHIN, supra note 335; MENENDIAN ET AL., supra note 322; Powell, supra note 
232; Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Dismantling the Segregated State (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Harvard Law School Library).   
 433 This would be particularly true if one extended the interventions to those structural features 
of society that indirectly affect interracial relationships — like the ongoing fact of racial animus.  
Differing experiences and understandings of racism can create a heavy burden for interracial cou-
ples.  See sources cited supra note 294.  Increased interracial contact and public education about 
racism, to name two examples, would presumably be among the best ways to remove these bur-
dens on communication and mutual understanding, see supra p. 1378; these would also likely 
pave the way for more interracial friendships as well as romantic relationships.   
 434 See Emens, supra note 342, at 846–47. 
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used only for data collection purposes.  But Mobile County, Alabama, 
for instance, asks for race on the very first line of the application.435  
This presumably links to a history of various Southern jurisdictions’ 
filing white and black marriages separately.436  This kind of framing of 
individual decisions should stop, due to the signals it sends inside and 
outside the state’s bureaucracy.437  But unlike matters incidental to 
marriage — like the names the parties choose to keep or adopt on 
marriage, which may be decided by some parties at or after the mo-
ment of state filing438 — the decision of who to marry is surely already 
decided by everyone who shows up to complete a marriage license ap-
plication.  Thus, the purpose of altering questions about race on the 
marriage license application is not to change a decisional frame in or-
der to affect behavior.439  This is consistent with the Article’s proposal 
that the state’s approach to intimate discrimination in the context of 
race should be to unburden existing interracial relationships, not to en-
courage the formation of new ones.  Race should be removed from the 
first line of a marriage license application because its implication is of-
fensive — because of its expressive message — but not because it will 
change individual choices about intimate discrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
Analyzing the problem of intimate discrimination has shown that 
regulatory intervention is appropriate at the structural, but not the in-
dividual, level.  Sources from law and psychology, sociology, econom-
ics, and literature demonstrate that discrimination at the level of indi-
vidual preferences and interactions may be troubling, but it may also 
be affirming or neutral, depending on context and rationale.  State in-
volvement with individual intimate preferences would also impede 
personal autonomy.  It would be woefully misguided to regulate indi-
vidual intimate preferences in the same way that we regulate employ-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 435 Mobile County, Alabama, Marriage License Application, available at http://www. 
mobilecounty.org/probatecourt/frame-marriagelicense.htm. 
 436 See, e.g., Alabama County Still Files Marriage Records by Race, WASH. POST, July 21, 
1991, at A16 (“A century-old custom of recording marriages by race in books marked ‘white’ and 
‘colored’ is still practiced in rural Chambers County. . . . ‘The county was organized in 1832, and 
it’s been handled that way all the time up to today,’ said Emerson W. Thompson, probate judge 
since 1983.  ‘What’s wrong with it?’”).   
 437 By contrast to Mobile’s approach, the more neutral, even apologetic, framing of questions 
about race, of the sort mentioned just above, is a more appropriate way to collect data on race 
that may be useful to public deliberation and antisubordination efforts of various sorts.  See, e.g., 
AMER. SOCIOLOGICAL ASS’N, THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTING DATA AND DOING SO-
CIAL SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ON RACE (2003), available at http://www2.asanet.org/media/ 
asa_race_statement.pdf. 
 438 See generally Emens, supra note 342. 
 439 Cf. supra note 340 (citing sources on decision science). 
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ment preferences.  Nonetheless, self-interrogation about one’s intimate 
preferences could usefully inform ethical choices in this domain.  Con-
sidering the possibility of such an inquiry has shown us a productive 
dynamic between law and critical inquiry: applying the legal frame-
work of functionalism proves a useful way to think about intimate dis-
crimination in a personal, ethical sense, and pushing the legal frame-
work through this psychological lens provides fresh insight on the 
value of the legal framework as an interpretive tool for challenging 
stereotypes. 
Important norms in the intimate domain frame our choices: for 
race, homogamy; for sex, heterogamy; for disability, desexualization.  
Society punishes those who violate these norms, but the norms can 
also harm those who do not violate them, in particular, those people 
with disabilities who may never have the chance to violate these norms 
because they are relatively excluded from the dating markets.  More-
over, hierarchies in the markets for sex and marriage have significant 
consequences for welfare — affecting longevity, health, and happiness 
— and for the problem of discrimination more broadly.  Intimate 
norms also seep into the employment domain, where assumptions from 
the intimate sphere hinder courts’ ability to recognize discrimination 
where it occurs. 
We have also seen how the state shapes the accidents and calcula-
tions of sex and love.  Even when seemingly uninvolved in intimate 
discrimination, the state creates infrastructure and influences hierar-
chies in ways that determine whom we meet (accidents) and how we 
view those we meet (calculations).  And here, unlike in the individual 
domain, the state should take action.  Most obviously, the state should 
complete the process of removing itself from express restrictions on 
who can pair with whom in the domain of sex.  The state should also 
work to overcome the desexualization norm for disabled people by, in-
ter alia, not only fulfilling the promise of the ADA to provide adequate 
accessibility, but also reconsidering accessibility through the novel 
frame of the architecture of intimacy.  The architecture of intimacy en-
compasses both making accessible spaces intimate and making inti-
mate spaces accessible.  The former refers to enabling disabled people 
to do more than simply enter spaces, by enabling them also to be close 
to those they might meet, date, and love.  The latter refers to the visi-
tability movement, which aims to make new private home construc-
tion accessible, at least minimally, so that disabled people can be wel-
comed into the homes of their friends, their lovers, and the friends and 
families of those they love. 
Moreover, studying intimate discrimination in the context of race 
reveals the burdens that state policy places on existing interracial rela-
tionships, thus highlighting the failures of the project of integration.  
In particular, residential housing segregation burdens interracial cou-
ples by failing to provide interracial communities where they might 
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choose to live.  Thus, the intimate lens with regard to race largely 
gives an additional reason for initiatives that seem a good idea other-
wise.  But it also helps explain why the housing problem has not yet 
been solved: the assumption that like attracts like joins with lingering 
fears of miscegenation to impede progress toward integration close to 
home.  In short, if we already know what to do, it may be helpful to 
understand why we have not done it yet.    
Finally, we have seen in the study of intimate discrimination an 
important reason for moving from the individual level to the structural 
level in antidiscrimination law.  Focusing on the individual level raises 
a whole host of problems and pitfalls that the structural level avoids.  
Moreover, focusing on the structural level can open up possibilities for 
change that are unimaginable at the individual level.  It is inconceiv-
able that punishing individuals whose intimate desires do not encom-
pass all races or ability levels or sexes will bring about an appealing 
outcome at the individual, much less the societal, level.  Yet this indi-
vidual bad-actor model is precisely what underpins the dominant un-
derstanding of our current employment discrimination regime.  In con-
trast, structural changes — from embracing the architecture of 
intimacy to lifting burdens on mixed race couples by helping to sup-
port genuinely integrated neighborhoods to changing marriage law to 
include same-sex couples — might engender larger, more substantive 
change.  Creating opportunities for human flourishing, without unduly 
burdening individual potential and autonomy, should be the core aims 
of antidiscrimination efforts.  An examination of the intimate domain 
helps us to see why a move to the structural level is crucial to that  
effort. 
